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Overview 
Australian government budgets are under pressure. Without tough 
decisions, they risk posting deficits of around 4½ per cent of GDP 
within 10 years. The problems have got worse since our first 
Budget Pressures report. We would be better off if we faced up to 
the tough problems sooner rather than later. We now need to find 
savings and tax increases of $70 billion a year. 
Over the economic cycle of boom and bust, balanced budgets are 
much better than the alternative. Persistent government deficits 
incur interest payments, and limit future borrowings, reducing 
flexibility in a crisis. They are also unfair: they require future 
taxpayers  to  pay  for  today’s  spending.   
Despite relatively favourable economic conditions, Australian 
governments will post a collective deficit of between 2-3 per cent 
of GDP this year, and will remain in deficit by 1 per cent of GDP in 
2017. Long-term spending has increased. The biggest driver was 
the sustained increase in health spending. Over the past decade 
health expenditure rose by over $40 billion in real terms. The 
ageing population was not the prime cause. Rather, people of any 
age saw doctors more often, had more tests and operations and 
took more prescription drugs. Similarly, Age Pension costs grew 
much faster than GDP, not because of population ageing, but with 
policy decisions to increase benefits and widen eligibility. 
New analysis in this edition of Budget Pressures shows that 
budget sustainability is also threatened by infrastructure spending. 
After a threefold increase in capital spending over the last 10 
years, states are paying 3 per cent more of their revenues in 
interest and depreciation. Capital recycling and public private 
partnerships may improve credit ratings, but ultimately future 
recurrent budgets must still pay for the cost of past infrastructure. 
Continued trends in health and Age Pension costs are likely to 
drag future budgets backwards by 2 per cent of GDP by 2023. 
Future budgets will also be strained by promises of substantial 
new spending on the National Disability Insurance Scheme, 
schools, and defence, costing an extra 1 per cent of GDP. In 
addition,  prices  of  Australia’s  minerals  are  likely  to  decline,  
dragging budgets another ½ percent of GDP into the red.  
What  can  responsible  leaders  do  to  bring  Australia’s  budgets  
under control? First, they must explain the size and importance of 
the problem. Second, they must design a package of measures 
that share the burden of reform fairly across the community. 
As we showed in our Balancing Budgets report, the most 
promising reforms include lifting the age of access to Age Pension 
and superannuation, tightening the Age Pension assets test, 
paying less for pharmaceuticals with expired patents and asking 
students to pay a greater share of their tertiary education. 
However, given the size of the problem, budgets can only be 
balanced by looking at both expenditure and revenue. The highest 
priority tax increases should be the withdrawal of poorly targeted 
tax concessions, particularly superannuation for the wealthy, 
capital gains discounts, and negative gearing.  
Sustainable budgets require governments to make tough choices. 
They  are  politically  difficult,  but  vital  to  Australia’s  prosperity. 
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1 The challenge for Australian government budgets 
Australian government budgets are under substantial pressure. 
They could deteriorate from a projected deficit of 1 per cent of 
GDP from 2016-17 onwards to a deficit of more than 4.5 per cent 
of GDP, or $65 billion  in  today’s  terms, by 2024. Figure 1 and the 
following text set out what these pressures are. 
Figure 1: Projected budget balance for Australian governments by 
2024 given plausible scenarios 
Per cent of GDP 
 
Source: Grattan analysis. See Supporting Analysis p44 for details. 
1. A series of long-run commitments with significant increases in 
spending beyond the forward estimates (National Disability 
Insurance Scheme and defence spending, for example) could 
easily increase expenses by 1 to 1.5 per cent of GDP.  
2. Health expenses are likely to increase by 1.5 to 2 per cent of 
GDP as their growth over the last decade continues. The 
prime cause is not an ageing population, as many believe, but 
the increase in the scope and volume of health services.  
3. Additional welfare payments to hold inequality at current levels 
would increase government spending by 0.5 to 2.5 per cent of 
GDP – assuming that the current tight targeting of welfare 
continues. 
4. A future fall in minerals prices, and thus the terms of trade, 
may reduce revenue by 0.5 to 2 per cent of GDP. 
Some of these issues are already playing out. The 2013-14 Mid-
Year Economic Financial Outlook (MYEFO) lowered budget 
outcomes and forecasts for 2013-14 relative to the 2012-13 
budget by approximately 3 per cent of GDP,1 reflecting many of 
the points discussed above. 
 
                                            
1 Commonwealth of Australia (2013) 
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Our forecast is more pessimistic than the long-term projections in 
the Pre-Election Financial Outlook (PEFO).2 PEFO assumes that 
at least one of revenue or spending will be controlled more tightly. 
They also do not include the effect of rising pressures on State 
budgets. 
In the remainder of this paper: 
x Chapter 2 explains why continued budget deficits are a 
problem; 
x Chapter 3 provides an overview of Australian government 
budgets; 
x Chapter 4 describes expenditure pressures over the last 
decade; 
x Chapter 5 describes increasing revenue pressures over the 
last decade; 
x Chapter 6 describes capital expenditure trends and 
pressures; 
x Chapter 7 describes future pressures on the budget;  
x Chapter 8 describes potential solutions for balancing 
Australian budgets. 
x Chapter 9 presents  a  ‘bluffer’s  guide  to  budgets’  that  explains  
the terminology used in budget discussions and this paper. 
                                            
2 Treasury (2013c), Chart F2, p.61 
A  ‘Supporting  analysis’  volume,  available  from  Grattan  Institute’s  
website at www.grattan.edu.au, presents more detailed analysis 
of Commonwealth and state budgets, as well as details of the 
methodology of this report. 
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2 The value of balanced budgets  
Over the economic cycle of boom and bust, balanced budgets are 
much better than the alternative. Persistent government deficits 
incur interest payments, and limit future borrowings. As a result 
they can unfairly shift costs between generations, and reduce 
flexibility in a crisis. Yet in good times it is hard for governments to 
run a surplus. They are invariably tempted to spend money. Many 
voters prefer outcomes with no identifiable losers.  
Australia has escaped these problems, repairing its debt position 
over the 2000s, supported by public attitudes that were more 
averse to debt than those in most other countries. However, there 
are concerns that Australian attitudes are softening. 
2.1 Balance over the economic cycle 
Balanced budgets over the economic cycle make a big difference. 
Persistent large deficits make both the old and the young 
vulnerable: the old risk the security of their pensions and health 
care; the young bear an increased tax burden in the future to pay 
for past spending. Persistent large deficits lead to high 
government debt that can reduce flexibility in a crisis.3 Some 
argue that high government debt can reduce long-run economic 
growth – although this claim is contested.4  
Persistent deficits undermine the security of people, such as 
retirees, who depend on government. High government debt may 
                                            
3 Kotlikoff (1984) 
4Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), but see the debate summarised in Economist 
(2010) and Herndon, et al. (2013) 
lead to governments being forced to cut spending dramatically in 
a crisis. It is almost inevitable that such cuts will hit the vulnerable 
hard as the largest categories of government spending are 
welfare (22 per cent) and health (19 per cent), and dominated by 
spending on older people. 
Perhaps the most important argument for budget reform is that 
deficits borrow from the future. They require future generations of 
taxpayers  to  pay  for  today’s  spending.  There  are  fundamental  
issues of intergenerational fairness if future taxpayers are forced 
to bear the burden of today’s  spending that they do not have a 
say in, nor benefit from. 
As many developed countries have rediscovered in recent years, 
high government debt coupled with low economic growth creates 
a terrible economic dilemma. If government increases spending, 
the debt gets worse, markets charge higher interest rates, and 
borrowing more becomes impossible. If government tries to 
reduce its deficit, GDP slows further, and government debt can 
rise as a proportion of GDP, making the problems worse.5 Their 
successors and financial institutions then find it difficult to borrow 
at reasonable costs, and economic growth is often slow for a long 
time.6 
How to respond to the trap of low growth and high government 
debt remains contentious. It is far better to avoid the trap in the 
                                            
5 De Grauwe and Ji (2013), Figure 5; Summers and DeLong (2012) 
6 Reinhart, et al. (2012) 
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first place. That means running balanced budgets over the 
economic cycle. 
This principle requires Australia to run substantial surpluses over 
the remainder of the current economic cycle. During the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), the Australian government aggressively 
stimulated the economy through increased spending to avoid 
unemployment. Some argue that the government should have 
instead  simply  relied  on  the  ‘automatic  stabilisers’  of  lower  tax  
collection and increased welfare payments.7  Irrespective of views 
on this question, if budgets are to balance over the cycle, then 
additional stimulus in an economic downturn must be matched by 
additional government surpluses during good times.  
It is arguable that continued deficits are sustainable if they are 
small enough to not increase government debt as a percentage of 
GDP. The burden of interest payments transferred to future 
generations can be rationalized if the debt funds productive 
investments that benefit future generations, or if economic growth 
is greater than the real interest rate.  
Yet in practice, relatively little of the increase in spending over the 
last decade paid for investments that benefit future generations. 
As Chapter  4’s  analysis shows, the big increases in spending 
were in health and the Age Pension. Most of the health budget is 
spent on older Australians. It is difficult to argue that this 
spending, while important, benefits future generations. The 
substantial increase in infrastructure spending may be more 
defensible – provided the spending was well targeted. 
                                            
7 Differing views are canvassed in McDonald and Morling (2011) 
However, even if persistent deficits to fund productive investment 
are economically optimal, they may still lead to poor outcomes in 
the long run. If  the  theory  of  “sustainable  deficits”  is  accepted,  it 
becomes easy for a government to justify excessive deficits 
because there is no clear level at which government debt is 
‘unsustainable’.  Similarly,  if  the  theory  of  “deficits  to  fund  
investments”  is  accepted,  it  becomes  easy  for  a  government  to  
justify excessive deficits because it is always hard to tell whether 
government spending is truly investing, or simply spending for 
current generations. It is also difficult to prove that the costs of 
infrastructure outweigh the benefits.  
Governments will always be tempted to use the excuse of funding 
productive investment to justify excessive deficits. Running a 
deficit enables a government to defer difficult decisions. As 
discussed  below,  political  forces  for  ‘responsible’  government  are  
the only real restraint on politically motivated spending. A deficit of 
zero – a balanced budget – may well be the only salient number 
to rally such political forces. Thus while perfect government may 
fund investments with debt, the best government in practice is 
likely to maintain a culture that champions balanced budgets to 
avoid a slide into unsustainable deficits. 
At the very least, a highly transparent and rigorous process is 
required to ensure that debt-funded investments are indeed 
productive.8 Many doubt that all of the recent investments by 
government were productive, as discussed below in Chapter 6.9. 
                                            
8 Freebairn and Corden (2013) 
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2.2 Mindsets for budget repair 
If Australian governments are serious about fixing their budgets, 
they need to make tough choices. Grattan  Institute’s  2013  report,  
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need, presents a range of 
them. 9 None are particularly appealing. Nobody likes paying 
higher taxes or receiving fewer services. But governments need to 
make these difficult choices rather than put them off for future 
governments.  We  cannot  simply  ‘grow  out  of  trouble’. We need 
structural reform.10   
Valuable lessons can be learnt from previous Australian and 
international experiences of budget repair. These experiences, 
summarised in Grattan’s  2013  Balancing budgets: Supporting 
analysis, show that to balance budgets, governments need to 
explain the problem, prioritise the large reforms, tackle both 
spending and taxation, and resist the temptation to delay.11  
2.3 Australian attitudes to budget deficits 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada are exceptions to the 
international pattern of governments predominantly repairing 
budgets in a crisis. From around 1995, in contrast to many other 
developed countries, Australia and New Zealand produced 
substantial and sustained surpluses for over a decade, reducing 
net debt rapidly, (see Figure 2).12 
                                            
9 Daley, et al. (2013a) 
10 IMF (2013), p. 10 
11 Daley, et al. (2013b), p. 51-55 
12 For a brief history, see Kamener and Tan (2012) 
The unusual performance of Australia and New Zealand may 
ultimately depend on public attitudes and education. In 2006 Ian 
Macfarlane,  then  Governor  of  Australia’s  Reserve  Bank,  
suggested that the average voter in Australia is more 
economically literate than a typical voter elsewhere. This may be 
because Australian media provide more coverage of key 
economic decisions such as Reserve Bank interest rate decisions, 
or perhaps because Australian mortgages are more likely to be on 
Figure 2: General government net debt 
per cent of potential GDP 
 
Note: IMF (2014c) does not include any US debt figures pre-2001. New Zealand figures 
were revised in 2014 and show a higher level of net debt to previous reports. 
Source: Grattan analysis of IMF (2014c) 
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a floating rate. Speaking before the GFC, Macfarlane observed 
that this economic awareness helped to produce surpluses in 
Australia,13 whereas the United States and many European 
countries were running deficits and increasing debt through the 
early 2000s. The difference cannot be explained by the additional 
boost to the Australian economy from the mining boom. From 
2003 to 2008, the US and Europe enjoyed strong economic 
growth but continued to run deficits that materially increased 
government debt, as Figure 2 shows. 
However, there are concerns that several years of budget deficits, 
and the accompanying rhetoric justifying them in Australia and 
overseas, may have eroded public aversion to deficits. Public 
concern about deficits may also be affected by promises to 
introduce specific costly programs and political attitudes projecting 
a belief in the ability of government to cure all social ills (see 
Chapter 7). 
 
                                            
13Macfarlane (2006).  
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3 The bottom line for Australian governments 
Eight years after moving into deficit during the GFC, the combined 
Commonwealth and State14 budgets are still not projected to 
return to balance. Although Commonwealth and State 
governments are currently forecasting that things will get better 
from here, with higher revenues and lower expenditures, they are 
not projecting balanced budgets until well after 2016-17. 
3.1 Combining Commonwealth and State budgets 
This paper seeks to identify the collective position of 
Commonwealth and state governments. A combined picture 
reveals the real pressures on Australian government budgets, 
which are often obscured by transfers between Commonwealth 
and state budgets.15  
3.2 Trends in the bottom line 
Australian government budget positions deteriorated over the last 
five years through the GFC, as Figure 3 shows. The deterioration 
in 2009 was not surprising: as economic growth slows, 
government budgets should generally move into deficit. As growth 
has picked up since 2009, deficits have narrowed, and are  
                                            
14 Throughout  this  paper,  we  use  ‘States’  to  include  both  States  and  Territories  of  
Australia. 
15 Throughout this paper, we use ‘transfers’ to refer to payments from the 
Commonwealth to the States. Where we present combined Commonwealth and 
State expenditures, these transfers are treated as State expenditure unless 
otherwise specified.  Welfare  transfers  are  called  ‘payments’  or  ‘benefits’  to  avoid  
confusion. Detail on the methodology for analysis of these budgets is presented 
in the Supporting Analysis volume. 
Figure 3:  Australian  governments’  historic  expenditure  and  revenue 
per cent of GDP, 2002-03 to 2016-17 
 
Note: Shows total revenue and expenditure for Commonwealth, State and Territory 
budgets. Transfers from the Commonwealth to States and Territories (e.g. GST, Specific 
Purpose Payments, and National Partnerships) have been removed from Commonwealth 
expenditure and States’  revenue  so  they  are  not  double-counted. See Supporting Analysis 
p35 for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth, State and Territory budget papers and mid-
year review papers 2002-03 to 2013-14; ABS (2013a)Table 30; ABS (2013d)Tables 231-
238 
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forecast to narrow further. But even so, government budget 
positions are not expected to balance within the forward estimates 
period (to 2016-17). Given economic conditions, they should 
probably already be in surplus (see Chapter 2). 
The collective deficit may not narrow as fast as is forecast. It 
relies on governments controlling spending growth more tightly 
and for longer than any government in Australia for the last 15 
years, as Figure 4 shows.  
The narrowing deficit also relies on continued bracket creep for 
income tax, which may not be politically sustainable as it hits 
middle income earners particularly hard.16 
3.3 Commonwealth and state trends 
Projections of budget balances have already been revised lower 
than those made only 18 months ago, primarily because the 
Commonwealth is forecasting substantially lower revenues.  
Figure 5 compares projections made by governments in their 
2012-13 budgets (released between May and August 2012) 
compared to those in their 2013-14 mid-year budget reviews 
(released between December 2013 and February 2014). The 
earlier projections show the Commonwealth and consolidated 
state budgets balancing in 2013-14, and combined state 
governments moving gradually into deficit across the forward 
estimates. The new projections show a marked deterioration in 
the Commonwealth budget balance. State projections are only 
slightly worse than previously thought.  
                                            
16 See below, Section 5.1 
Figure 4: Annual real growth in government expenditures 
5 year trailing average 
 
Note: ‘Large  states’ combine NSW, VIC, WA and QLD and in 2014 account for 
approximately 88 per cent of Gross-Domestic Product (GDP) 
Source: Treasury (2013a), Statement 10, Table 1, State and Territory Budget Papers 
(2002-03 to 2013-14) 
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The short-term  deterioration  in  the  Commonwealth  Government’s  
position is primarily due to falling revenues. The Government 
attributes this primarily to a softer economic outlook than that 
projected  in  earlier  budget  documents,  to  “legacy  issues  inherited  
from  the  former  government”,  and  to  some  changes  to  Treasury’s  
projection methodology.17 It is also driven by policy changes  
Figure 5: Budget projections from 2012-13 Budgets and 2013-14 
mid-year budget reviews 
Projected net operating balance, nominal $ bn 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth, State and Territory budget papers and mid-
year review papers 2011-12 to 2013-14 
                                            
17 Commonwealth of Australia (2013) p. 19 
proposed by the new government, including the abolition of the 
carbon price, and continuing fringe benefit tax concessions for 
company cars. Abolishing the minerals resource rent tax will 
reduce revenues, but the government intends to abolish the 
spending programs associated with the tax (such as the low 
income superannuation contribution and the Schoolkids Bonus  
Figure 6: Commonwealth and State expenditures and revenues 
per cent of GDP, 2002-03 to 2016-17 
 
Note: Revenue collected by the Commonwealth and transferred to States for expenditure 
on specified purposes is shown as Commonwealth revenue, and as State expenditure. To 
avoid double counting, it is excluded from both Commonwealth expenditure and State 
revenue. GST is treated as if it were a State revenue source. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth, State and Territory budget papers and mid-
year review papers 2002-03 to 2013-14; ABS (2013a)Table 30; ABS (2013d)Tables 231-
238; ABS (2013e). 
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payment).18 In the medium term, the GFC contributed 
substantially to deficits. Both revenue and expenditure for 
Commonwealth and States moved in the wrong direction during 
this period, as Figure 6 shows. While the economic cycle was 
responsible for many of the changes, substantial income tax cuts 
also dragged on Commonwealth revenue. With continued bracket 
creep Commonwealth revenue is rebounding, however, and is 
now only 0.5 per cent of GDP below pre-crisis levels. 
The long-term deterioration in budget balances is a result both of 
the Commonwealth spending more, and collecting less revenue, 
as a percentage of GDP. Even with the GFC long over, 
Commonwealth expenditure remains 1 per cent of GDP higher 
than it was in 2003, while revenue is 1.5 per cent lower. 
This analysis is based on a consistent treatment of transfers 
between the Commonwealth and States as being part of state 
expenditure. The analysis is also based on a consistent treatment 
of GST. The Commonwealth collects GST, and includes it in its 
revenues, but transfers all proceeds to the States. States bear the 
consequences if GST revenues are higher or lower than 
expected. To reveal the underlying picture, we treat the GST as 
part of state rather than Commonwealth revenue.  
                                            
18 Ibid. p. 274. The budget impact of policy choices of the Liberal-National 
government is further discussed in section 7.3 and Box 6 in section 8.1 
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4 Expenditure trends 
4.1 Overall expenditure trends 
Health, welfare, education, defence, and 
infrastructure account for two-thirds of 
Australian government spending, as 
Figure 7 shows.  
The three largest individual lines of 
spending are on old age pensions, 
hospitals and schools. Collectively, 
these amount to 8 per cent of GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: NFS = not further specified. ‘Other’  comprises  all  
other expenditure not elsewhere included, including 
employment, legal, immigration and customs, arts and 
sport, housing, communications, emergency services, 
superannuation and water. See Supporting Analysis 
p35 for further notes, including category definitions. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State 
budget papers 2013-14 and PBO (n.d.-a) 
Figure 7:  Australian  governments’  combined  expenditures 
Per cent of total, 2013-14 budget 
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Figure 8: Change in Australian  governments’  expenditure   
Real change in expenditure, $2013 bn, 2002-03 to 2013-14 
 
Notes:  ‘Other’  comprises  all  expenditure  not  elsewhere  included.  ‘Social  services’ 
comprises ageing and aged care services, disability services, and community services. 
‘Govt  &  econ’  comprises government operations and economy and finance. ‘Other’ 
comprises all expenditure not elsewhere included. See Supporting Analysis p35 for further 
notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2013-14; ABS (2014c); ABS (2014b); PBO (n.d.-a) 
Expenditures remain 1 per cent of GDP higher than before the 
GFC. The main cause is health expenditure, which is eating into 
government budgets. Growth in health spending above GDP over 
the past 11 years was greater than the growth above GDP of all 
other spending combined, as Figure 8 shows. Hospital spending 
increased above GDP more than any other individual category.19 
Infrastructure transport and planning expenditure also grew 
materially over the last decade. This includes the impact of higher 
depreciation charges as a result of increased state capital 
expenditure, primarily on transport infrastructure, as discussed in 
Chapter 6.  
Some welfare expenditures, particularly the Age Pension and 
Carer’s  Pension  also grew faster than GDP, but the overall 
welfare category grew much less due to the aggregate reduction 
in payments to working age people, including Newstart, Parenting 
Payment and Youth Allowance.  
Australian trends in the drivers of government expenditure are 
mirrored in other countries. In the United States, for example, 
government health spending increased by 2 per cent of GDP, and 
aged pensions by 1 per cent of GDP over the decade to 2011. 
Overall, however, government expenditure in the United States 
jumped by 5 per cent of GDP, driven by trends not matched in 
Australia such as substantially rising spending in defence (1 per 
cent), unemployment benefits (2 per cent) and jails (1 per cent).20 
This analysis is broadly consistent with the Parliamentary Budget 
Office analysis of Commonwealth Government expenditure.21 
More detail on expenditure changes by jurisdiction is presented in 
the Supporting Analysis volume.  
                                            
19 See Supporting Analysis p6. 
20 Silver (2013) 
21 PBO (2013a). There are some differences in classification, particularly of 
welfare and social services. See Supporting Analysis p35-37. 
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4.2 Commonwealth and state expenditure 
Australian governments are forecast to spend $518 billion in 
2013-14. The Commonwealth will spend the most, as Figure 9 
shows. It spends 76 per cent of its expenditure directly, mostly on 
welfare payments, defence, health services (including Medicare 
and pharmaceuticals) and education (including non-government 
schools and higher education).22  The rest is spent in 
Commonwealth grants to the states. About half of these grants, 
amounting to $52 billion in 2013-14 are untied grants, mostly GST 
revenue. States have full control over how this money is spent. 
The remaining funds – $43 billion in 2013-14 – are tied grants, 
meaning that the Commonwealth restricts how they are spent. 
Some tied grants are tightly controlled (a specified amount must 
be spent on public dental services to adults, for example), 
whereas other tied grants are looser (a specified amount must be 
spent on school education).23 As well as these tied and untied 
grants, states are forecast to directly raise $119 billion of revenue 
in 2013-14 and spend it on areas of their own choosing.24 
                                            
22 See Supporting Analysis p2 for further detail on Commonwealth expenditure. 
23 See section 9 for further details on Commonwealth-State transfers. In this 
report,  ‘tied’  grants  are  treated  as  State  expenditure. See Supporting Analysis 
p35-37 for further information.  
24 The history and constitutional underpinnings of these arrangements are 
detailed in Twomey (2014). See Supporting Analysis for further detail on State 
expenditure. 
Figure 9: Commonwealth and state expenditure 
$bn, 2013-14 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers 2013-14 
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Some states spend considerably more per person than others, as 
Figure 10 shows.25 Western Australia and Queensland spend at 
least $1,200 more per person than do New South Wales and 
Victoria. Western Australia spends more per person in almost 
every category of spending. Some of this may be due to the 
higher costs of serving regional and remote populations, but some 
is probably attributable to Western Australia being under 
considerably less revenue pressure than other states due to the 
mining boom, as Section 5.2 discusses. Queensland spends a 
much larger proportion of its budget on infrastructure, transport 
and planning than other large states do, as Section 4.6 discusses.  
                                            
25 See Supporting Analysis for further detail of expenditure by each state. 
Figure 10: State government expenditure per capita 
$’000  per  person, 2013-14 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers 2013-14; ABS (2014a) Table 4. 
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4.3 Health expenditure 
Health expenses are 19 per cent of Australian government 
expenditure, and grew by 76 per cent in real terms between 2002-
03 and 2013-14.  
Increases in health expenditures are mainly driven not by an 
ageing population, but by people of all ages seeing doctors more 
often, having more tests, treatments and operations, and taking 
more prescription drugs.26 These changing practices are costing 
more per person, as Figure 11 shows. 
If the scope of health services continues to increase at the rate of 
the last decade, health will demand an additional 2 per cent of 
GDP from government budgets between 2013 and 2023. 
Increased health expenditure appears to be having an impact. Life 
expectancy, particularly for those aged over 65, has increased 
rapidly and consistently.27 But it has come at a cost. If we want to 
continue to enjoy the benefits of increased access to 
sophisticated health services, governments will have to find a way 
to pay for them. 
                                            
26 See Productivity Commission (2013) Chapter 5.2 for an extensive discussion 
of these trends. 
27Daley, et al. (2012), p. 56 
Figure 11:  Change  in  Australian  governments’  health  expenditure 
$2012 bn, 2002-03 to 2011-12 
 
Note:  ‘Population  growth’  models  the  effect  of  the  increase  in  population  size  with  no  
change in the age structure or average per capita health expenditure. ‘Population  ageing’  
uses age-specific per capita health expenditure data (based on AIHW figures) to model the 
effect  of  changes  in  the  population  structure.  ‘Health  inflation  above  CPI’  uses  appropriate  
AIHW health price indices to model inflation in each category  of  expenditure.  ‘New,  
improved  and  more  services  per  person’  is  the  amount  of  expenditure  that  cannot  be  
explained by these three factors. This analysis uses data with slightly different definitions 
and timeframes to that shown in Figure 8, so the size of the increase does not match 
exactly. 
Source: Grattan analysis of AIHW (2012);AIHW (2012); ABS (2013a) Cat. no. 6401.0 
Tables 1 and 2; ABS (2013c) Cat. no. 3101.0 Table 59. 
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4.4 Education expenditure 
Education expenses are 13 per cent of Australian government 
expenditure, and grew by 48 per cent in real terms over the last 
decade. 
School education expenses are much larger than other areas of 
education expenditure (Figure 12). Although they grew more 
slowly in percentage terms than did other categories, they grew 
by 45 per cent in real terms over the last 11 years.28 School 
expenditure by governments in 2013-14 is $14.1 billion more in 
real terms than in 2002-03, the fourth largest increase in dollar 
terms, behind only hospitals, infrastructure, and welfare for 
seniors. Spending on government schools has been driven 
primarily by the reduction in government school class sizes, and 
by the increasing average seniority of teachers – which translates 
into higher pay.29 
School spending by governments as a percentage of GDP has 
fallen slightly. The proportion of the population that is of school 
age is smaller than it was 10 years ago. A shift of enrolments into 
non-government schools has reduced government spending on 
schools, since governments collectively pay less per student in a 
non-government school than they do in a government school.  
Higher education and research have also grown, but off a much 
smaller base. Together they will receive $5.4 billion more in real 
terms in 2013-14 than in 2002-03. Government-funded higher 
                                            
28 Data is for government expenditure only. In 2009, private expenditure was 
15.9 per cent of total expenditure on schools: see OECD (2013a) 
29 Jensen, et al. (2011) 
education student numbers grew by more than 34 per cent 
between 2002 and 2012.30 
Figure 12:  Change  in  Australian  governments’  education  
expenditure 
Real change in expenditure, $2013 bn, 2002-03 to 2013-14 
 
Note: ‘Education expenditure not further specified’ is too small to show; it comprised 
$0.3bn in 2013-14. See Supporting Analysis for further notes. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2013-14; ABS (2014c); b); PBO (n.d.-a) 
                                            
30 DIISRTE (2012); Commonwealth budget papers 2012-13; Norton (2013) 
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4.5 Welfare expenditure 
Welfare is the largest single category of government spending, 
consuming 22 per cent of expenditure. Welfare spending grew by 
34 per cent in real terms over the last decade, slower than GDP.  
Because this data only includes direct expenditure, it does not 
capture the significant support given to many Australian 
households through tax concessions on superannuation 
(discussed in Section 5.6). Much of this support goes to middle- 
and high-income households.31 If these are included, welfare 
would be a large component of the budget, and growing faster. 
The overall modest growth in welfare expenditure conceals very 
large variations between categories. The two largest categories of 
welfare – seniors and family support – grew by more than 50 per 
cent in real terms over the last 11 years, faster than real GDP, as 
Figure 13 shows.  
 
                                            
31 See Daley, et al. (2013a) pp. 32-36 
Figure 13:  Change  in  Australian  governments’  welfare expenditure 
Real change in expenditure, $2013 billion, 2002-03 to 2013-14 
 
Notes: Categories comprise welfare payments directly to the identified group, and related 
administrative spending where identifiable. ‘Families’  includes  family  tax  benefits,  child 
care  subsidies,  parental  leave,  baby  bonus  and  schoolkids  bonus.  ‘Workforce’  comprises  
payments to working-age people, including Newstart, Youth Allowance and Parenting 
Payment. See Supporting Analysis p35-40 for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2013-14; ABS (2014c); b); PBO (n.d.-a) 
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4.5.1 Welfare for seniors 
Over the same period total welfare for seniors, primarily Age 
Pension payments, grew by 61 per cent, faster than GDP. Welfare 
for seniors is now the largest component of welfare spending. Yet, 
as with health spending, demographic ageing is not the prime 
cause (Figure 14).32 Spending on older people has increased 
rapidly – despite an increasing number of people retiring with 
superannuation – as a result of deliberate policy choices to 
increase Age Pension spending. These included the Howard 
Government changes to the assets and income tests in 2006-07, 
the 2008-09 Rudd Government increase to the base pension rate, 
and the 2010-11 Gillard Government Clean Energy Supplement 
which accompanied the introduction of the carbon price. The 
growth in spending above GDP was entirely due to these 
discretionary changes. Whether they were appropriate depends 
on many factors, including whether Age Pension expenditure was 
too low in 2003. 
 
                                            
32 See also Productivity Commission (2005) and Betts (2014) 
Figure 14: Drivers of change in Age Pension expenditure 
$2013 bn, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Note:  Until September 2009, the Age Pension was indexed by CPI and benchmarked at 
25% of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE). From September 2009, it was 
indexed by the greater of CPI or the Pensioner and Beneficiary Living Cost Index (PBLCI), 
and  benchmarked  to  27.7%  of  MTAWE.  The  ‘indexation  above  CPI’  category  shows  the  
impact of using the 25% MTAWE benchmark over ten years. Change in MTAWE has been 
the highest index in 7 of the 10 years between 2002-03 and 2012-13.  ‘Demographic  
change’  is  based  on  the  increase  in  the  number  of  people  aged  65  and  over;;  this  is  an  
approximation as in 2002-03 women were eligible for the Age Pension from age 63.5. 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012a) Cat no. 6302.0 Table 10C; ABS (2013a) Cat. no. 
6401.0 Tables 1 and 2; ABS (2013b) Cat. no. 6467.0 Table 1; ABS (2013c) Cat. no. 3101.0 
Table 59; FaCS (2002); FaHCSIA (2012); Harmer (2009).  
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Welfare for seniors is relatively poorly targeted. Almost half of the 
$39 billion spent each year on the Age Pension goes to 
households with half a million dollars in net assets. Of mature-age 
households with a million dollars in net assets, about 80 per cent 
receive some welfare benefit, and on average it is more than $200 
a week, as Figure 15 shows.33 
There is widespread concern that Age Pension spending may 
become unsustainable in future decades, given the rapid recent 
rise in costs, an ageing population, and lax eligibility rules.34 The 
challenge would best be managed by increasing the Age Pension 
eligibility age, and better targeting payments towards those with 
genuine need and without significant assets, as Chapter 8 
discusses. 
On top of the Age Pension, a number of other government 
expenses and concessions are aimed at older people. The cost of 
concessions for public transport, car registration and third party 
insurance, utilities, rates, and health costs is already substantial. 
Public transport concessions are available to anyone over 60, 
irrespective of income.35 Many other concessions are available if 
any person in a household is entitled to a part pension. These 
concessions cost NSW about $1 billion in 2013-14.36 Older people 
also have access to additional welfare payments such as the 
Seniors Supplement, and benefit from substantial superannuation 
concessions and tax concessions such as the Senior Australians 
Tax Offset. Australia has the highest level of tax concessions for 
                                            
33 Daley, et al. (2013a), p. 37 
34 See, for example, Productivity Commission (2013)  
35 Seniors Card (2013) 
36 Includes concessions to health care card holders. NSW Government 2013-14 
Budget Paper 2, Appendix D  
private pensions in the OECD, and people of pension age pay 
much lower taxes than do younger people at the same level of 
gross income.37 
Figure 15: Household assets and Age Pension eligibility 
Household net wealth for mature-aged households, $m 
 
Note: ‘Mature-aged  households’  refers  to  households  in  which  the  household  reference  
person,  generally  the  ‘head’  of  the  household,  is  of  Age  Pension  age  (65  and  over) 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2011) 
                                            
37 Whiteford (2014b) 
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4.5.2 Welfare for jobseekers 
Welfare did not keep pace with GDP only because the aggregate 
cost of workforce payments such as Newstart, Youth Allowance 
and Parenting Payment fell in real terms. The unemployment rate 
fell, eligibility rules changed, and Newstart and Youth Allowance, 
which are indexed to the Consumer Price Index, did not keep 
pace with wage inflation. As a result, households whose main 
income is Newstart or jobseeker Youth Allowance have 
substantially lower disposable incomes after paying for housing: 
$305 and $242 a week, compared with $503 a week for 
households on other government payments.38 
These shifts have had substantial human impact. On any 
measure, households on Newstart and equivalent payments are 
doing it tougher than are households receiving other forms of 
welfare, as Figure 16 shows. Households in which the main 
income is Newstart or jobseeker Youth Allowance are more 
financially stressed, spend more of their income on basics, and 
are more likely to be and remain for an extended period in poverty 
than are other households.39  
The real reduction in workforce payments may be partially 
reversed in coming years. There is significant pressure to 
increase the level of Newstart given the stresses now experienced 
by Newstart households.40 Increasing Newstart by $50 a week 
would cost the budget about $2 billion, 0.1 per cent of GDP. 
                                            
38 Phillips and Nepal (2012), p. 13 
39 Ibid. 
40 See, for example, Australian Greens (2013); BCA (2013) 
Figure 16: Households experiencing hardships by main income 
source of household 
Percentage of households in category, 2009-10 
 
Note:  ‘Job  seeker  payment’  includes  Newstart  and  jobseeker  Youth  Allowance.  ‘Other  govt  
payment’  is  dominated  by  age  and  disability  pensions.  “Deprivations”  (such  as  the  inability  
to afford to invite friends for a meal once a  month)  and  “Financial  stresses”(such  being  
unable to pay electricity on time) are as defined by the ABS Household Expenditure 
Survey.  ‘Poverty”  is  defined  as  householders  whose  income  after  tax  and  welfare,  and  
paying for housing is less than 50% of the median Australian household: 
Source: Grattan analysis of Phillips and Nepal (2012). 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
>2 household 
deprivations 
>2 financial 
stressors 
>30% of income 
going to housing 
In poverty for ≥ 2 
years 
Job seeker payment Other govt payment Wages and salaries 
Budget pressures on Australian governments: 2014 edition 
Grattan Institute 2014 26 
4.5.3 Welfare for people with a disability 
In contrast to pensions for seniors, disability pensions grew at 
only about the same rate as GDP between 2002-03 and 2013-14. 
Some of this growth was the consequence of individuals switching 
from Newstart to the Disability Support Pension (DSP), which 
pays more per week, and does not have the same requirements 
to actively search for work.  
More than half the growth in DSP reflects demographic 
classification effects. The total proportion of older households on 
welfare has reduced over the last decade. However, there are 
more older households. As well, older households on welfare are 
more likely to claim DSP than Newstart, and DSP now supports 
some of the older households that would previously have received 
payments, such as mature age allowances, widows’ pensions, 
and Age Pensions for women between 60 and 65, that have now 
been phased out.41  
4.5.4 Welfare and inequality in Australia 
Overall, Australia’s  welfare  system  is  well-targeted. Welfare 
payments substantially reduce inequality of outcomes and 
opportunities. Once taxes and welfare are taken into account, 
overall inequality in Australia is a little above the OECD average, 
as Figure 17 shows. The effects of income inequality are 
mitigated  by  Australia’s  welfare  system. 
Australia’s  welfare  system  is  highly  targeted  towards  those  who  
need the most. Although the Australian government pays less to 
                                            
41 Whiteford (2011); Whiteford (2014a) 
all households than elsewhere in the OECD, it pays more to low-
income households, as Figure 18 shows. 
Australian spending on means-tested payments is almost double 
that of anywhere else in the OECD. As a result, those in the 
poorest quintile in Australia receive 12 times more in cash 
Figure 17: Household income inequality after taxes and payments 
in the OECD 
Gini coefficient, late 2000s, household disposable income 
 
Note: No Gini coefficients for income before taxes and transfers are available for Mexico. 
Figures for Chile, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland are for 2009, all others are 
for 2010. Gini coefficient based on equivalised household disposable income (after taxes 
and payments) for total population. 
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Source: OECD (2013b) 
payments than do those in the richest quintile. Across the OECD 
the poorest quintile only receives twice as much in cash 
payments, on average. The Australian tax system is also more 
redistributive than the OECD average, meaning that a greater 
proportion of the total tax take is collected from the rich than in 
comparable countries.42 
Figure 18: Redistribution of welfare payments in OECD countries 
Public payments to households as a proportion of population disposable 
income, mid-2000s 
 
                                            
42 OECD (2008), p.103-105 
Note: Incomes are equivalised. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Whiteford (2010) 
A more extensive discussion of inequality and the welfare system 
in Australia is presented in Section 7.4 of the 2013 edition of this 
report; the situation has not changed materially in the year since 
that report was published.43 
4.6 Infrastructure expenditure 
Infrastructure, transport and planning expenses are 7 per cent of 
Australian government budgets, and grew by 108 per cent in real 
terms between 2002-03 and 2013-14. States spent most of this 
money. Infrastructure, transport and planning now consume 16 
per cent of State government budgets.44  
Accounting  standards  mandate  that  “recurrent  spending”  on  
infrastructure  does  not  include  the  current  year’s  capital  
expenditure.  Instead  “recurrent  spending”  on  infrastructure 
includes the interest and depreciation costs of past capital 
expenditure. Interest and depreciation from past infrastructure 
spending are consuming an increasing proportion of state 
recurrent budgets, as Chapter 6 will show. 
As Figure 19 shows, infrastructure, transport and planning 
spending grew at least as fast as GDP in all large states. Growth 
was much faster than GDP in New South Wales and Queensland. 
A  significant  proportion  of  Queensland’s  expenditure ($4.1 billion) 
was spent by the Queensland Reconstruction Authority to repair 
                                            
43 Daley, et al. (2013), pp. 36-44. See also Whiteford (2013) 
44 The Commonwealth spends less than 1 per cent of its own-purpose 
expenditure on infrastructure, transport and planning. 
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infrastructure damaged in various natural disasters, including the 
2010-11 floods and more recent tropical cyclones. This spending 
will fall provided that the number and severity of such disasters 
declines. The increase in New South Wales appears to be a more 
general increase across all categories of infrastructure, transport 
and planning expenditure, although some may be due to New 
South Wales using a different accounting approach to funding its 
transport agencies.
Figure 19: Change  in  Australian  governments’  infrastructure, 
transport and planning expenditure, by jurisdiction 
Real change in expenditure, $2013 billion, 2002-03 to 2013-14 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2013-14; ABS (2014c); b); PBO (n.d.-a). 
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5 Revenue trends 
Australian governments are forecast to collect $497 billion in 
revenues in 2013-14, about 31 per cent of GDP. These revenues 
are dominated by income tax, company tax and the GST. 
Other taxes – including all those raised directly by the States – 
are relatively small, as Figure 20 shows. Revenues collected by 
the Commonwealth are three times larger than revenues collected 
by all the States and Territories combined. Commonwealth 
transfers make up around 45 per cent of State revenues. 
All major revenue sources dropped during the GFC. Collections 
have since recovered, apart from GST collections, which are likely 
to remain about 0.5 per cent of GDP less than the 2000-2010 
average. Government decisions to abolish carbon pricing and the 
Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) remove potential revenue 
sources, although the total amount anticipated to be collected 
from these sources was relatively small.45 
Tax expenditures – concessions to general tax provisions aimed 
at a specific policy outcome – now cost Australian governments 
more than $135 billion a year in foregone revenue.46 Although tax 
expenditures are notoriously difficult to compare across 
jurisdictions,  available  data  suggest  that  Australia’s  foregone  
revenue from these concessions is amongst the highest in the 
developed world as a percentage of GDP.47 
                                            
45 Longer-run Commonwealth revenue trends are reviewed in PBO (2014) 
46 Grattan analysis of Treasury (2014) and State government budget papers 
2013-14. 
47 Tyson (2014) 
Figure 20:  Australian  governments’  revenues 
$ bn, 2013-14 budgets 
 
Note:  Classifications are based on liability rather than incidence, so income  taxes’  are 
individual income tax, superannuation taxes and fringe  benefits  tax;;  ‘corporate  taxes’  are 
company  tax,  resource  rent  taxes  and  payroll  tax;;  ‘other  consumption  taxes’  are carbon 
pricing,  customs,  excise  and  other  sales  taxes;;  ‘other  taxes’  are mostly agricultural taxes 
for the Commonwealth, and gambling, insurance and vehicle taxes for the States;;  ‘non-tax 
revenues’  are not further specified for the Commonwealth, and are mostly dividends, 
interest, royalties and sale of goods and services for States;;  ‘property  taxes’  are mostly 
land tax and stamp duty. For Commonwealth transfers to States:  ‘untied  transfers’  are 
mostly  GST;;  ‘tied  transfers’  include Specific Purpose and National Partnership payments.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers 2013-14 
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5.1 Commonwealth revenues 
Revenues collected by the Commonwealth are forecast to amount 
to about 23.5 per cent of GDP in 2013-14. Over the 11 years to 
2014, all major Commonwealth revenue sources increased in real 
terms, as Figure 21 shows. However, they fell as a proportion of 
GDP. Corporate taxes revenues rose faster than did GDP growth, 
while income and consumption taxes rose more slowly.  
Yet this comparison conceals substantial variation from year to 
year, as Figure 22 shows. Commonwealth income and corporate 
tax dropped between 2007 and 2013 with big personal income tax 
cuts, and as the impact of the GFC flowed through the economy 
and then taxation revenues. Corporate tax revenues are forecast 
to return to close to their 2001-2010 average by 2017. Income tax 
receipts are projected to recover even more strongly, primarily 
due to bracket creep. Some have questioned whether allowing 
this level of fiscal drag is either politically feasible or economically 
desirable.48  
                                            
48 See, for example, Parkinson (2014). 
Figure 21: Change in Commonwealth government revenues 
Real change in revenue, $2013 bn, 2003 to 2014 
 
Note:  ‘Other  taxes’  is  mostly  agricultural  taxes;;  ‘other  consumption  taxes’  is  carbon  pricing,  
non-GST sales taxes, customs, and non-fuel  excises;;  ‘income  taxes’  is  individual  income  
tax, superannuation taxes and fringe benefits tax. Non-tax revenues can vary widely 
depending on asset sales. However, the change in non-tax revenue, close to GDP, 
suggests that there are not major anomalies in either 2003 or 2014. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth budget papers 2002-03 and 2013-14; ABS 
(2014c) Table 1; ABS (2014b) Table 30. 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Income
taxes
Corporate
taxes
GST Other
consumption
taxes
Non-tax
revenue
Other
taxes
Fuel
excise
Real growth
Growth if revenue a 
constant % of GDP
Budget pressures on Australian governments: 2014 edition 
Grattan Institute 2014 31 
Figure 22: Trends in major Commonwealth taxes 
per cent of GDP 
 
Note: Individual taxation receipts include individual and income tax withholding; corporate 
includes FBT, super funds, companies and resource rent taxes; indirect includes sales 
taxes, excise and customs duty, carbon price mechanism, and other.  
Source: Treasury (2013a) Budget Paper 1,Statement 5, Table C2,, Treasury (2013b) 
5.2 State revenues 
Revenues received by the States are forecast to amount to about 
14 per cent of GDP in 2013-14. Many of these revenues are 
collected by the Commonwealth and then transferred to the 
States. State governments collect little more than half of what they 
spend, as Figure 23 shows.  
Figure 23: State and Territory government revenues by source 
per cent of total, 2013-14 
 
Notes:  ‘Investment income’ includes interest income, dividends, and tax-equivalent 
payments from State entities. ‘Other own-source’ includes fines, fees, grants from entities 
other than the Commonwealth, and other revenue not elsewhere included.  ‘Other general 
purpose grants’ is mostly royalty payments to WA.  
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2013-14. 
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Figure 24: Change in State government revenues 
Real change in revenue, $2013 bn, 2003 to 2014 
 
Notes:  ‘Tied  grants’ include Specific Purpose Payments, National Partnership Payments, 
payments for on-passing to other entities, and other tied grants. ‘Taxation’  includes 
gambling, land, insurance, vehicle, payroll and stamp duties. ‘Investment’ includes interest 
income, dividends, and tax-equivalent payments from State entities.  ‘Other  own-source’  
includes fines, fees, grants from entities other than the Commonwealth, and other revenue 
not  elsewhere  included.  ‘Untied  grants’ in 2013-14 are mostly royalty payments to WA; in 
2002-03, they were mostly National Competition Policy payments and compensation 
payments for loss of revenue from State taxes abolished with the introduction of the GST 
(both have now ceased). 
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2002-03 and 2013-14; ABS (2014c) 
Table 1; ABS (2014b) Table 30. 
Over the last 11 years, State revenues from the Commonwealth 
have been under pressure. Tied transfers from the 
Commonwealth increased, but untied transfers – including GST 
revenues – shrank relative to GDP (Figure 24). The gap was filled 
by state charges and royalties growing faster than GDP.  
As Figure 25 shows, some States collect much more revenue per 
capita than do others. In 2013-14, Queensland will collect at least 
$750 more per person than New South Wales or Victoria, and 
Western Australia will collect over $2,000 more per person. More 
detail is presented in the Supporting analysis volume. 
5.3 Income taxes 
Income taxes are forecast to be 10.7 per cent of GDP in 2013-14, 
as shown in Figure 22. This is close to their long-run average from 
2000 to 2010.  
Income taxes fell by 2 per cent of GDP from a peak in 2004-05 to 
a low in 2009-10. Revenue (including falls in capital gains tax) fell 
partly as a result of the GFC. It also fell with a series of rate cuts, 
particularly steep between 2006-07 and 2008-09,49 so that income 
tax in 2010-2011 was $10 billion lower than it would have been if 
the thresholds from 2006-07 had been indexed at CPI. However, 
by 2015-16, several years of bracket creep will cancel out the 
annual impact of these tax cuts, and income tax collection will be 
the same as if the income tax brackets had simply been indexed 
at CPI from 2007-08.50 
There is a reasonable chance that Capital Gains Tax (CGT) 
receipts will increase by about 0.3 per cent of GDP over the next 
few years. CGT is collected as income, company and 
                                            
49 See PBO (2014), p.30 
50 Deloitte Access Economics (2012), p. 73 
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superannuation taxes. Collections in 2010 were at a cyclical low 
of 0.45 per cent of GDP, well below the peak of 1.48 per cent of 
GDP in 2007. However, the share market and property price 
boom of the 2000s should probably be seen as an aberration: 
over 15 years, CGT receipts averaged 0.72 per cent of GDP.51  
Figure 25: State government revenues per capita 
$2013 ’000  per  capita,  2013-14 budgets 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2013-14; ABS (2014a) Table 4. 
                                            
51 Grattan analysis of Commonwealth 2013-14 Budget Paper No.1, p. 5-10 
5.4 Corporate taxes 
Commonwealth corporate taxes are forecast to be about 5.5 per 
cent of GDP in 2013-14. The largest component is company tax 
(4.5 per cent of GDP); much of the remainder is paid by super 
funds, the carbon price, and resource rent taxes. Payroll tax 
collected by the States is a further 1.4 per cent of GDP. 
Over the last four years company tax revenues were below the 
average for 2000 to 2010, although above the low point of 2003. 
In part, economic growth and therefore corporate profits have 
been lower than before the GFC. In part company taxes are lower 
because of corporate losses during the GFC that were claimed in 
subsequent years.  
Until the 2013-14 Budget, Treasury consistently overestimated 
company tax collections by about 0.5 per cent of GDP.52 This was 
partly because mining companies paid less tax than forecasts, 
which failed to allow for accelerated depreciation on substantial 
new investments. Another explanation, based on taxation 
statistics, is that financial asset investing companies paid about 
$7 billion a year less tax after the share market crash in 2008.53 
5.5 Indirect taxes 
Indirect taxes – primarily the GST and fuel excise – dropped by 
about 1 per cent of GDP relative to the 2001-2010 average, as 
Figure 22 shows.  
                                            
52 Chessell, et al. (2012), p. xxi 
53 Joiner and Eslake (2013), p.10 
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The fall in GST was partially due to changes in household 
savings.54 In 2003, Australian households were saving less than 1 
per cent of their discretionary (post-tax) income. By 2013 they 
were much more frugal, saving almost 10 per cent of discretionary 
income, or 6.5 per cent of GDP. Figure 26 suggests this may be a 
persistent change in behaviour, driven by a combination of 
historically high debt levels that households are now looking to 
reduce, lower confidence as a result of the GFC, increased 
awareness of rising longevity and the need for additional 
retirement savings, and replacement of the wealth increase 
previously delivered by strong capital gains in housing and 
equities.55  
GST revenues also fell because consumers spent an increasing 
proportion of their income on GST-exempt items such as 
education, health, and housing in the form of rent and mortgage 
interest (see Figure 27).56 There was a further small loss of tax 
revenue as internet shopping grew, but not a material impact. As 
international online purchase sizes are small (averaging $38 
each) and falling, collecting GST on such purchases might well 
cost more than the revenue raised.57  
There is no obvious reason to expect these trends to reverse in 
the foreseeable future, particularly as the population ages: older  
 
                                            
54 The flow of household savings as calculated by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics includes contributions and net earnings, less withdrawals, for 
superannuation. 
55  Freestone, et al. (2011);  
56 See also PBO (2014) pp38-40 
57 See Daley, et al. (2013a) p52, and NAB (2013); cf EY (2012) 
Figure 26: GST revenue and household savings 
GST revenue and household savings, $2012 bn 
 
Note: Net household savings includes contributions and net earnings, less withdrawals, for 
superannuation. 
Source: ABS (2013e) Cat no. 5506.0, ABS (2013b) Cat no. 5204.0  
people spend a much higher proportion of their income on 
health.58 
Indirect taxes have also fallen relative to GDP because petrol 
excise was not indexed after 2001.59 As a result, revenue from 
fuel excises fell in real terms between 2003 and 2014, despite an 
                                            
58 Productivity Commission (2005).  
59 Treasury (2010b), section 9.3. 
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increasing population, as Figure 21 shows. If petrol excise had 
been indexed in line with inflation over the last decade, revenue 
on current volumes would be approximately $5 billion higher. The 
higher price would probably reduce consumption, so the net 
revenue foregone is probably about $3 billion.60 
Figure 27: Changes in consumer expenditure by GST liability 
Change in share of household expenditure, 2004-10, percentage points 
of expenditure 
 
Source: ABS (2006); ABS (2011) 
                                            
60 Daley, et al. (2013b). p. 28-29 
5.6 Tax expenditures 
When governments exempt certain types of transactions or 
taxpayers from an otherwise general tax, the foregone revenue is 
known as a tax expenditure. Tax expenditures are usually justified 
on the basis that they serve a particular policy objective better 
than does direct spending. Although tax expenditures are often 
less discussed than revenue or expenditure, they are a significant 
component of government budgets. 
Measuring tax expenditures is inherently difficult, and Treasury 
has not quantified almost a third of all identified tax 
expenditures.61 Nonetheless, available estimates forecast that the 
Commonwealth will forego $117 billion in tax expenditures in 
2013-14, or almost a third of revenues collected.62 As Figure 28 
shows, more than a third of this comes from superannuation tax, 
particularly the ability to contribute to superannuation funds from 
income before paying income tax, and the taxation of 
superannuation fund earnings at less than the marginal rate of 
income tax. The second-largest category is concessions for 
owner-occupied housing, particularly its exemption from capital 
                                            
61 Measuring a tax expenditure involves determining how much revenue would 
have been collected if the exemption did not exist, which requires assumptions 
about what tax rules would apply in its place as well as how taxpayers behaviour 
might then change. For example, determining how much revenue government 
would collect if owner-occupied housing were not exempt from capital gains tax 
requires assumptions about what rate would apply, as well as whether fewer 
people might choose to invest in owner-occupied housing were it not subject to 
such favourable tax treatment. For a discussion of the difficulty of estimating and 
comparing tax expenditures, and a detailed description of the method used, see 
Treasury (2014) and the relevant sections of State budget papers.  
62 Treasury notes that its estimates of tax expenditures are not strictly additive, 
introducing a further level of uncertainly to this figure. 
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gains tax. The third-largest is the exemption of fresh food, health, 
education, financial supplies and some other spending from GST.  
Figure 28: Commonwealth tax expenditures by category 
$bn, 2013-14 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Treasury (2014) 
Treasury suggests that the largest non-quantifiable expenditures 
include the ability to quarantine capital losses, as well as a 
number of company tax exemptions.63 
State tax expenditures are even more challenging to measure, 
since states use different tax benchmarks and assumptions. In 
2012-13, the four largest states estimated that they gave up 
almost $22 billion in tax exemptions,64 primarily through stamp 
duties, land and payroll tax. These exemptions are equivalent to 
20 per cent of those states’  own-source revenue. 
The best available data suggests that Australia has one of the 
largest tax expenditures in the world as a percentage of GDP.65  
This is not necessarily a bad thing; tax expenditures can achieve 
important policy aims. For example, exempting welfare payments 
from  income  tax  ensures  that  money  is  not  ‘churned’  from  
government to a recipient and returned immediately as tax. 
Nonetheless, tax expenditures are an important avenue for 
improving budgets. Chapter 8 assesses potential options for tax 
expenditure reform, including the significant fiscal benefits 
available from superannuation and GST reform. 
                                            
63 Treasury (2014) p11. These include exemptions for Commonwealth, State and 
Territory public authorities and entities; foreign branch profits; off-market share 
buy-backs; and charitable, religious, scientific, and community service entities. 
64 Grattan analysis of State budget papers 2013-14. Comparable data for 2013-
14 is not available for all jurisdictions. 
65 Tyson (2014) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Super Owner-
occupied
housing
GST Other
assets
Philan-
thropy
Welfare Other
Budget pressures on Australian governments: 2014 edition 
Grattan Institute 2014 37 
6 Capital expenditure
Capital expenditure is money spent on government-owned, fixed 
assets that provide services to the community.  
Australian governments plan to spend $21 billion on capital works 
in 2013-14. State and territory governments spend 84 per cent of 
this. Capital works are 6.1 per cent of all state and territory 
government spending in this financial year. 
Over the last decade capital expenditure has increased 
substantially, much faster than GDP. Between 2007 and 2013, 
total government capital spending was three to six times the real 
value of expenditure in 2003-2004. 
State governments tend to focus attention on their recurrent 
budget balance, which excludes capital expenditure. Yet higher 
capital expenditure matters because it increases interest and 
depreciation expenses in future recurrent budget balances. 
Interest and depreciation charges, largely a legacy of increased 
capital spending, have increased from about 6 to more than 9 per 
cent of state and territory revenue. State government recurrent 
spending to cover past infrastructure spending is consuming 
almost 0.5% of GDP more than 6 years ago. Tough policy choices 
can’t  reduce  these  charges:  they  are  locked  in  to  account  for  past  
spending. 
New assets come with operating and maintenance expenses. 
These additional costs are not easily identifiable in government 
budgets, but they inevitably put more pressure on Australian 
budgets. 
New assets can increase revenues, both through direct charging 
and by assisting economic growth that flows into higher tax 
revenues. They can also provide social benefits. However, unless 
projects are well-chosen and executed, the benefits may be less 
than the costs. Even if they exceed costs, government may not 
capture enough of the benefits to cover the costs of construction. 
Accounting for capital expenditure has obscured some of the 
underlying problems in state budgets. Unusually large 
Commonwealth grants for infrastructure have boosted state 
headline recurrent budget balances. However, the depreciation 
expenses that match that revenue will drag on future state 
recurrent budget balances for many years. 
Governments are regularly called on to spend more on 
infrastructure. If they simply maintain current levels of 
infrastructure spending, then interest and depreciation will 
consume an increasing share of their revenue in future. 
Capital recycling – selling assets and spending the proceeds on 
new assets – would reduce the debt of state and territory 
governments. But it will not improve recurrent budget balances 
unless governments strike unusually good bargains in selling 
assets.  
Similarly, increased use of public private partnerships (PPPs), 
instead of direct government borrowing for infrastructure, will not 
necessarily improve future budget balances. PPPs only 
substantially improve budgets if they generate additional revenue 
streams, such as new toll roads. 
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6.1 Trends in government capital expenditure  
States and territories spend substantial capital to build hospitals, 
schools, roads, public transport and other infrastructure.66 
Over the last 11 years capital expenditure has increased 
significantly, peaking in 2009-10  with  the  Commonwealth’s  
stimulus package (Figure 29).67 But even when stimulus 
expenditure is excluded, capital expenditure in real terms in 2013-
14 is four times higher than in 2002-03. 
The analysis presented in this report is based on Australian 
Bureau of Statistics calculations that do not capture all 
government capital expenditure.68 While this measure provides 
the most consistent comparison across Australia, it does not 
include spending that is often included in the headline capital 
expenditure of government budgets. For example, the ABS 
analysis does not include public non-financial corporations 
(PNFCs) that deliver services on behalf of government.69 These 
are often excluded from general government budgets on the basis 
                                            
66 Note that the Commonwealth Government provides funding to states and 
territories through grants to be spent on capital projects. 
67 This includes both the Building the Education Revolution (BER) and Social 
Housing Initiative under the Commonwealth  Government’s  National  Building  
Economic Stimulus Plan. 
68 This  analysis  uses  the  capital  expenditure  measure  of  ‘general  government  
net acquisition of non-financial  assets’  as  reported  by  ABS (2013d). This 
measure captures purchases of non-financial assets, less asset sales, 
depreciation and other changes such as movements in inventories. See 
Supporting Analysis p41-43 for definitions. 
69 States use different terms to refer to PNFCs. For example they are termed 
‘Public  Trading  Entities’  (PTEs)  in  New  South  Wales  and  ‘Government  Owned  
Corporations (GOCs) in Queensland. 
that their independent revenue streams will cover their costs, 
including capital expenditure.70 However, the headline capital 
expenditure in NSW does include capital expenditure in the PNFC 
sector to purchase assets directly or through finance leases, such 
as the lease of train carriages via RailCorp. 
Figure 29: State and territory capital expenditure  
General government net acquisition of non-financial assets, $2013 bn 
 
Notes: 2012-13 are estimated actuals, 2013-14 and forward estimates are budgeted 
figures 
                                            
70 Other issues in reconciling this analysis to budgets published by individual 
state governments, such as timing issues, are discussed in Supporting Analysis 
p41-43. 
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Source: ABS (2013) cat 5512, Treasury (2008), Part 2, Table 2.1, State and Territory 
budget papers 2013-14 
Box 1 – Budget classifications 
Government budgets are reported according to standard 
economic sector classifications, as defined by the ABS.71 The key 
terms are: 
General government means government departments and 
agencies that deliver public services, or act as a regulator of 
private sector activity. Examples of general government 
expenditure include education, health, and criminal justice. 
Public Non-Financial Corporations (PNFCs)72 typically deliver 
commercial services such as water, electricity and ports. They 
operate on a cost recovery basis and fund capital expenditure 
through user charges as well as borrowings.73 State governments 
may also provide general government funding to PNFCs to deliver 
services on behalf of the government. Such expenditures are 
usually included in headline capital expenditure numbers. 
Public Financial Corporations (PFCs) are arms of government 
engaged in financial activity including state central borrowing 
authorities such as Treasury corporations. 
6.2 Commonwealth capital expenditure 
The Commonwealth funds a large amount of state-based 
infrastructure such as roads, schools and hospitals. However the 
                                            
71 ABS (2014e) 
72 Also known as Public Trading Enterprises (PTEs) in New South Wales. 
73 Treasury NSW (2006) Budget Paper 4, pp. 16-17 
Commonwealth accounts for this funding as recurrent grants to 
states rather than as capital expenditure in its capital account. As 
a result,  the  Commonwealth’s  capital  expenditure  captures  only  
money spent on assets owned by the Commonwealth.  
Between 2002-03 and 2012-13 Commonwealth capital 
expenditure grew by 10 per cent a year, on average.74  
The growth significantly exceeded average GDP growth of 3 per 
cent per year. While capital investment peaked at around $7 
billion in 2009-10, it has reduced and is not forecast to grow over 
the forward estimates period (Figure 30). This may change in the 
2014-15 budget given recent defence acquisition decisions. 
Most Commonwealth Government capital expenditure is spent on 
defence assets. These include specialised military equipment 
such as aircraft, ships and building support facilities. The increase 
in defence spending over the last 10 years was largely due to 
buying weapons systems and planes, chiefly Super Hornets and 
heavy lift planes.75 Capital expenditure by other departments is 
significantly less than defence spending and includes buildings, 
infrastructure and computer software.76 
As it spends more on capital, the Commonwealth, like the states, 
will incur increasing interest and depreciation expenses. Yet the 
pressure on the Commonwealth budget will be less since the 
Commonwealth spends less on capital assets compared to states 
and territories. 
                                            
74 PBO (2013a), p. 50 
75 Growth in defence funding is consistent with a White Paper Defence 2000 
target of three per cent growth in defence spending per year: ibid. p. 38. 
76 Ibid., p. 50.  
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Figure 30: Commonwealth general government net capital 
investment 
$2013 bn 
 
Source: PBO (n.d.-b) 
6.3 Funding capital expenditure 
States could have funded capital expenditure through recurrent 
operating surpluses. However, over the last 7 years, states posted 
either recurrent deficits or small recurrent surpluses at best. 
Consequently, all states funded increased capital spending by 
running down accumulated surpluses and then borrowing and 
increasing debt. In 2006, total state and territory budgets had 
financial assets that exceeded debt liabilities by $37 billion. Today 
states have $69 billion in net debt, as Figure 31 shows. Borrowing 
by the three largest states – Queensland, Victoria and New South 
Wales – mostly drove the increase. Capital expenditure drove 
almost all the increase in debt as states collectively had close to 
zero net operating balances between 2008 and 2014. 
Although the Commonwealth Government contributed funds for 
large infrastructure projects, these were often conditional on 
states  matching  the  Commonwealth’s  funding.  Victoria’s  Regional  
Rail Link and the New  South  Wales’  Pacific  Highway  upgrade are 
examples.77 States therefore increased debt to pay their share. 
                                            
77 Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (2014b), Department 
of Infrastructure and Regional Development (2014a) 
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Figure 31: Combined state and territory net debt 
$2013 bn 
 
Note: Net debt is deposits held, advances received and borrowings, less cash, deposits, 
investments, advances paid, and investments, loans and placements: ABS (2005) 
Source: ABS (2013d), state and territory budget papers 2013-14  
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6.4 Recurrent budget impacts of capital expenditure  
From an accounting perspective, historic capital expenditure 
increases depreciation and therefore recurrent expenses in future 
budgets. If capital works are debt-funded, the increased interest 
also drags on future recurrent budgets.  
Unlike many other expenditures, depreciation charges cannot be 
reduced through a change in government policy or priorities. 
Depreciation costs are locked in for the life of the asset. Interest 
costs are locked in until debt is repaid. 
Over the last 11 years, interest and depreciation costs as a 
percentage of state revenue increased from about 6 to 9.4 per 
cent in 2013-14, as Figure 4 shows. They are estimated to 
increase slightly over the forward estimates period. Interest 
expenses have increased faster than depreciation. 
This increase is equivalent to states spending about 0.5% of GDP 
more paying for the infrastructure spending of previous years. 
Figure 32: State and territory depreciation and interest costs as a 
percentage of revenue 
Percentage of revenue 
 
Source: ABS (2013) cat 5512, State and Territory budget papers (2013-14) 
The only state that has not followed this trend is Tasmania, as 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 show. The particularly rapid increase in 
Queensland is partly due to capital works repairing damage from 
cyclones, flooding and bushfires. 
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Figure 33: Interest and depreciation costs as a percentage of 
revenue, by state  
Percentage of revenue  
 
Source: ABS (2013d), State and Territory budget papers (2013-14) 
If capital expenditure is simply maintained at current levels, 
depreciation charges may increase further. Whether this is 
happening is not clearly visible, and depends on the age profile of 
assets already being depreciated. The depreciation charges 
attributable to this profile are visible over the forward estimates. 
But beyond that period, some state government central agencies 
have no central registry of the aggregate stock of assets, their 
remaining life, or forecast depreciation costs. Instead, individual 
agencies hold these figures.  
Figure 34 Interest and depreciation costs as a percentage of 
revenue, by state 
Percentage of revenue 
 
Source: ABS (2013d), State and Territory budget papers (2013-14) 
6.5 Maintenance costs 
As well as adding to interest and depreciation expenses, new 
infrastructure also requires ongoing operational expenses and 
maintenance. Budgets typically do not provide aggregated 
reporting on maintenance. Maintenance spending can usually 
only be calculated by examining line items for each agency in 
every jurisdiction.  
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015FE 2017FE 
QLD 
NSW 
VIC 
WA 
Forecast 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015FE 2017FE 
ACT 
NT 
SA 
TAS 
Forecast 
Budget pressures on Australian governments: 2014 edition 
Grattan Institute 2014 44 
It is often possible to defer maintenance spending. Doing so 
improves recurrent budget balances but increases the amount 
that will need to be spent in future. 
Failing to maintain assets often increases total costs in the long 
run. As many home-owners have discovered, ignoring a leaky 
roof can cost a lot more than buying new tiles. If assets are badly 
run down, then recurrent maintenance will often be reclassified as 
capital works for renovations. This classification may defer the 
impact on recurrent budgets, but will then be a larger ongoing 
charge than is timely maintenance. 
A  case  study  of  Victoria’s  Department  of  Education  and Early 
Childhood Development (Box 2) shows that spending can be 
much less than industry standards for maintenance for many 
years. This creates a substantial backlog that will inevitably need 
to be spent but which is not visible in the budget papers. 
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Box 2: Maintenance  and  capital  expenditure  in  Victoria’s  Department  
of Education and Early Childhood Development  
Over a decade, spending on regular school maintenance in 
Victoria was only about 0.6 per cent of asset value, less than a 
third of the industry standard for asset management. 
As Figure 35 shows, money was allocated for maintenance both 
through recurrent school budgets, and as capital projects to 
“modernise  and  redevelop”  schools  when  buildings  had  fallen well 
behind contemporary requirements. These capital projects were a 
mixture of substantial renovations for new purposes, and catch-up 
maintenance  
In 2012, the Department undertook an audit of school buildings. It 
identified that more than 2000 buildings, or 7.5 per cent, were at 
the  point  of  ‘imminent  failure’  or  had  already  failed.  The 
Department estimated that an additional $420 million was required 
to return these buildings to appropriate condition, with more than 
half the spending classified as capital expenditure rather than 
maintenance.  
Following  the  Victorian  Auditor  General’s  report,  the  Department  is  
developing a new maintenance funding formula driven by the 
profile of stock of assets, rather than by the number of students. 
Note: The maintenance  funding  benchmark  used  by  the  Victoria  Auditor  General’s  Office  is  2  
per cent of asset stock. Victorian Auditor-General's Office (2012), p. viii 
Sources: Victorian Auditor-General's Office (2012) 
Figure 35: DEECD school maintenance expenditure 
Expenditure as a % of asset stock 
 
Note: Figures converted to $2012-13.  Asset  stock  is  ‘property,  plant  and  equipment’  Capital  
refurbishment includes modernisation, refurbishment and regeneration, minor works, 
construction of new classrooms, replacement and specific programs. Capital refurbishment is 
annual Total Estimated Expenditure (TEI) classified as Refurbishment Recurrent maintenance is 
maintenance provided to schools through SRPs and Budget and Expenditure Review 
Committee (BERC) funding) 
Source: DTF Victoria (multiple years), DEECD (multiple years) 
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6.6 Accounting impact of Commonwealth grants 
Accounting standards for Commonwealth infrastructure grants 
can make state budgets look better than they really are. 
Accounting standards require that states treat Commonwealth 
contributions as recurrent revenue. The Commonwealth treats 
these grants as recurrent expenditure, and so includes them in its 
recurrent budget balance. The states and territories treat the 
grants as recurrent income – which helps their headline recurrent 
budget balance – but when they spend the money they typically 
account for it as capital expenditure.  
This accounting trick does not immediately affect the  states’ 
headline recurrent budget balance, but it creates a drag on future 
recurrent budget balances as the asset depreciates. It increases 
both short-term recurrent revenue and long-term future recurrent 
spending. When Commonwealth grants for capital expenditure 
return to more normal levels, the underlying recurrent budget 
position of state governments will be revealed as worse than it is 
on current headline numbers.  
6.7 Capital recycling 
Capital recycling is the use of proceeds from the sale of 
government-owned assets to invest in new infrastructure. Such 
sales are claimed to free up capital for new capital works that 
would otherwise put the budget further into debt.  
Capital recycling does affect net debt positions: the amount of 
cash that governments are liable to pay bondholders. If 
governments built new infrastructure, but did not sell existing 
infrastructure, their debt levels would be higher. Debt positions  
Box 3: Capital recycling examples 
New South Wales leased Port Botany and Port Kembla to private 
operators and put the cash produced from these long-term leases 
into  NSW’s  infrastructure  fund,  Restart  NSW.78 The government 
intends to use some of this money to fund transport capital 
projects including the WestConnex project. 
The Commonwealth Government recently announced the sale of 
Medibank Private in 2014-15.79 It intends to spend the proceeds 
of the sale on infrastructure.80  
To encourage states to recycle capital, the Commonwealth 
Government announced that it will provide incentives for state and 
territory governments to sell assets. The Commonwealth will 
make incentive payments, valued at 15 per cent of the asset sale 
price, when sale proceeds are invested in infrastructure as 
opposed to paying down net debt.81 
are relevant when ratings agencies calculate credit ratings for 
state governments. These ratings affect the interest rate paid on 
state debt.  
Capital recycling usually does not markedly improve a 
government’s  recurrent  budget  balance.  If you sell an asset and 
use the funds to repay debt, then you avoid interest and operating 
expenses. However, the reduced expense is usually matched by 
reduced income given up when the asset is sold. The private 
                                            
78 Treasury NSW (2013), Budget Paper 2, pp. 1-14 
79 Cormann (2014a) 
80 Cormann (2014b) 
81 Hockey (2014) 
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sector usually values assets according to their future revenues.82 
Because  the  private  sector’s  cost  of  capital  is  higher  than  public  
sector debt charges, assets are likely to be sold at prices so that 
the savings in interest payments are outweighed by the loss of 
future income.  
However,  capital  recycling  can  improve  a  government’s  recurrent  
budget balance if the purchaser thinks that they will be able to 
generate substantially more revenue from the asset than 
government did, and accordingly pays more for the asset. For 
example, the NSW government sold three ports for more than $5 
billion at what were generally regarded as excellent prices.83 
However, even at these prices, the interest saved will only just 
cover the current earnings given up. Although the ports had not 
paid dividends to government in the previous five years,84 they 
were generating profits, retained in the business. The purchasers 
paid about 25 times the current earnings,85 implying that the 
revenues were about 4% of the sale price. States currently pay an 
interest rate of around 4% on their borrowings. 
Privatisation of government assets may also lead to productivity 
gains.86 The value of these gains may be captured by the public, 
government, or the new operator.87 Who gains depends on the 
price paid, and whether user charges fall as costs are reduced. 
                                            
82 PWC (2014) 
83 Bartholomeusz (2014) 
84 Roe (2014) 
85 Bartholomeusz (2014) 
86 For example, in the electricity distribution sector, private operators appear to 
have materially lower capital and maintenance costs: see Wood, et al. (2012) 
87 See discussion in Daley, et al. (2013a) pp. 78-9. 
Capital recycling may also effectively transfer risks from 
government to the private sector. 
The construction of new assets affects recurrent budgets whether 
or not other assets are recycled. New assets create additional 
depreciation, and will drag on future budgets, except in the 
unusual situation where additional revenues from the asset (such 
as tolls) are greater than the depreciation and interest costs from 
building the asset. 
6.8 Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
PPPs have become a popular mechanism to finance state 
government infrastructure. A private entity borrows the capital, 
builds the asset, and then leases it to government through a 
finance lease. Typically the asset is transferred back to 
government once the finance lease expires – often after decades.  
A few assets generate so much income that government does not 
need to make payments under the finance lease. Much more 
commonly, government undertakes to make regular payments to 
the developer for a number  of  years.  Ultimately  these  ‘availability 
payments’, as they are often called, must be funded from 
recurrent budgets. 
PPPs  affect  a  state’s  capital  expenditures  just as if the state built 
the asset itself. Accounting rules typically require state 
governments to record the capitalised value of the finance lease 
as a capital expense when the asset is commissioned. This value 
should be similar to the cost of borrowing to build the asset, and 
then paying interest and repaying the principal on those 
borrowings. Given the higher profit margins and financing costs of  
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Box 4: What are Public Private Partnerships? 
PPPs are agreements between private enterprise and 
governments to deliver public infrastructure projects.88 Since the 
early 2000s governments have undertaken about 130 PPPs to 
build roads, railways, hospitals, courts and prisons, among other 
projects.89 PPPs typically bundle the investment to finance, design 
and build a single piece of public infrastructure, and to provide 
services from the infrastructure, into a long-term contract.90 
Private investors finance and manage the construction of public 
infrastructure, then lease it to government over a contracted 
period, sometimes between 20 and 30 years.  
the typical PPP, the finance lease may well be more expensive 
than borrowing directly.  
PPP arrangements have a similar effect on recurrent expenditures 
as if the state built and operated the asset itself. The annual 
payments under a finance lease should be similar to the cost of 
interest, principal repayments and maintenance. 
PPP arrangements are only likely to cost budgets less if 
outsourcing  a  project’s  design,  building  and  operation  to a single 
operator aligns incentives and reduces the long run total cost of 
ownership of the asset. For example, a private sector operator 
might  choose  to  invest  more  in  a  road’s  initial  construction 
because this will reduce future maintenance costs. The best 
                                            
88 Infrastructure Australia (2008) 
89 See Infrastructure Australia (2014) for a full list of completed PPPs:  
90 Engle, et al. (2013), RBA (2014) 
argument for PPPs is that private operators may make better 
trade-offs of this kind than the public sector. 
However, these advantages need to be balanced against the 
additional costs of PPPs, including transaction costs and the 
higher cost of funds for a private sector operator. The conditions 
of  the  PPP  may  also  reduce  government’s  ability  to  build  future  
infrastructure. They may also provide windfall gains to private 
operators when government builds additional connecting 
infrastructure. 
PPPs can transfer construction risk, and sometimes forecasting 
risks, to private sector operators. They may be better at managing 
construction risks, reducing total cost. Private sector capital may 
increase discipline around forecasting, so that white elephants are 
built less often. Yet these advantages must again be balanced 
against the additional costs, particularly the price that the private 
sector demands for taking forecasting risk. 
Due to the commercially sensitive nature of PPPs, there is little 
publicly available information on the total cost of projects to 
government, nor the annual payment for each project. Nor is there 
information on the capital costs – interest and depreciation 
expenses – that the government will continue to incur for the life 
of the finance lease. This reduces transparency of capital 
expenditure across states and territories.
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Box 5: PPPs in Australia  
The Victorian County Court project showed how PPPs can be 
innovative. The Liberty Group, a private entity, designed, 
developed, financed,  built  and  manages  the  state’s  busiest trial 
court. It comprises 54 courts and state-of-the-art technology, 
including video-conferencing and remote-witness facilities.  
The  consortium’s  bid  included  the  construction  - but not fit out – of 
two additional floors for future expansion at no further cost to 
taxpayers until new courtrooms were required. The delay in fit-out 
expenditure on eight additional courtrooms until they were needed 
in 2008 generated significant savings that both reduced the 
government’s  costs  and  improved  the  consortium’s  return  on  
investment. 
PPPs can effectively transfer construction and traffic risks to 
private sector operators. These risks are real. Cracks in walls 
delayed  opening  Melbourne’s  City  Link  tunnel.  Delays  in  
construction of the Victorian Desalination Plant resulted in lower 
payments to the private sector operator. Several toll road PPPs, 
including  Sydney’s  Cross-City and Lane Cove Tunnels and 
Brisbane’s  Clem7  tunnel,  went  into  receivership  when  traffic  
volumes fell significantly short of forecasts.  
Source: Hodge and Duffield (n.d.), Guest (2011), New South Wales Audit Office (2006) 
6.9 Impact of capital expenditure  
The rapid increase in state infrastructure spending may be 
surprising given the frequent assertions that Australia has a large 
infrastructure deficit. 91 Yet Australian government spending on 
infrastructure increased significantly over the last seven years, 
and was much higher over this period than its typical level since 
1987 when the ABS began collecting records. 
Figure 36: Infrastructure work done for the public sector 
per cent of GDP 
 
Note: Health and education expenditure is general government expenditure by national, 
state and local government 
Source: ABS (2013c) Table 11, ABS (2013b) Table 53. Excludes telecommunications 
which is insignificant after Telstra sale 
                                            
91 Citigroup (Citigroup Economic & Market Analysis) (2008); Productivity 
Commission (2014) and Infrastructure Australia (2013b) cited by Productivity 
Commission (2014), p. 58 
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Capital expenditure can be a good thing; infrastructure is 
important for economic growth if it is the right infrastructure in the 
right place at the right time for the right price.92  
However, governments may not be getting particularly good value 
from the significant increase in infrastructure spending. Some 
have questioned whether governments have invested  in  the  ‘right’  
or most productive infrastructure.93 Governments continue to 
promise  investment  in  projects  that  don’t  have  rigorous  benefit  
cost analyses ahead of those that do.94 Even when these 
analyses are followed, they do not guarantee value for money. 
Analyses for transport infrastructure systemically overestimate the 
benefit cost ratios of projects.95 A litany of local examples – from 
the cost overruns for the Myki ticketing system in Melbourne to 
the highly optimistic initial traffic forecasts for the Clem7 Tunnel in 
Brisbane, the Cross City Tunnel in Sydney, Eastlink in Melbourne, 
and the Sydney and Brisbane airport trains – demonstrates that 
Australia is not immune from this dynamic.96 Unfortunately, 
rigorous evaluation is hampered by lack of availability of data. 
Others have suggested that governments have overpaid for 
infrastructure as a result of high costs.97 The recent increase in 
government capital expenditure has not produced a clear lift in 
                                            
92 Eslake (2010) 
93 The Productivity Commission notes that there are many examples of poor 
project  selection  leading  to  ‘highly  inefficient  outcomes’.  Productivity Commission 
(2014), p. 69  
94 See, for example, Wiggins (2013); Infrastructure Australia (2013a); Flyvbjerg 
(2009); Davies (2013); Dobes (2008); Ergas and Robson (2010)  
95 Flyvbjerg (2009) 
96 Davies (2010); Davies (2012) 
97 Victorian Government (2014), p.34 
productivity, although this would inevitably be hard to see given 
the many drivers of productivity growth.98  
On any view, increased capital expenditure has led to higher 
interest and depreciation costs that are an ongoing drag on state 
budgets. In addition, operating expenses will increase with capital 
expenditure. In the long term, budgets will be under even more 
pressure if expenses are not increased to maintain these assets 
properly. 
Given the other pressures on state budgets, there is little room to 
fund new infrastructure. Sustainable spending on infrastructure 
will require improved recurrent budget balances, either through 
reduced spending in other areas, or higher taxes and charges. 
While PPPs may lead to better trade-offs between initial spending, 
design, and maintenance costs, they are not likely to result in a 
much better recurrent budget bottom line than government 
construction. Similarly, capital recycling may affect credit ratings, 
but it will not alter the additional pressure on recurrent budget 
balances due to new capital spending. 
To ensure long-term state budget sustainability, the Victorian 
government has adopted a principle that future capital spending 
must be funded from recurrent budget surpluses so that debt does 
not increase, with interest payments that drag in future. 
 
                                            
98 For a more detailed discussion of the merits of recent infrastructure spending, 
see Daley, et al. (2013a), p.65. 
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7 Budget pressures
Many in the community expect that Commonwealth and state 
government budgets will balance, without substantial cuts to 
services or increases in taxes. Many also expect that our 
standards of living will continue to rise rapidly. These expectations 
have been set by 20 years of rising standards of living, with real 
incomes per person rising at more than 2 per cent a year. 
Through the 1990s, productivity improvements fuelled growth. In 
the  2000s,  rising  prices  for  Australia’s  minerals  exports  delivered  
rising standards of living, particularly through lower prices for 
imports. These strong terms of trade boosted government 
revenues by about 2 per cent of GDP. 
Yet good budgetary and economic times obscured mounting 
pressures on Commonwealth and state government budgets. In 
particular, health costs increased by 1 per cent of GDP, cuts 
amounting to 1 per cent of GDP were made to income tax and 
fuel excise and governments suffered through the global financial 
crisis. These hits to budgets were offset, however, by the price 
and economic effects of the mining boom.  
The next decade is likely to be more difficult than the last. Real 
wages are likely to grow much more slowly. As the terms of trade 
fall, income growth per capita is likely to be much lower than we 
have come to expect through the last decade.99 Falling terms of 
trade and lower economic growth will also make it harder to 
balance government budgets. 
                                            
99 Gruen (2012) p. 3; Eslake and Walsh (2011), Parkinson (2014). This is likely 
to be the case unless productivity growth rises quickly and to far above its 
historical average. 
Budgets will face increasing pressures. Demand for health care is 
likely to continue to rise. As wages grow more slowly, inequality 
may increase, placing pressure on government to increase 
welfare  spending.  Australia’s  ageing  population  will  also  put  more  
pressure on budgets in the form of Aged Pension and aged care 
costs.100 Without changes, the Aged Pension could expand from 
2.4 to 3.3 per cent of GDP by 2060.101  
The increased capital expenditure over the last 10 years will 
continue to place pressure on budgets due to interest and 
depreciation expenses. These now account for 10 per cent of 
revenue in some states. Unless new revenue sources or spending 
cuts  are  found,  these  pressures  may  limit  governments’  ability  to  
invest in new infrastructure, as Chapter 6 discussed. 
Finally, new government spending will increase the pressure on 
budgets. Implementing the National Disability Insurance Scheme, 
reforms to school funding and a more expensive paid parental 
scheme will all make future budgets more difficult. 
The  title  of  Laura  Tingle’s  2012 Quarterly Essay, ‘Great 
Expectations’, aptly captured the political tendency to raise 
expectations about what government can and should deliver. 102 
As she pointed out, although governments have relinquished 
direct control of many institutions, from running airlines to setting 
interest rates, political rhetoric over the last decade has tended to 
                                            
100 IMF (2014a), pp. 27-28, Productivity Commission (2013), p. 143, 148 
101 Productivity Commission (2013) p. 146 
102 Tingle (2012) 
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imply that government can solve virtually any problem. Such 
expectations were easier to fulfil when real GDP was rising 
quickly, and government revenues were rising as a percentage of 
GDP.  
While there may well be political pressures for government to 
increase living standards in more difficult economic times, there is 
little government can do. Community expectations about budgets 
are also likely to be disappointed. As the Secretary to the 
Treasury, Martin Parkinson, has pointed out, there is a “gap  
between community expectations and what governments can 
realistically  do…  [and]  a  gap  between  what  citizens  want  from  
governments and what they are prepared to pay for those 
services”.103  
7.1 Macroeconomic influences on Australian budgets 
Government budgets benefited from the strong terms of trade 
over the last decade. The prices of goods that generated taxes 
rose more quickly than the price of goods and services that 
governments bought (particularly foreign goods and Australian 
wages). Terms of trade have already fallen from their peak, and 
Treasury projects they will return to 2005-06 levels by 2019-20.104 
It is possible they will fall faster and further, back to the long-run 
average that prevailed between 1982 and 2002. This would mirror 
the history of other terms of trade changes around the world, 
which have tended to be symmetrical, falling back as far and as 
fast as they rose.105 If Treasury projections are right, Australian 
                                            
103 Parkinson (2014) 
104 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), Part2, p. 17 
105 Minifie, et al. (2013), p35 
governments will be looking for 0.5 per cent of GDP in savings or 
tax increases to repair their budget balances. They could be 
looking for as much as 1.5 per cent of GDP in savings if terms of 
trade return to long run averages. 
Australian government budgets are also benefiting from relatively 
benign economic conditions. Four years after the GFC, the 
economy of Australia and its major trading partners in Asia are 
close to their long run growth rates, even if the economies of 
many developed countries have not yet recovered to their pre-
GFC size.  
Combining these effects, one would expect Australian 
governments to be running comfortable surpluses at this point in 
the mining and economic cycles in order to pay back the stimulus 
spending of the GFC, and to absorb the likely hit to budget 
balances when the terms of trade return to more normal levels. 
Instead, Australian governments are relying on current minerals 
prices only declining slowly, and even then the effect will be to 
maintain current deficits or thin surpluses. Governments are very 
exposed to the risk of a scenario in which mining investment and 
earnings slow more quickly. Consequently there is a strong case 
for adjusting budget revenue and expenses sooner rather than 
later to prepare for this. 
7.1.1 Terms of trade and minerals prices 
The improvement in the terms of trade since 2003 as a result of 
the mining boom is estimated to have added around 1 to 2 per 
cent of GDP to the Commonwealth Government budget balance 
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over the last few years, as Figure 37 shows.106 The publicly 
reported cash balance was materially higher than the structural 
balance (what the budget outcome would have been without 
cyclical economic factors). 
This free kick to the budget came because government revenues 
were boosted by high export prices,107 while government 
expenses were more linked to import prices and local wages. 
When mining prices return closer to historic levels, these effects 
will unwind. Indeed there are signs this is already happening.108 
The speed of the decline in mineral prices is uncertain. Treasury 
expects they will only decline slowly in the near term,109 reducing 
steadily over the long term as global supply increases.110 Treasury 
now estimates that the terms of trade will decline to their 2006-07 
levels by 2017-18, and then continue to decline to 2005-06 levels 
by 2019-20. The projected decline to 2019-20 is outside the 
forward estimates period of the next three years. 
The decline in the terms of trade may be faster and deeper than 
this. It is quite plausible that terms of trade could decline to about 
halfway between peak and the long-run average. If so, the price 
effect would reduce the Commonwealth budget balance by 0.6 
per cent of GDP below current forecasts. Treasury scenario 
analysis suggest the flow-on effects on the economy and the 
                                            
106 Estimates by Treasury officials in 2010 are consistent with estimates 
compiled by the OECD, the IMF, and in Deloitte Access Economics (2012) 
107 McDonald, et al. (2010) 
108 Swan (2013) 
109 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), p. 12 
110 Ibid., p. 12 
labour market would be much larger, albeit possibly offset by 
changes in the exchange rate.111 
Figure 37: Commonwealth budget balance 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Notes: Financial years (i.e. 2003 is 2002-03). 2013f is the 2013-14 forecast in the 13-14 
Budget. Stimulus allocated to cyclical; changes in company tax from the decade average 
due to depreciation allocated to cyclical. Depreciation rate assumed at 15 per cent. Terms 
of trade baseline is 2002-03. 
Source: Minifie et al. (2013)  
 
                                            
111 Treasury (2013a) Budget Paper 1, Statement 3, Appendix A 
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When minerals prices decline, nominal economic growth rates 
and government revenues will reduce, increasing the pressure on 
government budgets. If terms of trade fall faster than Treasury 
projections, and revert to their long-run average, they could 
reduce Commonwealth revenues and budget balance by 2 per 
cent of GDP, as Figure 38 shows. 
To be prepared for this scenario, Australian governments would 
need to be running a budget balance 1 to 2 per cent of GDP 
higher than ordinary economic indicators would suggest. As 
discussed below, major economic indicators for Australia and the 
world suggest the Australian economy is now growing close to 
trend, and that governments should have a net budget surplus, 
even without the contribution of the terms of trade. 
Government revenues in some states also benefited from a surge 
in royalties as volumes increased, and some states increased 
royalty rates. But total royalties collected are just $10.6 billion, or 
0.7 per cent of GDP, so the potential impact on Australian 
government budgets of royalty payments falling with mining prices 
is relatively small.  
How significant is the risk of lower terms of trade? It is inherently 
difficult  to  forecast  the  minerals  prices  that  drive  Australia’s  terms  
of trade. They may stay stronger for longer given high demand 
from the continuing economic development of a range of 
countries, and relatively slow increases in supply due to 
consolidation of the global mining industry, declining ore grades, 
and slowing construction.112 Iron ore prices have fallen from 
around $US135 a tonne in December 2013 to $112 in April 2014, 
                                            
112 Eslake (2011) 
having rebounded after falling to as low as $104 in March 2014.113 
The Australian Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 
(BREE) forecast the price will fall to $US97 a tonne by 2017.114 
Figure 38: Impact of terms of trade on Commonwealth tax revenues 
Per cent of GDP 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2013b) cat. no. 5204.0; ABS (2013e) cat. no. 5506.0; 
Commonwealth budget papers for 2002-03 to 2013-14;McDonald et al. (2010). 
                                            
113 IMF (2014b); McGrath (2014)  
114 BREE (2014). Analysts such as Goldman Sachs forecast a period of 
oversupply in 2014, pushing down prices further to around $85 a tonne by 2017: 
Goldman Sachs (2013) 
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7.1.2 Economic growth 
Australian economic growth has a material impact on budgets 
from year to year. The gap between forecast and actual economic 
growth and prices has typically added or subtracted in the order of 
$5 to $10 billion from Commonwealth revenues over the last 
decade.115  
Australia is no longer at the bottom of the economic cycle. 
Instead, the economy is probably at or above the average 
performance that can be expected over the next decade or two. 
GDP growth is close to its average over the 2000s and inflation is 
inside  the  RBA’s  target  of  2 to 3 per cent. Unemployment has 
edged up, and Australian rates of unemployment and under-
employment are higher than if the economy were running at full 
capacity. Participation rates have stalled for almost all age-groups 
over the last 2 years, ending seven years of strong growth, as 
Figure 39 shows.  
Nevertheless, current rates of participation and unemployment are 
consistent with other recent periods of low unemployment outside 
the boom years of 2005-2008.116 
The fact that commodity prices are higher than during the pre-
GFC boom, and that terms of trade are higher than almost any 
period in the last 60 years, is a big boost to national income. 
Yet  much  of  Australia’s  good  fortune  is  driven  by  the  economic  
performance of its trading partners. While the world economy has 
slowed post-GFC,  Australia’s  main  trading  partners  have  roared  
                                            
115 See Chessell, et al. (2012)p. xviii, xxi 
116 RBA (2013), ABS (2014d) cat 6202 Table 01 
ahead at growth rates only a little below their mid-2000s boom. As 
a consequence, Australian commodity export volumes are higher 
than ever. Iron ore exports are double their pre-GFC level.  
There are some weaknesses in the Australian economy that might 
improve. The high dollar is impeding growth in trade-exposed 
industries, particularly manufacturing and international services 
such as higher education. Economic growth may also be boosted 
Figure 39: Annual change in participation rate 
Percentage points change in workforce participation per year 
 
Source: Borland (2013) 
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as new mining capacity begins production. A key will be how 
much of this revenue stays in Australia, either as dividends for 
shareholders or tax and royalties for governments. However, the 
RBA estimates that foreigners own about 80 per cent of the 
resources sector,117 and in the absence of a well-designed 
resource rent tax, their profits are only captured in Australia 
through state mining royalties and company tax of 30 per cent 
which acts as a  “final  tax”  for  foreign  shareholders. 
Whatever the fate of this revenue, economic growth is normally 
slower after the peak of a mining boom than before.118 The history 
of previous mining booms around the world suggests that 
manufacturing industries typically rebound strongly afterwards. 
But these rebounding industries typically add less to economic 
growth than is subtracted by the slowing resources sector.119 
Therefore, the current economic conditions may be about as good 
as it gets. Australian budgets should not expect a significant 
improvement  from  the  economy  ‘returning  to  normal’.  Economic  
conditions that are generally close to long-run trends suggest that 
at this point in the economic cycle, Australia governments should 
be posting comfortable surpluses. 
Classic Keynesian fiscal policy maintains that a country should 
have budget surpluses when the economy is growing strongly, 
and budget deficits when the risks of stalling are high. On this 
basis, the substantial budgetary stimulus that Australia employed 
at the bottom of the economic cycle needs to be counter-balanced 
                                            
117 Connolly and Orsmond (2011) 
118 Aitkin, et al. (2014) 
119 See Minifie, et al. (2013) for a discussion of how other industries bounce 
back. 
by budget surpluses even at mid-points in the economic cycle. Yet 
the  current  government’s  statement  of  fiscal  strategy,  ‘to restore 
public sector finances by returning the budget to sustainable 
surplus…  by  2023-24”,120 implies a much slower return to surplus 
than would be expected at this point in the economic cycle. 
The budgetary surpluses appropriate at this point in the economic 
cycle are on top of the  buffer  that  may  be  needed  if  Australia’s  
terms of trade reduce, affecting prices in ways that would reduce 
government budget balances by about 1 to 2 per cent of GDP, as 
Section 7.1.1 discusses. 
7.1.3 Economic forecasts  
Budgetary forecasts depend on economic forecasts. If the latter 
are systemically optimistic or pessimistic, then the medium-term 
outlook may need to be revised. In the 2000s, budget outcomes 
were often about 1 per cent of GDP better than forecast, and 
since the GFC they have generally been about 1 per cent worse 
than forecast, as Figure 40 shows. 
The variations are primarily in revenues, not expenses.121 Before 
the GFC, Treasury tended to underestimate the strength of growth 
in the global and Australian economies, and in the terms of trade, 
causing it to underestimate taxation revenue.122 Since the GFC, 
Treasury has generally overestimated the budget outcome by 
about 1 per cent of GDP. About half of this is due to 
                                            
120 Treasury (2013b), p. 26 
121 Deloitte Access Economics (2013), p. 17 
122 Chessell, et al. (2012), p. xviii 
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overestimating the strength of global and Australian economic 
growth.123 
Figure 40: Actual and forecast underlying cash balance, 
Commonwealth budget 
Per cent of GDP, year of forecast labelled 
 
Source: Treasury (multiple years), Commonwealth of Australia (2013) 
Estimating economic growth is inherently difficult: an RBA 
analysis found that half of its forecasts for GDP growth for the 
                                            
123 Ibid., p. 37 
following year were out by 1.2 per cent or more. Private sector 
forecasts are similarly inaccurate.124 These forecasting issues are 
likely to balance out over the economic cycle, however. Treasury 
has now corrected its previous systemic overestimation of 
company tax revenues in its forecasts.125  
More recently, Treasury revised down its forecasts since the 
2012-13 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO). The 
deficit is worse by $17 billion, due to a $9 billion (one-off) grant to 
the Reserve Bank, $4 billion in spending decisions and $4 billion 
due to lower income, primarily personal income tax. These 
revised forecasts also include the impact of election commitments 
such as the repeal of the carbon and mining taxes, the 
introduction of the “Direct  Action” response to climate change, and 
the implementation of paid parental leave.126 
7.1.4 Balance sheet risks  
Government net debt is created by year-to-year budget deficits, 
and any major liabilities assumed by government that turn out to 
be unrecoverable. Only financial sector contingent liabilities are 
likely to be material to total government debt, and government is 
unlikely to have to pay for them given current policy settings. 
The Commonwealth sets out its major contingent liabilities in its 
‘Statement  of  Risks’,  part  of  each  year’s  budget  papers. Many of 
these risks are substantial, several are described as 
“unquantifiable”, but few are likely to result in the Commonwealth 
government taking on a debt of tens of percentage points of GDP.  
                                            
124 Tulip and Wallace (2012), p. 40 
125 See above section 5.4 
126 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), pp.19-22 
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The largest risk is a government assuming the bad debts of major 
financial institutions. During the GFC the Commonwealth 
guaranteed the deposits of Australians, and provided guarantees 
for the wholesale borrowing of Australian banks. As recent events 
in Spain, Iceland, Ireland and Cyprus have shown, taking on 
these liabilities can add materially to total government debt.  
Yet despite the stresses of the GFC, Australia’s  financial  
institutions remain in relatively good health.  Australia’s  strong  
emergence from the GFC was in part good luck, as its banks were 
short of deposits given its long-running negative balance of 
payments, and so did not lend to sub-prime mortgages or to 
governments that subsequently encountered difficulties. As well, 
the Australian property market did not suffer a rapid collapse. In 
part this was due to good management as many bank managers 
had been part of banks that came near to failing in 1990, and 
APRA actively discouraged more risky lending in the years before 
the GFC.127 Whether by good luck or good management, the 
failure of a substantial financial institution in Australia appears 
unlikely in the foreseeable future given current policy settings.  
7.2 Spending pressures on Australian budgets 
Future government budgets will come under pressure from rising 
political expectations and specific policy promises. Social and 
economic trends, particularly growing demand for health services, 
may also increase pressures.128 Rising inequality as a result of 
increasing returns to the more highly educated may also create 
                                            
127 McDonald and Morling (2011) 
128 The IMF (2014a) notes that both health care and pensions will be impacted 
by ageing populations, see p. 22 
pressure for additional welfare spending, particularly if income 
inequality increases with the slowing of the mining boom. The 
ageing population will place additional pressure due to lower 
workforce participation and increased costs, including Aged 
Pension and aged care. Yet the impact may be mitigated if policy 
reforms to increase workforce participation are put in place. 
States’  recent  capital  expenditure  will  also  put increasing pressure 
on budgets in the form of interest and depreciation expenses. 
7.2.1 Health costs 
Health dominated the increase in government spending above 
GDP over the last decade. Health costs are likely to continue to 
increase as a percentage of GDP. As Chapter 4 discusses, the 
primary driver of increasing health costs over the last decade was 
not an ageing population, but rather increased services for all 
ages. Without concerted policy changes, these trends are likely to 
continue. The 2010 Intergenerational Report (IGR) forecast that 
health costs would grow by 3 per cent of GDP over the following 
40 years, with 1.3 per cent of GDP a result of the increased scope 
of health services.129 Actual growth due to servicing in just the last 
decade was an additional 1 per cent of GDP, and about 2 per cent 
of GDP after adjusting for the terms of trade boom, a growth 
substantially faster than the IGR projection.130 
                                            
129 Treasury (2010a) 
130 If economy-wide prices grew at the CPI over the past decade, health 
spending would have been about two percentage points above its 2002-3 
proportion of GDP. As the terms of trade boom lifted economy-wide prices, this 
meant government had additional revenues to pay for increasing health costs. 
However, we expect economy-wide prices to move with CPI over the coming 
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If the scope of health services continues to increase at the rate of 
the last decade, health will demand an additional 2 per cent of 
GDP in government budgets by 2023. 
7.2.2 Welfare 
Welfare is the largest category of government expenditure, 
comprising 22 cents of every dollar spent by Australian 
governments. Future budgets are therefore sensitive to changes 
in welfare spending. 
The purposes of welfare are contested. Almost all political 
theories agree that welfare payments should enable the most 
disadvantaged to pursue worthwhile opportunities and to live lives 
they have reason to value. Other theories, less universally 
accepted, aim to reduce inequality of outcomes and opportunities 
more generally. According to some economic analysis and some 
political theories, if incomes before taxes and payments become 
less equal, there is likely to be pressure to increase welfare to 
redress the balance. The pressures are likely to be greater if 
richer households are seen to gain the vast bulk of the benefits of 
economic growth.131 
The real incomes of poor Australian households have generally 
risen over the last decade. At the same time tertiary graduates 
earn less of a premium than elsewhere in the OECD, perhaps 
because the mining boom has kept wages relatively high for those 
with fewer skills. 
                                                                                    
decade, with the price of healthcare continuing along its current trend. This 
implies an increase in share of GDP of about 2 per cent by 2022-23. 
131 For more detailed analysis of inequality issues see Daley, et al. (2013). 
But if the mining boom slows, inequality is likely to increase and 
absolute incomes will grow more slowly.132 This may increase the 
pressure for Australian governments to spend more on welfare. 
In particular, government may face pressure to increase Newstart 
payments, which have fallen in real terms while Aged Pension 
payments increased much faster than CPI due to indexation 
arrangements and policy decisions.133  
The rapid growth of inequality in the rest of the world suggests 
that inequality in Australia may grow much faster in future, 
particularly if lower skilled workers are less in demand after the 
mining boom. If this happens, inevitably there will be more calls 
for governments to increases taxes and payments to reduce 
inequality. These calls are likely to be louder if poorer households 
are not seeing any growth in real income. Real household 
incomes have declined for three of the last five quarters.134 
Reducing inequality in these circumstances would impose 
substantial pressures on government budgets, particularly the 
Commonwealth’s,  which  includes  most  welfare  payments.  Even  in 
                                            
132 Minifie, et al. (2013) see p. 15 for a discussion of how the mining boom has 
impacted employment and wages, countering the international trend towards 
increased inequality. 
133 In 1991 the Aged Pension was indexed to 25 per cent male total average 
weekly earnings, whereas unemployment benefits were left indexed to the 
consumer price index. Subsequently in 2009 the Rudd government lifted the rate 
again to 27.7 per cent of male earnings Department of Social Services (2014). A 
review is being conducted into the working age welfare payments including 
Newstart and the Disability Support Payments. The review however excludes the 
Age Pension and family assistance payments. Buckmaster (2014) 
134 National Centre for Social and Economic Modeling (NATSEM) analysis 
discussed by Uren (2014) 
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Australia’s  highly  targeted  tax-payment system, if Australian 
household income inequality follows its historic trend for another 
decade, it would cost 0.5 to 1.5 per cent of GDP to maintain the 
current level of household income inequality. 
In practice, attempts to redistribute more widely drive at least 
some welfare payments. For example real spending on the Age 
Pension, after adjusting for the ageing of the population, is $8 
billion a year more than a decade ago. This suggests that the 
estimated budget pressure from welfare increases of 0.5 to 1.5 
per cent of GDP may be conservative. 
Unfortunately, higher taxes and payments inevitably impose 
inefficiencies, and often reduce incentives for workforce 
participation. Policy changes that increase participation rates 
among low-income households can have lower costs and do more 
to reduce inequality, although inevitably there are fewer 
guarantees that such policies will have the desired impact.  
7.2.3 Ageing 
The ageing of the population has not yet had much impact on 
Australian government budgets. It will have more impact over the 
next decade in aged care and health as substantially more people 
move into their 70s and 80s, as Figure 41 shows.  
The impact on the budget can be offset by taxation and welfare 
reforms that encourage greater workforce participation by older 
Australians. Chapter 8 discusses these potential policy changes. 
Figure 41: Age-related government spending 
$ thousands per person, 2011-12 
 
Note: Selected categories of expenditure. Includes Commonwealth, states and territories. 
‘Other’  includes  the Disability Support Pension, Parenting Payment, Family Tax Benefit, 
Disability Support Services (both Australian Government and state and territory), Other 
social security and welfare payment, Defence and other expenditures and other state and 
territory expenditures not classified elsewhere. 
Source: PC (2013) Figure 5.1 
An ageing population will also substantially affect budgets if 
pension benefits and eligibility grow faster than GDP. The cost of 
pensions increased substantially over the last decade, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.5. Under current policy settings, these 
costs will continue to grow. The Productivity Commission 
estimates that the cost of pensions may increase by 0.4 per cent 
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of GDP in the next 10 years and to 3.3 per cent of GDP by 
2060.135 
Changes will be needed to make the pension system more 
sustainable.136 The public debate is beginning to acknowledge 
that  Australia’s  current  spending  on  Aged  Pensions  is  
unsustainable. Accordingly, the Australian Government has 
mooted changes, including raising the eligibility age to 70, 
tightening assets tests to include the family home and lowering 
generous indexation arrangements.137 
Aged care cost Australian governments $17 billion in 2012-13 – 
1.1 per cent of GDP - with most of it spent on residential care.138 
The Productivity Commission estimates that these costs may 
increase to 2.6 per cent of GDP by 2059-60.139 Demand for these 
types of services will only increase with an ageing population, 
placing additional significant pressure on budgets if governments 
continue to meet the majority of costs. However, reforms 
recommended by the Productivity Commission, if they are 
implemented, may reduce the cost to government. 
                                            
135 Productivity Commission (2013) p. 146. The IMF (2014a) estimates that 
pension spending will increase by 0.7 per cent of GDP by 2030. 
136 IMF (2014a) p. 27 Stevens (2014) also notes that due to the demographic 
shift, more people will be moving into retirement and fewer people entering the 
workforce over time. As a result, governments need to focus on the medium term 
issue of the ageing population rather than the individual budget year outcomes. 
Stevens (2014) 
137 Maher (2014) 
138 Other types of care include home care and support. 
139 Productivity Commission (2013) p. 150. This is greater than that projected by 
the Intergenerational Report of 2010 which suggested an increase to 1.8 per 
cent of GDP by 2049-50. 
Figure 42: Projected real increases in aged care costs 
Per cent of GDP 
Source: Productivity Commission (2013) Figure 5.12 
Political pressure to continue these levels of age related 
expenditure is likely to grow. As the age of the median voter 
increases, a greater proportion of the electorate will have a vested 
interest in broader eligibility and higher benefits for aged 
pensions. In the medium run, this is where an ageing population 
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passes and the population ages.140 
The impact of ageing on government budgets depends on both 
demography and workforce participation. If more older people 
work, then economic output is higher, governments collect more 
in taxes, and pension expenses are lower. 
Participation may even increase, despite ageing, if older age 
workforce participation is reinforced by policy change to increase 
the age of access to the Age Pension and superannuation.141  
Without change in the participation rate of each age group, overall 
participation will reduce over the next decade. If participation rates 
of older age groups continue to increase, however, then overall 
participation rates will only fall slightly in the next decade, 
although they will probably fall more substantially thereafter, as 
Figure 42 shows. 
Policy reforms along the lines of those identified in Grattan 
Institute’s  2012  report,  Game-changers, would more than  
                                            
140 Thanks to Jeff Borland for this insight 
141 Increased female workforce participation across age brackets will also 
provide substantial benefit to the economy if women with young children take 
home more of their earnings after paying tax, giving up welfare benefits, and 
paying for childcare. More in-depth analysis on this issue is provided in Daley, et 
al. (2012). 
Figure 43: Changes in labour force participation rates 
% of total population who participate in workforce 
 
Note:  ‘lower  participation  due  to  ageing’  assumes current age-specific participation rate of 
each  age  cohort.  ‘Increased  participation  of  older  workers’  assumes  participation rate of 
each age cohort continues to increase at 50% of current trends.  ‘Super  /  pension  reforms’  
are to lift age of access to pension and superannuation to 70, as specified and modelled in 
Daley  et  al  (2012a).  ‘Increased  female  participation  with  childcare/welfare  reforms’  
assumes reforms to tax, welfare and childcare subsidies, as specified and modelled in 
Daley et al (2012a) 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012e); Daley et al (2012a); ABS (2008) 3222.0 T A9. 
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medium term budget position by increasing participation, and 
therefore increasing income and consumption tax revenues while 
reducing pension expenditure. See Chapter 8 for a discussion of 
potential policy reform. 
7.2.4 Capital expenditure 
States and territories have increased capital expenditure 
significantly in the last 10 years as Chapter 6 shows. As a result, 
governments face ongoing budget pressure through increased 
interest and depreciation expenses that cannot be compressed. 
These costs will be borne on an annual basis for the length of the 
debt and life of the assets.  
Future infrastructure investment, expected under Coalition-
National Government policy, will add to these expenses, placing 
ongoing pressure on budgets.142 
7.3 Commitments beyond the forward estimates 
Government commitments to spending beyond the forward 
estimates could reduce budget balances by around $29 billion, or 
1.2 per cent of GDP, within the next few years, as Figure 44 
shows.  
                                            
142 The Prime Minister has signaled his intention for increased infrastructure 
investment  by  wanting  to  be  known  as  the  ‘Infrastructure  Prime  Minister’.  Abbott 
(2013), Abbott (2013). Future intended capital expenditure by the 
Commonwealth Government is yet to be made clear. However, the Productivity 
Commission notes that without reform to the process for selecting infrastructure 
projects,  increased  spending  will  ‘increase  cost  to  users,  taxpayers,  the  
community  generally,  and  the  provision  of  wasteful  infrastructure’.  Productivity 
Commission (2014), p. 2 
The Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO), released in 
December, incorporated the budget impact of most of the 
government’s  election  commitments  within  the  forward  estimates. 
This included abolishing the carbon price and mining tax, cutting 
company tax, increasing paid parental leave, and implementing 
Direct Action climate policy.143 However, the government made a 
number of commitments that have a significant budget impact 
beyond 2017.  
The government has now committed to the rollout of the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme in all jurisdictions,144 and costs will 
ramp up significantly beyond the forward estimates as the scheme 
is fully implemented.145 Furthermore, recent reports of the 
scheme’s  trials  costing  much  more  than  anticipated  suggest  the  
total cost of delivery may be even higher than estimated.146 Costs 
for  the  ‘Schools  First’  funding agreement (previously known as the 
Gonski reforms) also rise significantly beyond 2017. 
It is Coalition policy to restore defence spending to historic levels 
of 2 per cent of GDP.147  The budget papers also note that a 
return  to  Australia’s  commitment  to  spend 0.5 per cent of gross 
national income on development aid would involve a significant 
increase above current forward estimates provisions.148  
                                            
143 Commonwealth of Australia (2013) p. 3 
144 Western Australia is the final state to establish trial sites: Abbott (2014) 
145 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), p. 21 
146 Harrison (2014) 
147 Loughnane (2013c) 
148 Commonwealth of Australia (2013)p. 21 
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Figure 44: Budget impact of government policy commitments  
Nominal $ bn 
 
Note:  ‘Foreign  aid’  shows  the  budget  impact  of  a  return  to  official  development  assistance  
of  0.5  per  cent  of  gross  national  income  from  2018.  ‘Disability  insurance’  shows  MYEFO  
estimates  of  costs  beyond  the  forward  estimates  of  the  NDIS.  ‘Schools’  shows  the  
estimated  impact  of  the  ‘Schools  First’  funding  agreement  on  Commonwealth  and  state  
budgets. ‘Restore  defence  spending’  shows  budget  impact of a return to 2009-10 spending 
levels as a percentage of GDP from 2017. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers and Mid-Year 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook , 2013-14; Loughnane (2010); Loughnane (2013c). 
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8 Budget solutions
8.1 Possible reform choices 
Governments will have to make difficult choices to fix the 
structural budget deficits they face. In the 2013 report Balancing 
Budgets: Tough Choices We Need, Grattan Institute presented a 
series of options for budget reform.  
We do not suggest that any Australian government will – or 
should – implement all the proposed options. However, we have 
tried to identify as many choices as possible that would both make 
a material difference to budget outcomes and not have 
unacceptable social or economic side-effects. Australian 
governments may find many of the choices unpalatable, but given 
the size of their long-term budget challenge, it will be hard for 
them to repair budgets without facing at least some of them. If 
they are all ruled off the table then Australians are entitled to ask 
whether their governments are serious about restoring budget 
balances. 
All the budget choices presented are politically difficult. If they 
were easy, they would already have  been  made.  Australia’s  
governments are small by OECD standards, and our public sector 
operates more efficiently than most.149 This makes it harder to find 
savings by cutting waste and shrinking non-essential services. 
                                            
149 OECD (2012a); OECD (2012b) 
Box 6: Commitments of the new government 
The new Commonwealth Government made a number of election 
commitments, not considered in the Balancing Budgets report, 
that would have a significant effect on the long-term budget 
balance. Further budget improvement would be achieved by not 
enacting some of these proposals: 
x Expanded paid parental leave: an extra $2 billion a year going 
mostly to middle- and upper-income families.150 
x Cutting company tax results in foregone revenue of over 
$3 billion per year.151 
x Changes to climate policy – the net effect of abolishing the 
carbon price and associated industry compensation, and 
introducing Direct Action – costs about $4.5 billion a year.152 
x Increasing defence spending – the commitment to increase 
defence spending from 1.6 to 2 per cent of GDP in 10 years –
will cost around $8 billion at full implementation.153 
Although these commitments were offset by budget improvements 
elsewhere (such as a levy on large companies, the abolition of the 
schoolkids bonus, and cuts to the public service and foreign 
aid),154 these improvements could be enacted without the 
accompanying spending, thereby improving the budget balance. 
Note: All costings are at full implementation, in $2013 
                                            
150 Grattan analysis of Loughnane (2013a); PBO (2013b) 
151 Grattan analysis of PBO (2013b) 
152 Grattan analysis of ibid. 
153 Grattan analysis of Loughnane (2013b); Thomson (2013) 
154 See PBO (2013b); Hockey and Robb (2013) 
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Figure 45: Budgetary impact of possible budget choices 
$2013 bn per year 
 
Note: Proposals considered that would generate less than $2 billion are not shown. These 
include congestion charges, grants to first home-buyers, middle-class welfare, public 
sector efficiency, avoidable hospital costs and end-of-life care. Collateral impacts include 
impacts on economic growth, disproportionate impact on people in the bottom 20% of 
incomes, and impacts on other social objectives: see Daley, McGannon, et al. (2013a) pp. 
20-22 
Source: Daley et al 2013 
The budgetary and collateral impacts of the 20 choices analysed 
in Balancing Budgets are summarised in Figure 45.  
Some clear themes emerge from the analysis, as Figure 46 
shows. Proposals for better targeting of support for older people –  
Figure 46: Budgetary impact of possible budget choices by theme 
$2013 bn per year 
 
Note: Proposals considered that would generate less than $2 billion are not shown. These 
include congestion charges, grants to first home-buyers, middle-class welfare, public 
sector efficiency, avoidable hospital costs and end-of-life care. 
Source: Daley et al 2013 
both pensions and superannuation (shown in orange) – are 
generally larger and more attractive than other alternatives. Just 
four choices could improve the budget balance by $27 billion a 
year.155 Reform of assets taxation (shown in red), particularly 
                                            
155 There is some interaction between the Age Pension asset test proposal and 
the retirement age proposal. If the retirement age is lifted, the additional savings 
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negative gearing and the CGT discount, could yield $7 billion a 
year. Of the other reforms, broadening the GST is large and 
relatively attractive. Some of the remaining tax exemptions are 
less attractive – they may have survived for good reasons. Tax 
increases could do more to improve budget balances, but they 
usually have more negative side effects. A number of cost 
reductions have smaller side effects, but their budgetary impact is 
also often smaller. 
8.2 Packaging reform 
All the proposals presented would leave some people worse off, 
at least in the short run. In the last decade, governments have 
been averse to making decisions that create identifiable losers.156 
Instead, potential losers were compensated with other measures, 
which generally drew on large and growing surpluses. In the 
current environment of substantial and increasing deficits, losers 
can no longer be paid off. 
Yet it is important for pain to be shared: people may be more 
willing to accept the burden if they understand that everyone is 
experiencing some pain. It is also harder for special-interest 
groups to claim that their interests should not be adversely 
affected when everyone in the community is sharing the burden.  
For these reasons, big and difficult reforms may be best 
introduced in a package. A package can show the magnitude of 
the problem and that the burden is widely shared. It can also 
                                                                                    
from reforming the Age Pension asset test are reduced as fewer people are old 
enough to qualify for the Age Pension. 
156For example, see Megalogenis (2012); Tingle (2012) 
include some (smaller) spending increases that mitigate the 
impacts on those worst off and least able to absorb adverse 
change. 
A package that would both focus on the most attractive 
opportunities identified in our prioritisation and distribute the 
burden across the community, affecting both rich and poor, would: 
x broaden the GST to include fresh food and private spending 
on health and education; 
x raise the pension and super age to 70; 
x include the primary residence in the Age Pension asset test, 
while allowing people to continue to claim a pension, although 
its value would be recovered from  the  recipient’s  estate;;   
x limit superannuation tax concessions so that only $10,000 a 
year can be contributed before tax, and those over 60 years 
old pay 15 per cent rather than no tax on earnings. 
The proposals in this package would contribute about $37 billion a 
year towards balancing budgets. The package picks up many of 
the proposals that would do most to improve budget balances, 
with relatively limited side effects  
It would affect both rich and poor. Broadening the GST would 
affect all income groups, but hit low-income earners hardest, 
although compensation could reduce most of the impact. Raising 
the pension and superannuation age would affect all income 
groups. Including the primary residence in the Age Pension asset 
test would primarily affect middle-income earners – people doing 
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well enough to own their own house, but not so well that they do 
not qualify for the Age Pension.157 Limiting superannuation tax 
concessions would mainly affect high-income earners, who reap 
most of the benefits of tax concessions for contributing more than 
$10,000 a year to superannuation. 
The package would probably slightly reduce inequality overall, 
which is consistent with some – but by no means all – efforts to 
improve budget balances around the world.158 
The major sensitivity with the package is that all the reforms 
appear to affect older Australians more. This may be more 
perception than reality, but it would need to be addressed.  
Increasing the pension and superannuation preservation age 
mainly affects those aged about 50 to 55 in the short term. 
Assuming that the eligibility ages are lifted gradually, those 
already retired would be unaffected. All Australians who are under 
50 today will share the burden in the future as they age. Many 
under the age of 45 may believe that increase is inevitable – and 
in any case the effect is at least 20 years away.  
Including owner-occupied dwellings in the assets test primarily 
affects those over 65 – although these rules will of course apply to 
everyone when they are older. Limiting superannuation 
contribution tax concessions would affect high wage earners in all 
age groups, but particularly those over the age of 60. This group 
                                            
157 People in this cohort are likely to be middle-income earners over their 
lifetimes, and although their income in retirement is likely to be less than when 
working, their disposable incomes can often be relatively high: see Phillips and 
Nepal (2012) 
158 Rawdanowicz, et al. (2013), p. 27-28 
currently pays much lower rates of income tax than do younger 
people on similar incomes. Those who are younger will also miss 
out on current, generous arrangements as they age. 
Broadening the GST affects the spending of all Australians. Older 
Australians who are not working are likely to prefer other tax 
changes such as income tax increases that inherently affect them 
less. 
The skew of Australia’s  current  tax  and  welfare  systems  explains  
why the proposed package would have a greater impact on older 
Australians in the short term. Our tax and welfare system is 
generally tightly targeted to those most in need. The biggest 
exception is pension and superannuation systems, which are 
substantially  ‘age-based’  rather  than  ‘needs  based’.  Reforming 
these arrangements is a high priority that would substantially 
improve budget balances with relatively limited side effects. 
Other packages might be designed around a different combination 
of proposals. The key task is to group together major reforms in 
ways that demonstrate that everyone in the community is sharing 
the burden of budget repair.  
Further detail of potential reforms is provided in Balancing 
Budgets.159 Other proposals for budget reform were made by the 
National Commission of Audit in May 2014.160 Further analysis is 
required to understand both the costs and benefits of these 
proposals.161 
                                            
159 Daley, et al. (2013a) 
160 National Commission of Audit (2014) 
161 McGannon and Daley (2014) 
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9 A bluffer’s guide to budgets 
9.1 General economic and financial terms 
Gross domestic product or GDP is a measure of the size of a 
country’s  economy. In 2012-13,  Australia’s  GDP  is  forecast  to  be  
approximately $1,564 billion or $1.6 trillion.162 
Inflation measures how much prices have increased over time. It 
is often measured by the change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) which tracks the prices of what a typical household buys.  
As a result of inflation, a loaf of bread costs more today than 
several years ago. Consequently, $1 today buys less than $1 
bought in 2000. Nominal prices are the prices you see in the 
shop at the time. Real prices remove the effects of inflation so 
that a dollar has a constant value – it buys the same number of 
loaves of bread in any year. Real prices provide more meaningful 
comparisons of spending in different years. Real prices are often 
expressed in dollar values for a particular year, e.g. 2013 dollars. 
In the context of budgets, nominal spending is the amount listed 
in the budget papers each year. Real spending removes the 
effect of inflation so we can compare how spending has actually 
changed. For example, if government purchases medicines that 
increase in price by 3 per cent each year, and government 
spending increases at 3 per cent per year, government buys the 
same amount of medicine every year. While its nominal spending 
grows at 3 per cent each year, its real spending is constant.  
                                            
162 Commonwealth of Australia (2013); ABS (2014b) Table 30. 
A price deflator converts nominal values into real values, and is 
based on a measure of inflation. The nominal price divided by the 
price deflator is the real price. 
Production is how much is produced in an economy. Economic 
growth measures the increase in production from time to time. 
Productivity measures how much is produced by a given input. 
Labour productivity, for example, measures how much is 
produced per hour worked. Capital productivity measures how 
much is produced for every dollar invested. Productivity growth 
measures how much more is produced with the same inputs. 
The labour force participation rate is the proportion of working-
age adults (16 years and older) who are either working or looking 
for work. The labour force includes the unemployed, but not 
people who are retired, institutionalised, or at home caring for 
children. 
Australia, like most developed countries, has an ageing 
population. People are living longer on average, so a greater 
proportion of the population is older. This demographic change 
is likely to have big effects on society over time, affecting 
participation rates, tax collection, and government spending, 
particularly health and aged pensions 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) is a Paris-based think-tank whose 
members and funders are rich countries. It includes most 
developed countries.  
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9.2 Macroeconomics 
Many measures of economic activity – such as GDP, 
unemployment and interest rates – move in cycles. During a 
boom, economic output increases, unemployment drops, and 
interest rates typically rise. Conversely, during busts, 
unemployment increases, interest rates fall, and GDP growth 
slows (or becomes negative). This is known as the economic 
cycle. 
The terms of trade is the ratio of export prices to import prices for 
a country. Crudely, it measures the tonnes of coal Australia must 
export in order to import a plasma-screen TV. When terms of 
trade rise, Australia earns more plasma screen TVs per tonne of 
coal. If terms of trade fall, Australia would need to export more 
tonnes of coal to buy the same number of televisions. 
From the mid-2000s, increased international demand for 
Australian minerals raised their price relative to other goods. 
Mining became very profitable. More mines were dug, increasing 
employment in the mining sector, as well as related industries 
(such as construction). Increasing demand for Australian minerals 
contributed to the rise in the value of the Australian dollar. These 
effects together are known as the mining boom.  
The global financial crisis (GFC) is a common term for the 
financial crisis of 2007-08, which led to the 2008-12 global 
recession. Australia fared considerably better than most of the 
developed world during and after the crisis, but even so, 
economic growth slowed and government budgets were placed 
under greater pressure than in earlier years. 
9.3 Budgets 
9.3.1 Revenue 
Revenue is all money the government collects. It is made up of: 
x Taxes, including: 
- Income taxes – taxes paid by individuals on their earnings 
- Company tax – taxes paid by companies on their profits. 
When firms purchase new equipment, they are not generally 
allowed to deduct the entire cost from their revenues all at 
once. Instead, they allocate a portion of the investment to 
each year of its useful life. For some types of asset, 
Australian tax rules allow accelerated depreciation: firms 
can claim a greater share of the initial investment cost each 
year than the usual portion. This means that firms claim the 
cost  of  the  capital  more  quickly,  and  so  the  firm’s  cost  of  
investing decreases. Because firms pay less tax while they 
are claiming this greater portion of costs, accelerated 
depreciation reduces government revenues in the short 
term. 
- Sales taxes – such as the Goods and Services Tax 
- Excises – sales taxes levied on a particular product, such 
as fuel, cigarettes, or alcohol.  
- Customs duties - taxes on imported items, including 
clothing and cars 
- Other taxes, including resource rent taxes (‘mining  taxes’)  
Budget pressures on Australian governments: 2014 edition 
Grattan Institute 2013 71 
and carbon pricing. 
x Sale of goods and services 
x Income received from investments, such as dividends from 
government-owned companies, and interest. 
x Royalties – In Australia, states own resources and mining 
companies purchase them. Royalty revenues are the sales of 
these minerals to mining companies. Royalties are generally 
levied either as a fixed rate per tonne, or as a percentage of 
the total value. 
x Grants from other levels of government 
9.3.2 Tax expenditures 
x When governments exempt certain types of transactions or 
taxpayers from an otherwise general tax, the foregone 
revenue is known as a tax expenditure. Tax expenditures are 
usually justified on the basis that they serve a particular policy 
objective better than does direct spending. Although tax 
expenditures are often less discussed than revenue or 
expenditure, they are a significant component of government 
budgets. 
9.3.3 Expenditure 
Expenditure is all money the government spends. It includes: 
x Payments to individuals, such as the Age Pension and 
unemployment benefits.163  
x Transfers to other levels of government 
x Purchases of goods and services. This includes purchase of 
physical goods as needed, as well as the purchase of services 
from many different entities. For example, a government might 
purchase job retraining services from a private company or 
not-for-profit organisation rather than employ staff directly to 
deliver the training. 
x Salaries and other expenses for employees, including front-
line staff such as teachers and nurses as well as 
administrative staff. 
9.3.4 Capital expenditure 
Capital expenditure is money spent on building infrastructure, 
which can also be referred to as fixed or non-financial assets. 
General government capital expenditure is money spent on 
government infrastructure that is used to deliver services for the 
community. Examples include hospitals, schools, rail 
infrastructure and roads.  
Government-owned corporations, or public non-financial 
corporations, also spend capital funding on infrastructure. 
Examples include water boards, railway corporations and 
electricity generators and distributors where state owned. 
                                            
163 These  payments  are  sometimes  called  ‘transfers’  or  ‘welfare  transfers’.  This  
report  uses  ‘transfers’  to  refer  to  payments  by  the  Commonwealth  to  the  states;;  
welfare  transfers  are  called  ‘payments’  or  ‘benefits’  to  avoid  confusion. 
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However these corporations deliver services typically on a user 
pay basis. In some instances, these corporations deliver 
infrastructure and services on behalf of the general government. 
However, accounting methods for recording this varies between 
states. 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) – a private financing 
mechanism for public infrastructure such as hospitals, schools 
and transport infrastructure such as rail and roads. Private 
providers are contracted to finance, design, build and operate 
infrastructure that is leased back to the state. 
Capital expenditure costs include: 
x Net acquisition of non-financial assets – the total change in 
the value of infrastructure over a year. It includes the purchase 
of, or expenditure on capital assets, less the sales of any 
capital assets, depreciation and any other changes such as 
the revaluation of assets. 
x Depreciation – the annualised cost of consuming a fixed 
asset or infrastructure over the number of years the asset is 
expected to last. 
x Interest expenses – interest paid on debt used to finance 
capital expenditure. 
When governments finance capital expenditure through 
borrowing, it is recorded as a component of net debt. This is the 
total debt owed which includes borrowings, deposits and 
advances received by government, less any cash and 
investments held by government and loans made to other parties. 
9.4 Terms used in the budget papers 
Commonwealth and State governments in Australia each publish 
a collection of documents every year in May or June that set out 
the  government’s  economic  and  fiscal  plans  for  the  next  year.  
These are generically called the budget papers. 
Since economic conditions change through the year, governments 
also update their estimates of revenue and expenses late in the 
year. The Commonwealth update is called the Mid-Year 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO). They also publish an 
updated set of figures before each election in the Pre-election 
Fiscal Outlook (PEFO). State governments publish equivalent 
documents under different names. 
Budget papers generally contain figures for revenue and 
expenditure for the previous financial year, the current financial 
year (sometimes called the budget year), and the next three 
financial years. This three-year period is called the forward years 
and the figures are known as the forward estimates.  
Figures for the previous, current and next financial year are 
generally presented as estimates. Sometimes figures for the past 
year are presented as actual figures and the current year as 
budgeted figures. The figures for the final two years of the 
forward estimates are generally presented as projections. 
Government expenses and revenues vary with the economic 
cycle. During a boom, profits and incomes increase, resulting in 
more taxes being paid; unemployment also falls, reducing 
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expenses. During a bust, the opposite happens. The cyclical 
balance component of the budget is the proportion of revenues 
and expenses that occur due to the economic cycle. Once we 
subtract this from the cash balance, we arrive at the structural 
balance. Determining the cyclical balance depends on modelling 
assumptions about the relationship between the economic cycle, 
expenses, and revenues. 
9.5 Surplus, deficits and debt 
A budget deficit occurs when a government collects less in 
revenues than it spends in any given year. A budget surplus 
occurs when revenues are greater than expenditures in a year. 
Government debt is the total debt that a government owes, and 
may come from governments running deficits several years in a 
row. Gross debt is the total amount of debt the government has. 
Net debt is the gross debt minus the value of assets the 
government owns (such as the Future Fund). 
9.6 Federal financial relations 
In Australia, the Commonwealth government collects most of the 
taxes, while State governments deliver most of the services. To 
correct this imbalance, the Commonwealth transfers money to the 
States in several ways: 
x Some funding, such as the money collected via the GST, is 
given to States as untied funding. It can be spent however 
the State chooses. 
x Most of the rest of the funding is given to the States as tied 
funding. This funding is given to the States on the condition 
that they use if for a particular purpose. There are two types of 
tied funding: Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) are 
relatively large amounts of money to be spent in general 
areas, such as schools or housing. National Partnership 
Payments (NPPs) are smaller amounts of money more 
closely tied to a particular policy goal, such as improving 
literacy and numeracy, or mental health reform. 
x A  small  amount  is  paid  by  the  Commonwealth  ‘through’  the  
states to other bodies, mostly non-government schools and 
local governments. States do not control how this money is 
spent; they just pass it on to the Commonwealth-identified 
recipient. These payments are sometimes known as on-
passings. 
In this report, we use the term ‘transfers’ to refer to untied and 
tied funding from the Commonwealth to the States. Where we 
present combined Commonwealth and state expenditures, these 
transfers are treated as state expenditure unless otherwise 
specified. On-passings are always treated as Commonwealth 
expenditure. 
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Overview 
Australian government budgets are under pressure. Without tough 
decisions, they risk posting deficits of around 4½ per cent of GDP 
within 10 years. The problems have got worse since our first 
Budget Pressures report. We would be better off if we faced up to 
the tough problems sooner rather than later. We now need to find 
savings and tax increases of $70 billion a year. 
Over the economic cycle of boom and bust, balanced budgets are 
much better than the alternative. Persistent government deficits 
incur interest payments, and limit future borrowings, reducing 
flexibility in a crisis. They are also unfair: they require future 
taxpayers  to  pay  for  today’s  spending.   
Despite relatively favourable economic conditions, Australian 
governments will post a collective deficit of between 2-3 per cent 
of GDP this year, and will remain in deficit by 1 per cent of GDP in 
2017. Long-term spending has increased. The biggest driver was 
the sustained increase in health spending. Over the past decade 
health expenditure rose by over $40 billion in real terms. The 
ageing population was not the prime cause. Rather, people of any 
age saw doctors more often, had more tests and operations and 
took more prescription drugs. Similarly, Age Pension costs grew 
much faster than GDP, not because of population ageing, but with 
policy decisions to increase benefits and widen eligibility. 
New analysis in this edition of Budget Pressures shows that 
budget sustainability is also threatened by infrastructure spending. 
After a threefold increase in capital spending over the last 10 
years, states are paying 3 per cent more of their revenues in 
interest and depreciation. Capital recycling and public private 
partnerships may improve credit ratings, but ultimately future 
recurrent budgets must still pay for the cost of past infrastructure. 
Continued trends in health and Age Pension costs are likely to 
drag future budgets backwards by 2 per cent of GDP by 2023. 
Future budgets will also be strained by promises of substantial 
new spending on the National Disability Insurance Scheme, 
schools, and defence, costing an extra 1 per cent of GDP. In 
addition,  prices  of  Australia’s  minerals  are  likely  to  decline,  
dragging budgets another ½ percent of GDP into the red.  
What  can  responsible  leaders  do  to  bring  Australia’s  budgets  
under control? First, they must explain the size and importance of 
the problem. Second, they must design a package of measures 
that share the burden of reform fairly across the community. 
As we showed in our Balancing Budgets report, the most 
promising reforms include lifting the age of access to Age Pension 
and superannuation, tightening the Age Pension assets test, 
paying less for pharmaceuticals with expired patents and asking 
students to pay a greater share of their tertiary education. 
However, given the size of the problem, budgets can only be 
balanced by looking at both expenditure and revenue. The highest 
priority tax increases should be the withdrawal of poorly targeted 
tax concessions, particularly superannuation for the wealthy, 
capital gains discounts, and negative gearing.  
Sustainable budgets require governments to make tough choices. 
They  are  politically  difficult,  but  vital  to  Australia’s  prosperity. 
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1 The challenge for Australian government budgets 
Australian government budgets are under substantial pressure. 
They could deteriorate from a projected deficit of 1 per cent of 
GDP from 2016-17 onwards to a deficit of more than 4.5 per cent 
of GDP, or $65 billion  in  today’s  terms, by 2024. Figure 1 and the 
following text set out what these pressures are. 
Figure 1: Projected budget balance for Australian governments by 
2024 given plausible scenarios 
Per cent of GDP 
 
Source: Grattan analysis. See Supporting Analysis p44 for details. 
1. A series of long-run commitments with significant increases in 
spending beyond the forward estimates (National Disability 
Insurance Scheme and defence spending, for example) could 
easily increase expenses by 1 to 1.5 per cent of GDP.  
2. Health expenses are likely to increase by 1.5 to 2 per cent of 
GDP as their growth over the last decade continues. The 
prime cause is not an ageing population, as many believe, but 
the increase in the scope and volume of health services.  
3. Additional welfare payments to hold inequality at current levels 
would increase government spending by 0.5 to 2.5 per cent of 
GDP – assuming that the current tight targeting of welfare 
continues. 
4. A future fall in minerals prices, and thus the terms of trade, 
may reduce revenue by 0.5 to 2 per cent of GDP. 
Some of these issues are already playing out. The 2013-14 Mid-
Year Economic Financial Outlook (MYEFO) lowered budget 
outcomes and forecasts for 2013-14 relative to the 2012-13 
budget by approximately 3 per cent of GDP,1 reflecting many of 
the points discussed above. 
 
                                            
1 Commonwealth of Australia (2013) 
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Our forecast is more pessimistic than the long-term projections in 
the Pre-Election Financial Outlook (PEFO).2 PEFO assumes that 
at least one of revenue or spending will be controlled more tightly. 
They also do not include the effect of rising pressures on State 
budgets. 
In the remainder of this paper: 
x Chapter 2 explains why continued budget deficits are a 
problem; 
x Chapter 3 provides an overview of Australian government 
budgets; 
x Chapter 4 describes expenditure pressures over the last 
decade; 
x Chapter 5 describes increasing revenue pressures over the 
last decade; 
x Chapter 6 describes capital expenditure trends and 
pressures; 
x Chapter 7 describes future pressures on the budget;  
x Chapter 8 describes potential solutions for balancing 
Australian budgets. 
x Chapter 9 presents  a  ‘bluffer’s  guide  to  budgets’  that  explains  
the terminology used in budget discussions and this paper. 
                                            
2 Treasury (2013c), Chart F2, p.61 
A  ‘Supporting  analysis’  volume,  available  from  Grattan  Institute’s  
website at www.grattan.edu.au, presents more detailed analysis 
of Commonwealth and state budgets, as well as details of the 
methodology of this report. 
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2 The value of balanced budgets  
Over the economic cycle of boom and bust, balanced budgets are 
much better than the alternative. Persistent government deficits 
incur interest payments, and limit future borrowings. As a result 
they can unfairly shift costs between generations, and reduce 
flexibility in a crisis. Yet in good times it is hard for governments to 
run a surplus. They are invariably tempted to spend money. Many 
voters prefer outcomes with no identifiable losers.  
Australia has escaped these problems, repairing its debt position 
over the 2000s, supported by public attitudes that were more 
averse to debt than those in most other countries. However, there 
are concerns that Australian attitudes are softening. 
2.1 Balance over the economic cycle 
Balanced budgets over the economic cycle make a big difference. 
Persistent large deficits make both the old and the young 
vulnerable: the old risk the security of their pensions and health 
care; the young bear an increased tax burden in the future to pay 
for past spending. Persistent large deficits lead to high 
government debt that can reduce flexibility in a crisis.3 Some 
argue that high government debt can reduce long-run economic 
growth – although this claim is contested.4  
Persistent deficits undermine the security of people, such as 
retirees, who depend on government. High government debt may 
                                            
3 Kotlikoff (1984) 
4Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), but see the debate summarised in Economist 
(2010) and Herndon, et al. (2013) 
lead to governments being forced to cut spending dramatically in 
a crisis. It is almost inevitable that such cuts will hit the vulnerable 
hard as the largest categories of government spending are 
welfare (22 per cent) and health (19 per cent), and dominated by 
spending on older people. 
Perhaps the most important argument for budget reform is that 
deficits borrow from the future. They require future generations of 
taxpayers  to  pay  for  today’s  spending.  There  are  fundamental  
issues of intergenerational fairness if future taxpayers are forced 
to bear the burden of today’s  spending that they do not have a 
say in, nor benefit from. 
As many developed countries have rediscovered in recent years, 
high government debt coupled with low economic growth creates 
a terrible economic dilemma. If government increases spending, 
the debt gets worse, markets charge higher interest rates, and 
borrowing more becomes impossible. If government tries to 
reduce its deficit, GDP slows further, and government debt can 
rise as a proportion of GDP, making the problems worse.5 Their 
successors and financial institutions then find it difficult to borrow 
at reasonable costs, and economic growth is often slow for a long 
time.6 
How to respond to the trap of low growth and high government 
debt remains contentious. It is far better to avoid the trap in the 
                                            
5 De Grauwe and Ji (2013), Figure 5; Summers and DeLong (2012) 
6 Reinhart, et al. (2012) 
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first place. That means running balanced budgets over the 
economic cycle. 
This principle requires Australia to run substantial surpluses over 
the remainder of the current economic cycle. During the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC), the Australian government aggressively 
stimulated the economy through increased spending to avoid 
unemployment. Some argue that the government should have 
instead  simply  relied  on  the  ‘automatic  stabilisers’  of  lower  tax  
collection and increased welfare payments.7  Irrespective of views 
on this question, if budgets are to balance over the cycle, then 
additional stimulus in an economic downturn must be matched by 
additional government surpluses during good times.  
It is arguable that continued deficits are sustainable if they are 
small enough to not increase government debt as a percentage of 
GDP. The burden of interest payments transferred to future 
generations can be rationalized if the debt funds productive 
investments that benefit future generations, or if economic growth 
is greater than the real interest rate.  
Yet in practice, relatively little of the increase in spending over the 
last decade paid for investments that benefit future generations. 
As Chapter  4’s  analysis shows, the big increases in spending 
were in health and the Age Pension. Most of the health budget is 
spent on older Australians. It is difficult to argue that this 
spending, while important, benefits future generations. The 
substantial increase in infrastructure spending may be more 
defensible – provided the spending was well targeted. 
                                            
7 Differing views are canvassed in McDonald and Morling (2011) 
However, even if persistent deficits to fund productive investment 
are economically optimal, they may still lead to poor outcomes in 
the long run. If  the  theory  of  “sustainable  deficits”  is  accepted,  it 
becomes easy for a government to justify excessive deficits 
because there is no clear level at which government debt is 
‘unsustainable’.  Similarly,  if  the  theory  of  “deficits  to  fund  
investments”  is  accepted,  it  becomes  easy  for  a  government  to  
justify excessive deficits because it is always hard to tell whether 
government spending is truly investing, or simply spending for 
current generations. It is also difficult to prove that the costs of 
infrastructure outweigh the benefits.  
Governments will always be tempted to use the excuse of funding 
productive investment to justify excessive deficits. Running a 
deficit enables a government to defer difficult decisions. As 
discussed  below,  political  forces  for  ‘responsible’  government  are  
the only real restraint on politically motivated spending. A deficit of 
zero – a balanced budget – may well be the only salient number 
to rally such political forces. Thus while perfect government may 
fund investments with debt, the best government in practice is 
likely to maintain a culture that champions balanced budgets to 
avoid a slide into unsustainable deficits. 
At the very least, a highly transparent and rigorous process is 
required to ensure that debt-funded investments are indeed 
productive.8 Many doubt that all of the recent investments by 
government were productive, as discussed below in Chapter 6.9. 
                                            
8 Freebairn and Corden (2013) 
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2.2 Mindsets for budget repair 
If Australian governments are serious about fixing their budgets, 
they need to make tough choices. Grattan  Institute’s  2013  report,  
Balancing budgets: tough choices we need, presents a range of 
them. 9 None are particularly appealing. Nobody likes paying 
higher taxes or receiving fewer services. But governments need to 
make these difficult choices rather than put them off for future 
governments.  We  cannot  simply  ‘grow  out  of  trouble’. We need 
structural reform.10   
Valuable lessons can be learnt from previous Australian and 
international experiences of budget repair. These experiences, 
summarised in Grattan’s  2013  Balancing budgets: Supporting 
analysis, show that to balance budgets, governments need to 
explain the problem, prioritise the large reforms, tackle both 
spending and taxation, and resist the temptation to delay.11  
2.3 Australian attitudes to budget deficits 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada are exceptions to the 
international pattern of governments predominantly repairing 
budgets in a crisis. From around 1995, in contrast to many other 
developed countries, Australia and New Zealand produced 
substantial and sustained surpluses for over a decade, reducing 
net debt rapidly, (see Figure 2).12 
                                            
9 Daley, et al. (2013a) 
10 IMF (2013), p. 10 
11 Daley, et al. (2013b), p. 51-55 
12 For a brief history, see Kamener and Tan (2012) 
The unusual performance of Australia and New Zealand may 
ultimately depend on public attitudes and education. In 2006 Ian 
Macfarlane,  then  Governor  of  Australia’s  Reserve  Bank,  
suggested that the average voter in Australia is more 
economically literate than a typical voter elsewhere. This may be 
because Australian media provide more coverage of key 
economic decisions such as Reserve Bank interest rate decisions, 
or perhaps because Australian mortgages are more likely to be on 
Figure 2: General government net debt 
per cent of potential GDP 
 
Note: IMF (2014c) does not include any US debt figures pre-2001. New Zealand figures 
were revised in 2014 and show a higher level of net debt to previous reports. 
Source: Grattan analysis of IMF (2014c) 
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a floating rate. Speaking before the GFC, Macfarlane observed 
that this economic awareness helped to produce surpluses in 
Australia,13 whereas the United States and many European 
countries were running deficits and increasing debt through the 
early 2000s. The difference cannot be explained by the additional 
boost to the Australian economy from the mining boom. From 
2003 to 2008, the US and Europe enjoyed strong economic 
growth but continued to run deficits that materially increased 
government debt, as Figure 2 shows. 
However, there are concerns that several years of budget deficits, 
and the accompanying rhetoric justifying them in Australia and 
overseas, may have eroded public aversion to deficits. Public 
concern about deficits may also be affected by promises to 
introduce specific costly programs and political attitudes projecting 
a belief in the ability of government to cure all social ills (see 
Chapter 7). 
 
                                            
13Macfarlane (2006).  
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3 The bottom line for Australian governments 
Eight years after moving into deficit during the GFC, the combined 
Commonwealth and State14 budgets are still not projected to 
return to balance. Although Commonwealth and State 
governments are currently forecasting that things will get better 
from here, with higher revenues and lower expenditures, they are 
not projecting balanced budgets until well after 2016-17. 
3.1 Combining Commonwealth and State budgets 
This paper seeks to identify the collective position of 
Commonwealth and state governments. A combined picture 
reveals the real pressures on Australian government budgets, 
which are often obscured by transfers between Commonwealth 
and state budgets.15  
3.2 Trends in the bottom line 
Australian government budget positions deteriorated over the last 
five years through the GFC, as Figure 3 shows. The deterioration 
in 2009 was not surprising: as economic growth slows, 
government budgets should generally move into deficit. As growth 
has picked up since 2009, deficits have narrowed, and are  
                                            
14 Throughout  this  paper,  we  use  ‘States’  to  include  both  States  and  Territories  of  
Australia. 
15 Throughout this paper, we use ‘transfers’ to refer to payments from the 
Commonwealth to the States. Where we present combined Commonwealth and 
State expenditures, these transfers are treated as State expenditure unless 
otherwise specified.  Welfare  transfers  are  called  ‘payments’  or  ‘benefits’  to  avoid  
confusion. Detail on the methodology for analysis of these budgets is presented 
in the Supporting Analysis volume. 
Figure 3:  Australian  governments’  historic  expenditure  and  revenue 
per cent of GDP, 2002-03 to 2016-17 
 
Note: Shows total revenue and expenditure for Commonwealth, State and Territory 
budgets. Transfers from the Commonwealth to States and Territories (e.g. GST, Specific 
Purpose Payments, and National Partnerships) have been removed from Commonwealth 
expenditure and States’  revenue  so  they  are  not  double-counted. See Supporting Analysis 
p35 for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth, State and Territory budget papers and mid-
year review papers 2002-03 to 2013-14; ABS (2013a)Table 30; ABS (2013d)Tables 231-
238 
28%
29%
30%
31%
32%
33%
34%
35%
36%
2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Revenue
Expenditure
Forecast
Financial year ended
Budget pressures on Australian governments: 2014 edition 
Grattan Institute 2014 13 
forecast to narrow further. But even so, government budget 
positions are not expected to balance within the forward estimates 
period (to 2016-17). Given economic conditions, they should 
probably already be in surplus (see Chapter 2). 
The collective deficit may not narrow as fast as is forecast. It 
relies on governments controlling spending growth more tightly 
and for longer than any government in Australia for the last 15 
years, as Figure 4 shows.  
The narrowing deficit also relies on continued bracket creep for 
income tax, which may not be politically sustainable as it hits 
middle income earners particularly hard.16 
3.3 Commonwealth and state trends 
Projections of budget balances have already been revised lower 
than those made only 18 months ago, primarily because the 
Commonwealth is forecasting substantially lower revenues.  
Figure 5 compares projections made by governments in their 
2012-13 budgets (released between May and August 2012) 
compared to those in their 2013-14 mid-year budget reviews 
(released between December 2013 and February 2014). The 
earlier projections show the Commonwealth and consolidated 
state budgets balancing in 2013-14, and combined state 
governments moving gradually into deficit across the forward 
estimates. The new projections show a marked deterioration in 
the Commonwealth budget balance. State projections are only 
slightly worse than previously thought.  
                                            
16 See below, Section 5.1 
Figure 4: Annual real growth in government expenditures 
5 year trailing average 
 
Note: ‘Large  states’ combine NSW, VIC, WA and QLD and in 2014 account for 
approximately 88 per cent of Gross-Domestic Product (GDP) 
Source: Treasury (2013a), Statement 10, Table 1, State and Territory Budget Papers 
(2002-03 to 2013-14) 
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The short-term  deterioration  in  the  Commonwealth  Government’s  
position is primarily due to falling revenues. The Government 
attributes this primarily to a softer economic outlook than that 
projected  in  earlier  budget  documents,  to  “legacy  issues  inherited  
from  the  former  government”,  and  to  some  changes  to  Treasury’s  
projection methodology.17 It is also driven by policy changes  
Figure 5: Budget projections from 2012-13 Budgets and 2013-14 
mid-year budget reviews 
Projected net operating balance, nominal $ bn 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth, State and Territory budget papers and mid-
year review papers 2011-12 to 2013-14 
                                            
17 Commonwealth of Australia (2013) p. 19 
proposed by the new government, including the abolition of the 
carbon price, and continuing fringe benefit tax concessions for 
company cars. Abolishing the minerals resource rent tax will 
reduce revenues, but the government intends to abolish the 
spending programs associated with the tax (such as the low 
income superannuation contribution and the Schoolkids Bonus  
Figure 6: Commonwealth and State expenditures and revenues 
per cent of GDP, 2002-03 to 2016-17 
 
Note: Revenue collected by the Commonwealth and transferred to States for expenditure 
on specified purposes is shown as Commonwealth revenue, and as State expenditure. To 
avoid double counting, it is excluded from both Commonwealth expenditure and State 
revenue. GST is treated as if it were a State revenue source. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth, State and Territory budget papers and mid-
year review papers 2002-03 to 2013-14; ABS (2013a)Table 30; ABS (2013d)Tables 231-
238; ABS (2013e). 
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payment).18 In the medium term, the GFC contributed 
substantially to deficits. Both revenue and expenditure for 
Commonwealth and States moved in the wrong direction during 
this period, as Figure 6 shows. While the economic cycle was 
responsible for many of the changes, substantial income tax cuts 
also dragged on Commonwealth revenue. With continued bracket 
creep Commonwealth revenue is rebounding, however, and is 
now only 0.5 per cent of GDP below pre-crisis levels. 
The long-term deterioration in budget balances is a result both of 
the Commonwealth spending more, and collecting less revenue, 
as a percentage of GDP. Even with the GFC long over, 
Commonwealth expenditure remains 1 per cent of GDP higher 
than it was in 2003, while revenue is 1.5 per cent lower. 
This analysis is based on a consistent treatment of transfers 
between the Commonwealth and States as being part of state 
expenditure. The analysis is also based on a consistent treatment 
of GST. The Commonwealth collects GST, and includes it in its 
revenues, but transfers all proceeds to the States. States bear the 
consequences if GST revenues are higher or lower than 
expected. To reveal the underlying picture, we treat the GST as 
part of state rather than Commonwealth revenue.  
                                            
18 Ibid. p. 274. The budget impact of policy choices of the Liberal-National 
government is further discussed in section 7.3 and Box 6 in section 8.1 
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4 Expenditure trends 
4.1 Overall expenditure trends 
Health, welfare, education, defence, and 
infrastructure account for two-thirds of 
Australian government spending, as 
Figure 7 shows.  
The three largest individual lines of 
spending are on old age pensions, 
hospitals and schools. Collectively, 
these amount to 8 per cent of GDP. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: NFS = not further specified. ‘Other’  comprises  all  
other expenditure not elsewhere included, including 
employment, legal, immigration and customs, arts and 
sport, housing, communications, emergency services, 
superannuation and water. See Supporting Analysis 
p35 for further notes, including category definitions. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State 
budget papers 2013-14 and PBO (n.d.-a) 
Figure 7:  Australian  governments’  combined  expenditures 
Per cent of total, 2013-14 budget 
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Figure 8: Change in Australian  governments’  expenditure   
Real change in expenditure, $2013 bn, 2002-03 to 2013-14 
 
Notes:  ‘Other’  comprises  all  expenditure  not  elsewhere  included.  ‘Social  services’ 
comprises ageing and aged care services, disability services, and community services. 
‘Govt  &  econ’  comprises government operations and economy and finance. ‘Other’ 
comprises all expenditure not elsewhere included. See Supporting Analysis p35 for further 
notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2013-14; ABS (2014c); ABS (2014b); PBO (n.d.-a) 
Expenditures remain 1 per cent of GDP higher than before the 
GFC. The main cause is health expenditure, which is eating into 
government budgets. Growth in health spending above GDP over 
the past 11 years was greater than the growth above GDP of all 
other spending combined, as Figure 8 shows. Hospital spending 
increased above GDP more than any other individual category.19 
Infrastructure transport and planning expenditure also grew 
materially over the last decade. This includes the impact of higher 
depreciation charges as a result of increased state capital 
expenditure, primarily on transport infrastructure, as discussed in 
Chapter 6.  
Some welfare expenditures, particularly the Age Pension and 
Carer’s  Pension  also grew faster than GDP, but the overall 
welfare category grew much less due to the aggregate reduction 
in payments to working age people, including Newstart, Parenting 
Payment and Youth Allowance.  
Australian trends in the drivers of government expenditure are 
mirrored in other countries. In the United States, for example, 
government health spending increased by 2 per cent of GDP, and 
aged pensions by 1 per cent of GDP over the decade to 2011. 
Overall, however, government expenditure in the United States 
jumped by 5 per cent of GDP, driven by trends not matched in 
Australia such as substantially rising spending in defence (1 per 
cent), unemployment benefits (2 per cent) and jails (1 per cent).20 
This analysis is broadly consistent with the Parliamentary Budget 
Office analysis of Commonwealth Government expenditure.21 
More detail on expenditure changes by jurisdiction is presented in 
the Supporting Analysis volume.  
                                            
19 See Supporting Analysis p6. 
20 Silver (2013) 
21 PBO (2013a). There are some differences in classification, particularly of 
welfare and social services. See Supporting Analysis p35-37. 
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4.2 Commonwealth and state expenditure 
Australian governments are forecast to spend $518 billion in 
2013-14. The Commonwealth will spend the most, as Figure 9 
shows. It spends 76 per cent of its expenditure directly, mostly on 
welfare payments, defence, health services (including Medicare 
and pharmaceuticals) and education (including non-government 
schools and higher education).22  The rest is spent in 
Commonwealth grants to the states. About half of these grants, 
amounting to $52 billion in 2013-14 are untied grants, mostly GST 
revenue. States have full control over how this money is spent. 
The remaining funds – $43 billion in 2013-14 – are tied grants, 
meaning that the Commonwealth restricts how they are spent. 
Some tied grants are tightly controlled (a specified amount must 
be spent on public dental services to adults, for example), 
whereas other tied grants are looser (a specified amount must be 
spent on school education).23 As well as these tied and untied 
grants, states are forecast to directly raise $119 billion of revenue 
in 2013-14 and spend it on areas of their own choosing.24 
                                            
22 See Supporting Analysis p2 for further detail on Commonwealth expenditure. 
23 See section 9 for further details on Commonwealth-State transfers. In this 
report,  ‘tied’  grants  are  treated  as  State  expenditure. See Supporting Analysis 
p35-37 for further information.  
24 The history and constitutional underpinnings of these arrangements are 
detailed in Twomey (2014). See Supporting Analysis for further detail on State 
expenditure. 
Figure 9: Commonwealth and state expenditure 
$bn, 2013-14 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers 2013-14 
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Some states spend considerably more per person than others, as 
Figure 10 shows.25 Western Australia and Queensland spend at 
least $1,200 more per person than do New South Wales and 
Victoria. Western Australia spends more per person in almost 
every category of spending. Some of this may be due to the 
higher costs of serving regional and remote populations, but some 
is probably attributable to Western Australia being under 
considerably less revenue pressure than other states due to the 
mining boom, as Section 5.2 discusses. Queensland spends a 
much larger proportion of its budget on infrastructure, transport 
and planning than other large states do, as Section 4.6 discusses.  
                                            
25 See Supporting Analysis for further detail of expenditure by each state. 
Figure 10: State government expenditure per capita 
$’000  per  person, 2013-14 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers 2013-14; ABS (2014a) Table 4. 
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4.3 Health expenditure 
Health expenses are 19 per cent of Australian government 
expenditure, and grew by 76 per cent in real terms between 2002-
03 and 2013-14.  
Increases in health expenditures are mainly driven not by an 
ageing population, but by people of all ages seeing doctors more 
often, having more tests, treatments and operations, and taking 
more prescription drugs.26 These changing practices are costing 
more per person, as Figure 11 shows. 
If the scope of health services continues to increase at the rate of 
the last decade, health will demand an additional 2 per cent of 
GDP from government budgets between 2013 and 2023. 
Increased health expenditure appears to be having an impact. Life 
expectancy, particularly for those aged over 65, has increased 
rapidly and consistently.27 But it has come at a cost. If we want to 
continue to enjoy the benefits of increased access to 
sophisticated health services, governments will have to find a way 
to pay for them. 
                                            
26 See Productivity Commission (2013) Chapter 5.2 for an extensive discussion 
of these trends. 
27Daley, et al. (2012), p. 56 
Figure 11:  Change  in  Australian  governments’  health  expenditure 
$2012 bn, 2002-03 to 2011-12 
 
Note:  ‘Population  growth’  models  the  effect  of  the  increase  in  population  size  with  no  
change in the age structure or average per capita health expenditure. ‘Population  ageing’  
uses age-specific per capita health expenditure data (based on AIHW figures) to model the 
effect  of  changes  in  the  population  structure.  ‘Health  inflation  above  CPI’  uses  appropriate  
AIHW health price indices to model inflation in each category  of  expenditure.  ‘New,  
improved  and  more  services  per  person’  is  the  amount  of  expenditure  that  cannot  be  
explained by these three factors. This analysis uses data with slightly different definitions 
and timeframes to that shown in Figure 8, so the size of the increase does not match 
exactly. 
Source: Grattan analysis of AIHW (2012);AIHW (2012); ABS (2013a) Cat. no. 6401.0 
Tables 1 and 2; ABS (2013c) Cat. no. 3101.0 Table 59. 
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4.4 Education expenditure 
Education expenses are 13 per cent of Australian government 
expenditure, and grew by 48 per cent in real terms over the last 
decade. 
School education expenses are much larger than other areas of 
education expenditure (Figure 12). Although they grew more 
slowly in percentage terms than did other categories, they grew 
by 45 per cent in real terms over the last 11 years.28 School 
expenditure by governments in 2013-14 is $14.1 billion more in 
real terms than in 2002-03, the fourth largest increase in dollar 
terms, behind only hospitals, infrastructure, and welfare for 
seniors. Spending on government schools has been driven 
primarily by the reduction in government school class sizes, and 
by the increasing average seniority of teachers – which translates 
into higher pay.29 
School spending by governments as a percentage of GDP has 
fallen slightly. The proportion of the population that is of school 
age is smaller than it was 10 years ago. A shift of enrolments into 
non-government schools has reduced government spending on 
schools, since governments collectively pay less per student in a 
non-government school than they do in a government school.  
Higher education and research have also grown, but off a much 
smaller base. Together they will receive $5.4 billion more in real 
terms in 2013-14 than in 2002-03. Government-funded higher 
                                            
28 Data is for government expenditure only. In 2009, private expenditure was 
15.9 per cent of total expenditure on schools: see OECD (2013a) 
29 Jensen, et al. (2011) 
education student numbers grew by more than 34 per cent 
between 2002 and 2012.30 
Figure 12:  Change  in  Australian  governments’  education  
expenditure 
Real change in expenditure, $2013 bn, 2002-03 to 2013-14 
 
Note: ‘Education expenditure not further specified’ is too small to show; it comprised 
$0.3bn in 2013-14. See Supporting Analysis for further notes. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2013-14; ABS (2014c); b); PBO (n.d.-a) 
                                            
30 DIISRTE (2012); Commonwealth budget papers 2012-13; Norton (2013) 
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4.5 Welfare expenditure 
Welfare is the largest single category of government spending, 
consuming 22 per cent of expenditure. Welfare spending grew by 
34 per cent in real terms over the last decade, slower than GDP.  
Because this data only includes direct expenditure, it does not 
capture the significant support given to many Australian 
households through tax concessions on superannuation 
(discussed in Section 5.6). Much of this support goes to middle- 
and high-income households.31 If these are included, welfare 
would be a large component of the budget, and growing faster. 
The overall modest growth in welfare expenditure conceals very 
large variations between categories. The two largest categories of 
welfare – seniors and family support – grew by more than 50 per 
cent in real terms over the last 11 years, faster than real GDP, as 
Figure 13 shows.  
 
                                            
31 See Daley, et al. (2013a) pp. 32-36 
Figure 13:  Change  in  Australian  governments’  welfare expenditure 
Real change in expenditure, $2013 billion, 2002-03 to 2013-14 
 
Notes: Categories comprise welfare payments directly to the identified group, and related 
administrative spending where identifiable. ‘Families’  includes  family  tax  benefits,  child 
care  subsidies,  parental  leave,  baby  bonus  and  schoolkids  bonus.  ‘Workforce’  comprises  
payments to working-age people, including Newstart, Youth Allowance and Parenting 
Payment. See Supporting Analysis p35-40 for further notes.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2013-14; ABS (2014c); b); PBO (n.d.-a) 
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4.5.1 Welfare for seniors 
Over the same period total welfare for seniors, primarily Age 
Pension payments, grew by 61 per cent, faster than GDP. Welfare 
for seniors is now the largest component of welfare spending. Yet, 
as with health spending, demographic ageing is not the prime 
cause (Figure 14).32 Spending on older people has increased 
rapidly – despite an increasing number of people retiring with 
superannuation – as a result of deliberate policy choices to 
increase Age Pension spending. These included the Howard 
Government changes to the assets and income tests in 2006-07, 
the 2008-09 Rudd Government increase to the base pension rate, 
and the 2010-11 Gillard Government Clean Energy Supplement 
which accompanied the introduction of the carbon price. The 
growth in spending above GDP was entirely due to these 
discretionary changes. Whether they were appropriate depends 
on many factors, including whether Age Pension expenditure was 
too low in 2003. 
 
                                            
32 See also Productivity Commission (2005) and Betts (2014) 
Figure 14: Drivers of change in Age Pension expenditure 
$2013 bn, 2002-03 to 2012-13 
 
Note:  Until September 2009, the Age Pension was indexed by CPI and benchmarked at 
25% of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE). From September 2009, it was 
indexed by the greater of CPI or the Pensioner and Beneficiary Living Cost Index (PBLCI), 
and  benchmarked  to  27.7%  of  MTAWE.  The  ‘indexation  above  CPI’  category  shows  the  
impact of using the 25% MTAWE benchmark over ten years. Change in MTAWE has been 
the highest index in 7 of the 10 years between 2002-03 and 2012-13.  ‘Demographic  
change’  is  based  on  the  increase  in  the  number  of  people  aged  65  and  over;;  this  is  an  
approximation as in 2002-03 women were eligible for the Age Pension from age 63.5. 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012a) Cat no. 6302.0 Table 10C; ABS (2013a) Cat. no. 
6401.0 Tables 1 and 2; ABS (2013b) Cat. no. 6467.0 Table 1; ABS (2013c) Cat. no. 3101.0 
Table 59; FaCS (2002); FaHCSIA (2012); Harmer (2009).  
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Welfare for seniors is relatively poorly targeted. Almost half of the 
$39 billion spent each year on the Age Pension goes to 
households with half a million dollars in net assets. Of mature-age 
households with a million dollars in net assets, about 80 per cent 
receive some welfare benefit, and on average it is more than $200 
a week, as Figure 15 shows.33 
There is widespread concern that Age Pension spending may 
become unsustainable in future decades, given the rapid recent 
rise in costs, an ageing population, and lax eligibility rules.34 The 
challenge would best be managed by increasing the Age Pension 
eligibility age, and better targeting payments towards those with 
genuine need and without significant assets, as Chapter 8 
discusses. 
On top of the Age Pension, a number of other government 
expenses and concessions are aimed at older people. The cost of 
concessions for public transport, car registration and third party 
insurance, utilities, rates, and health costs is already substantial. 
Public transport concessions are available to anyone over 60, 
irrespective of income.35 Many other concessions are available if 
any person in a household is entitled to a part pension. These 
concessions cost NSW about $1 billion in 2013-14.36 Older people 
also have access to additional welfare payments such as the 
Seniors Supplement, and benefit from substantial superannuation 
concessions and tax concessions such as the Senior Australians 
Tax Offset. Australia has the highest level of tax concessions for 
                                            
33 Daley, et al. (2013a), p. 37 
34 See, for example, Productivity Commission (2013)  
35 Seniors Card (2013) 
36 Includes concessions to health care card holders. NSW Government 2013-14 
Budget Paper 2, Appendix D  
private pensions in the OECD, and people of pension age pay 
much lower taxes than do younger people at the same level of 
gross income.37 
Figure 15: Household assets and Age Pension eligibility 
Household net wealth for mature-aged households, $m 
 
Note: ‘Mature-aged  households’  refers  to  households  in  which  the  household  reference  
person,  generally  the  ‘head’  of  the  household,  is  of  Age  Pension  age  (65  and  over) 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2011) 
                                            
37 Whiteford (2014b) 
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4.5.2 Welfare for jobseekers 
Welfare did not keep pace with GDP only because the aggregate 
cost of workforce payments such as Newstart, Youth Allowance 
and Parenting Payment fell in real terms. The unemployment rate 
fell, eligibility rules changed, and Newstart and Youth Allowance, 
which are indexed to the Consumer Price Index, did not keep 
pace with wage inflation. As a result, households whose main 
income is Newstart or jobseeker Youth Allowance have 
substantially lower disposable incomes after paying for housing: 
$305 and $242 a week, compared with $503 a week for 
households on other government payments.38 
These shifts have had substantial human impact. On any 
measure, households on Newstart and equivalent payments are 
doing it tougher than are households receiving other forms of 
welfare, as Figure 16 shows. Households in which the main 
income is Newstart or jobseeker Youth Allowance are more 
financially stressed, spend more of their income on basics, and 
are more likely to be and remain for an extended period in poverty 
than are other households.39  
The real reduction in workforce payments may be partially 
reversed in coming years. There is significant pressure to 
increase the level of Newstart given the stresses now experienced 
by Newstart households.40 Increasing Newstart by $50 a week 
would cost the budget about $2 billion, 0.1 per cent of GDP. 
                                            
38 Phillips and Nepal (2012), p. 13 
39 Ibid. 
40 See, for example, Australian Greens (2013); BCA (2013) 
Figure 16: Households experiencing hardships by main income 
source of household 
Percentage of households in category, 2009-10 
 
Note:  ‘Job  seeker  payment’  includes  Newstart  and  jobseeker  Youth  Allowance.  ‘Other  govt  
payment’  is  dominated  by  age  and  disability  pensions.  “Deprivations”  (such  as  the  inability  
to afford to invite friends for a meal once a  month)  and  “Financial  stresses”(such  being  
unable to pay electricity on time) are as defined by the ABS Household Expenditure 
Survey.  ‘Poverty”  is  defined  as  householders  whose  income  after  tax  and  welfare,  and  
paying for housing is less than 50% of the median Australian household: 
Source: Grattan analysis of Phillips and Nepal (2012). 
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4.5.3 Welfare for people with a disability 
In contrast to pensions for seniors, disability pensions grew at 
only about the same rate as GDP between 2002-03 and 2013-14. 
Some of this growth was the consequence of individuals switching 
from Newstart to the Disability Support Pension (DSP), which 
pays more per week, and does not have the same requirements 
to actively search for work.  
More than half the growth in DSP reflects demographic 
classification effects. The total proportion of older households on 
welfare has reduced over the last decade. However, there are 
more older households. As well, older households on welfare are 
more likely to claim DSP than Newstart, and DSP now supports 
some of the older households that would previously have received 
payments, such as mature age allowances, widows’ pensions, 
and Age Pensions for women between 60 and 65, that have now 
been phased out.41  
4.5.4 Welfare and inequality in Australia 
Overall, Australia’s  welfare  system  is  well-targeted. Welfare 
payments substantially reduce inequality of outcomes and 
opportunities. Once taxes and welfare are taken into account, 
overall inequality in Australia is a little above the OECD average, 
as Figure 17 shows. The effects of income inequality are 
mitigated  by  Australia’s  welfare  system. 
Australia’s  welfare  system  is  highly  targeted  towards  those  who  
need the most. Although the Australian government pays less to 
                                            
41 Whiteford (2011); Whiteford (2014a) 
all households than elsewhere in the OECD, it pays more to low-
income households, as Figure 18 shows. 
Australian spending on means-tested payments is almost double 
that of anywhere else in the OECD. As a result, those in the 
poorest quintile in Australia receive 12 times more in cash 
Figure 17: Household income inequality after taxes and payments 
in the OECD 
Gini coefficient, late 2000s, household disposable income 
 
Note: No Gini coefficients for income before taxes and transfers are available for Mexico. 
Figures for Chile, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland are for 2009, all others are 
for 2010. Gini coefficient based on equivalised household disposable income (after taxes 
and payments) for total population. 
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Source: OECD (2013b) 
payments than do those in the richest quintile. Across the OECD 
the poorest quintile only receives twice as much in cash 
payments, on average. The Australian tax system is also more 
redistributive than the OECD average, meaning that a greater 
proportion of the total tax take is collected from the rich than in 
comparable countries.42 
Figure 18: Redistribution of welfare payments in OECD countries 
Public payments to households as a proportion of population disposable 
income, mid-2000s 
 
                                            
42 OECD (2008), p.103-105 
Note: Incomes are equivalised. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Whiteford (2010) 
A more extensive discussion of inequality and the welfare system 
in Australia is presented in Section 7.4 of the 2013 edition of this 
report; the situation has not changed materially in the year since 
that report was published.43 
4.6 Infrastructure expenditure 
Infrastructure, transport and planning expenses are 7 per cent of 
Australian government budgets, and grew by 108 per cent in real 
terms between 2002-03 and 2013-14. States spent most of this 
money. Infrastructure, transport and planning now consume 16 
per cent of State government budgets.44  
Accounting  standards  mandate  that  “recurrent  spending”  on  
infrastructure  does  not  include  the  current  year’s  capital  
expenditure.  Instead  “recurrent  spending”  on  infrastructure 
includes the interest and depreciation costs of past capital 
expenditure. Interest and depreciation from past infrastructure 
spending are consuming an increasing proportion of state 
recurrent budgets, as Chapter 6 will show. 
As Figure 19 shows, infrastructure, transport and planning 
spending grew at least as fast as GDP in all large states. Growth 
was much faster than GDP in New South Wales and Queensland. 
A  significant  proportion  of  Queensland’s  expenditure ($4.1 billion) 
was spent by the Queensland Reconstruction Authority to repair 
                                            
43 Daley, et al. (2013), pp. 36-44. See also Whiteford (2013) 
44 The Commonwealth spends less than 1 per cent of its own-purpose 
expenditure on infrastructure, transport and planning. 
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infrastructure damaged in various natural disasters, including the 
2010-11 floods and more recent tropical cyclones. This spending 
will fall provided that the number and severity of such disasters 
declines. The increase in New South Wales appears to be a more 
general increase across all categories of infrastructure, transport 
and planning expenditure, although some may be due to New 
South Wales using a different accounting approach to funding its 
transport agencies.
Figure 19: Change  in  Australian  governments’  infrastructure, 
transport and planning expenditure, by jurisdiction 
Real change in expenditure, $2013 billion, 2002-03 to 2013-14 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers for 2002-03 and 
2013-14; ABS (2014c); b); PBO (n.d.-a). 
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5 Revenue trends 
Australian governments are forecast to collect $497 billion in 
revenues in 2013-14, about 31 per cent of GDP. These revenues 
are dominated by income tax, company tax and the GST. 
Other taxes – including all those raised directly by the States – 
are relatively small, as Figure 20 shows. Revenues collected by 
the Commonwealth are three times larger than revenues collected 
by all the States and Territories combined. Commonwealth 
transfers make up around 45 per cent of State revenues. 
All major revenue sources dropped during the GFC. Collections 
have since recovered, apart from GST collections, which are likely 
to remain about 0.5 per cent of GDP less than the 2000-2010 
average. Government decisions to abolish carbon pricing and the 
Minerals Resource Rent Tax (MRRT) remove potential revenue 
sources, although the total amount anticipated to be collected 
from these sources was relatively small.45 
Tax expenditures – concessions to general tax provisions aimed 
at a specific policy outcome – now cost Australian governments 
more than $135 billion a year in foregone revenue.46 Although tax 
expenditures are notoriously difficult to compare across 
jurisdictions,  available  data  suggest  that  Australia’s  foregone  
revenue from these concessions is amongst the highest in the 
developed world as a percentage of GDP.47 
                                            
45 Longer-run Commonwealth revenue trends are reviewed in PBO (2014) 
46 Grattan analysis of Treasury (2014) and State government budget papers 
2013-14. 
47 Tyson (2014) 
Figure 20:  Australian  governments’  revenues 
$ bn, 2013-14 budgets 
 
Note:  Classifications are based on liability rather than incidence, so income  taxes’  are 
individual income tax, superannuation taxes and fringe  benefits  tax;;  ‘corporate  taxes’  are 
company  tax,  resource  rent  taxes  and  payroll  tax;;  ‘other  consumption  taxes’  are carbon 
pricing,  customs,  excise  and  other  sales  taxes;;  ‘other  taxes’  are mostly agricultural taxes 
for the Commonwealth, and gambling, insurance and vehicle taxes for the States;;  ‘non-tax 
revenues’  are not further specified for the Commonwealth, and are mostly dividends, 
interest, royalties and sale of goods and services for States;;  ‘property  taxes’  are mostly 
land tax and stamp duty. For Commonwealth transfers to States:  ‘untied  transfers’  are 
mostly  GST;;  ‘tied  transfers’  include Specific Purpose and National Partnership payments.  
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers 2013-14 
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5.1 Commonwealth revenues 
Revenues collected by the Commonwealth are forecast to amount 
to about 23.5 per cent of GDP in 2013-14. Over the 11 years to 
2014, all major Commonwealth revenue sources increased in real 
terms, as Figure 21 shows. However, they fell as a proportion of 
GDP. Corporate taxes revenues rose faster than did GDP growth, 
while income and consumption taxes rose more slowly.  
Yet this comparison conceals substantial variation from year to 
year, as Figure 22 shows. Commonwealth income and corporate 
tax dropped between 2007 and 2013 with big personal income tax 
cuts, and as the impact of the GFC flowed through the economy 
and then taxation revenues. Corporate tax revenues are forecast 
to return to close to their 2001-2010 average by 2017. Income tax 
receipts are projected to recover even more strongly, primarily 
due to bracket creep. Some have questioned whether allowing 
this level of fiscal drag is either politically feasible or economically 
desirable.48  
                                            
48 See, for example, Parkinson (2014). 
Figure 21: Change in Commonwealth government revenues 
Real change in revenue, $2013 bn, 2003 to 2014 
 
Note:  ‘Other  taxes’  is  mostly  agricultural  taxes;;  ‘other  consumption  taxes’  is  carbon  pricing,  
non-GST sales taxes, customs, and non-fuel  excises;;  ‘income  taxes’  is  individual  income  
tax, superannuation taxes and fringe benefits tax. Non-tax revenues can vary widely 
depending on asset sales. However, the change in non-tax revenue, close to GDP, 
suggests that there are not major anomalies in either 2003 or 2014. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth budget papers 2002-03 and 2013-14; ABS 
(2014c) Table 1; ABS (2014b) Table 30. 
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Figure 22: Trends in major Commonwealth taxes 
per cent of GDP 
 
Note: Individual taxation receipts include individual and income tax withholding; corporate 
includes FBT, super funds, companies and resource rent taxes; indirect includes sales 
taxes, excise and customs duty, carbon price mechanism, and other.  
Source: Treasury (2013a) Budget Paper 1,Statement 5, Table C2,, Treasury (2013b) 
5.2 State revenues 
Revenues received by the States are forecast to amount to about 
14 per cent of GDP in 2013-14. Many of these revenues are 
collected by the Commonwealth and then transferred to the 
States. State governments collect little more than half of what they 
spend, as Figure 23 shows.  
Figure 23: State and Territory government revenues by source 
per cent of total, 2013-14 
 
Notes:  ‘Investment income’ includes interest income, dividends, and tax-equivalent 
payments from State entities. ‘Other own-source’ includes fines, fees, grants from entities 
other than the Commonwealth, and other revenue not elsewhere included.  ‘Other general 
purpose grants’ is mostly royalty payments to WA.  
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2013-14. 
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Figure 24: Change in State government revenues 
Real change in revenue, $2013 bn, 2003 to 2014 
 
Notes:  ‘Tied  grants’ include Specific Purpose Payments, National Partnership Payments, 
payments for on-passing to other entities, and other tied grants. ‘Taxation’  includes 
gambling, land, insurance, vehicle, payroll and stamp duties. ‘Investment’ includes interest 
income, dividends, and tax-equivalent payments from State entities.  ‘Other  own-source’  
includes fines, fees, grants from entities other than the Commonwealth, and other revenue 
not  elsewhere  included.  ‘Untied  grants’ in 2013-14 are mostly royalty payments to WA; in 
2002-03, they were mostly National Competition Policy payments and compensation 
payments for loss of revenue from State taxes abolished with the introduction of the GST 
(both have now ceased). 
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2002-03 and 2013-14; ABS (2014c) 
Table 1; ABS (2014b) Table 30. 
Over the last 11 years, State revenues from the Commonwealth 
have been under pressure. Tied transfers from the 
Commonwealth increased, but untied transfers – including GST 
revenues – shrank relative to GDP (Figure 24). The gap was filled 
by state charges and royalties growing faster than GDP.  
As Figure 25 shows, some States collect much more revenue per 
capita than do others. In 2013-14, Queensland will collect at least 
$750 more per person than New South Wales or Victoria, and 
Western Australia will collect over $2,000 more per person. More 
detail is presented in the Supporting analysis volume. 
5.3 Income taxes 
Income taxes are forecast to be 10.7 per cent of GDP in 2013-14, 
as shown in Figure 22. This is close to their long-run average from 
2000 to 2010.  
Income taxes fell by 2 per cent of GDP from a peak in 2004-05 to 
a low in 2009-10. Revenue (including falls in capital gains tax) fell 
partly as a result of the GFC. It also fell with a series of rate cuts, 
particularly steep between 2006-07 and 2008-09,49 so that income 
tax in 2010-2011 was $10 billion lower than it would have been if 
the thresholds from 2006-07 had been indexed at CPI. However, 
by 2015-16, several years of bracket creep will cancel out the 
annual impact of these tax cuts, and income tax collection will be 
the same as if the income tax brackets had simply been indexed 
at CPI from 2007-08.50 
There is a reasonable chance that Capital Gains Tax (CGT) 
receipts will increase by about 0.3 per cent of GDP over the next 
few years. CGT is collected as income, company and 
                                            
49 See PBO (2014), p.30 
50 Deloitte Access Economics (2012), p. 73 
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superannuation taxes. Collections in 2010 were at a cyclical low 
of 0.45 per cent of GDP, well below the peak of 1.48 per cent of 
GDP in 2007. However, the share market and property price 
boom of the 2000s should probably be seen as an aberration: 
over 15 years, CGT receipts averaged 0.72 per cent of GDP.51  
Figure 25: State government revenues per capita 
$2013 ’000  per  capita,  2013-14 budgets 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of State budget papers for 2013-14; ABS (2014a) Table 4. 
                                            
51 Grattan analysis of Commonwealth 2013-14 Budget Paper No.1, p. 5-10 
5.4 Corporate taxes 
Commonwealth corporate taxes are forecast to be about 5.5 per 
cent of GDP in 2013-14. The largest component is company tax 
(4.5 per cent of GDP); much of the remainder is paid by super 
funds, the carbon price, and resource rent taxes. Payroll tax 
collected by the States is a further 1.4 per cent of GDP. 
Over the last four years company tax revenues were below the 
average for 2000 to 2010, although above the low point of 2003. 
In part, economic growth and therefore corporate profits have 
been lower than before the GFC. In part company taxes are lower 
because of corporate losses during the GFC that were claimed in 
subsequent years.  
Until the 2013-14 Budget, Treasury consistently overestimated 
company tax collections by about 0.5 per cent of GDP.52 This was 
partly because mining companies paid less tax than forecasts, 
which failed to allow for accelerated depreciation on substantial 
new investments. Another explanation, based on taxation 
statistics, is that financial asset investing companies paid about 
$7 billion a year less tax after the share market crash in 2008.53 
5.5 Indirect taxes 
Indirect taxes – primarily the GST and fuel excise – dropped by 
about 1 per cent of GDP relative to the 2001-2010 average, as 
Figure 22 shows.  
                                            
52 Chessell, et al. (2012), p. xxi 
53 Joiner and Eslake (2013), p.10 
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The fall in GST was partially due to changes in household 
savings.54 In 2003, Australian households were saving less than 1 
per cent of their discretionary (post-tax) income. By 2013 they 
were much more frugal, saving almost 10 per cent of discretionary 
income, or 6.5 per cent of GDP. Figure 26 suggests this may be a 
persistent change in behaviour, driven by a combination of 
historically high debt levels that households are now looking to 
reduce, lower confidence as a result of the GFC, increased 
awareness of rising longevity and the need for additional 
retirement savings, and replacement of the wealth increase 
previously delivered by strong capital gains in housing and 
equities.55  
GST revenues also fell because consumers spent an increasing 
proportion of their income on GST-exempt items such as 
education, health, and housing in the form of rent and mortgage 
interest (see Figure 27).56 There was a further small loss of tax 
revenue as internet shopping grew, but not a material impact. As 
international online purchase sizes are small (averaging $38 
each) and falling, collecting GST on such purchases might well 
cost more than the revenue raised.57  
There is no obvious reason to expect these trends to reverse in 
the foreseeable future, particularly as the population ages: older  
 
                                            
54 The flow of household savings as calculated by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics includes contributions and net earnings, less withdrawals, for 
superannuation. 
55  Freestone, et al. (2011);  
56 See also PBO (2014) pp38-40 
57 See Daley, et al. (2013a) p52, and NAB (2013); cf EY (2012) 
Figure 26: GST revenue and household savings 
GST revenue and household savings, $2012 bn 
 
Note: Net household savings includes contributions and net earnings, less withdrawals, for 
superannuation. 
Source: ABS (2013e) Cat no. 5506.0, ABS (2013b) Cat no. 5204.0  
people spend a much higher proportion of their income on 
health.58 
Indirect taxes have also fallen relative to GDP because petrol 
excise was not indexed after 2001.59 As a result, revenue from 
fuel excises fell in real terms between 2003 and 2014, despite an 
                                            
58 Productivity Commission (2005).  
59 Treasury (2010b), section 9.3. 
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increasing population, as Figure 21 shows. If petrol excise had 
been indexed in line with inflation over the last decade, revenue 
on current volumes would be approximately $5 billion higher. The 
higher price would probably reduce consumption, so the net 
revenue foregone is probably about $3 billion.60 
Figure 27: Changes in consumer expenditure by GST liability 
Change in share of household expenditure, 2004-10, percentage points 
of expenditure 
 
Source: ABS (2006); ABS (2011) 
                                            
60 Daley, et al. (2013b). p. 28-29 
5.6 Tax expenditures 
When governments exempt certain types of transactions or 
taxpayers from an otherwise general tax, the foregone revenue is 
known as a tax expenditure. Tax expenditures are usually justified 
on the basis that they serve a particular policy objective better 
than does direct spending. Although tax expenditures are often 
less discussed than revenue or expenditure, they are a significant 
component of government budgets. 
Measuring tax expenditures is inherently difficult, and Treasury 
has not quantified almost a third of all identified tax 
expenditures.61 Nonetheless, available estimates forecast that the 
Commonwealth will forego $117 billion in tax expenditures in 
2013-14, or almost a third of revenues collected.62 As Figure 28 
shows, more than a third of this comes from superannuation tax, 
particularly the ability to contribute to superannuation funds from 
income before paying income tax, and the taxation of 
superannuation fund earnings at less than the marginal rate of 
income tax. The second-largest category is concessions for 
owner-occupied housing, particularly its exemption from capital 
                                            
61 Measuring a tax expenditure involves determining how much revenue would 
have been collected if the exemption did not exist, which requires assumptions 
about what tax rules would apply in its place as well as how taxpayers behaviour 
might then change. For example, determining how much revenue government 
would collect if owner-occupied housing were not exempt from capital gains tax 
requires assumptions about what rate would apply, as well as whether fewer 
people might choose to invest in owner-occupied housing were it not subject to 
such favourable tax treatment. For a discussion of the difficulty of estimating and 
comparing tax expenditures, and a detailed description of the method used, see 
Treasury (2014) and the relevant sections of State budget papers.  
62 Treasury notes that its estimates of tax expenditures are not strictly additive, 
introducing a further level of uncertainly to this figure. 
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gains tax. The third-largest is the exemption of fresh food, health, 
education, financial supplies and some other spending from GST.  
Figure 28: Commonwealth tax expenditures by category 
$bn, 2013-14 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Treasury (2014) 
Treasury suggests that the largest non-quantifiable expenditures 
include the ability to quarantine capital losses, as well as a 
number of company tax exemptions.63 
State tax expenditures are even more challenging to measure, 
since states use different tax benchmarks and assumptions. In 
2012-13, the four largest states estimated that they gave up 
almost $22 billion in tax exemptions,64 primarily through stamp 
duties, land and payroll tax. These exemptions are equivalent to 
20 per cent of those states’  own-source revenue. 
The best available data suggests that Australia has one of the 
largest tax expenditures in the world as a percentage of GDP.65  
This is not necessarily a bad thing; tax expenditures can achieve 
important policy aims. For example, exempting welfare payments 
from  income  tax  ensures  that  money  is  not  ‘churned’  from  
government to a recipient and returned immediately as tax. 
Nonetheless, tax expenditures are an important avenue for 
improving budgets. Chapter 8 assesses potential options for tax 
expenditure reform, including the significant fiscal benefits 
available from superannuation and GST reform. 
                                            
63 Treasury (2014) p11. These include exemptions for Commonwealth, State and 
Territory public authorities and entities; foreign branch profits; off-market share 
buy-backs; and charitable, religious, scientific, and community service entities. 
64 Grattan analysis of State budget papers 2013-14. Comparable data for 2013-
14 is not available for all jurisdictions. 
65 Tyson (2014) 
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6 Capital expenditure
Capital expenditure is money spent on government-owned, fixed 
assets that provide services to the community.  
Australian governments plan to spend $21 billion on capital works 
in 2013-14. State and territory governments spend 84 per cent of 
this. Capital works are 6.1 per cent of all state and territory 
government spending in this financial year. 
Over the last decade capital expenditure has increased 
substantially, much faster than GDP. Between 2007 and 2013, 
total government capital spending was three to six times the real 
value of expenditure in 2003-2004. 
State governments tend to focus attention on their recurrent 
budget balance, which excludes capital expenditure. Yet higher 
capital expenditure matters because it increases interest and 
depreciation expenses in future recurrent budget balances. 
Interest and depreciation charges, largely a legacy of increased 
capital spending, have increased from about 6 to more than 9 per 
cent of state and territory revenue. State government recurrent 
spending to cover past infrastructure spending is consuming 
almost 0.5% of GDP more than 6 years ago. Tough policy choices 
can’t  reduce  these  charges:  they  are  locked  in  to  account  for  past  
spending. 
New assets come with operating and maintenance expenses. 
These additional costs are not easily identifiable in government 
budgets, but they inevitably put more pressure on Australian 
budgets. 
New assets can increase revenues, both through direct charging 
and by assisting economic growth that flows into higher tax 
revenues. They can also provide social benefits. However, unless 
projects are well-chosen and executed, the benefits may be less 
than the costs. Even if they exceed costs, government may not 
capture enough of the benefits to cover the costs of construction. 
Accounting for capital expenditure has obscured some of the 
underlying problems in state budgets. Unusually large 
Commonwealth grants for infrastructure have boosted state 
headline recurrent budget balances. However, the depreciation 
expenses that match that revenue will drag on future state 
recurrent budget balances for many years. 
Governments are regularly called on to spend more on 
infrastructure. If they simply maintain current levels of 
infrastructure spending, then interest and depreciation will 
consume an increasing share of their revenue in future. 
Capital recycling – selling assets and spending the proceeds on 
new assets – would reduce the debt of state and territory 
governments. But it will not improve recurrent budget balances 
unless governments strike unusually good bargains in selling 
assets.  
Similarly, increased use of public private partnerships (PPPs), 
instead of direct government borrowing for infrastructure, will not 
necessarily improve future budget balances. PPPs only 
substantially improve budgets if they generate additional revenue 
streams, such as new toll roads. 
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6.1 Trends in government capital expenditure  
States and territories spend substantial capital to build hospitals, 
schools, roads, public transport and other infrastructure.66 
Over the last 11 years capital expenditure has increased 
significantly, peaking in 2009-10  with  the  Commonwealth’s  
stimulus package (Figure 29).67 But even when stimulus 
expenditure is excluded, capital expenditure in real terms in 2013-
14 is four times higher than in 2002-03. 
The analysis presented in this report is based on Australian 
Bureau of Statistics calculations that do not capture all 
government capital expenditure.68 While this measure provides 
the most consistent comparison across Australia, it does not 
include spending that is often included in the headline capital 
expenditure of government budgets. For example, the ABS 
analysis does not include public non-financial corporations 
(PNFCs) that deliver services on behalf of government.69 These 
are often excluded from general government budgets on the basis 
                                            
66 Note that the Commonwealth Government provides funding to states and 
territories through grants to be spent on capital projects. 
67 This includes both the Building the Education Revolution (BER) and Social 
Housing Initiative under the Commonwealth  Government’s  National  Building  
Economic Stimulus Plan. 
68 This  analysis  uses  the  capital  expenditure  measure  of  ‘general  government  
net acquisition of non-financial  assets’  as  reported  by  ABS (2013d). This 
measure captures purchases of non-financial assets, less asset sales, 
depreciation and other changes such as movements in inventories. See 
Supporting Analysis p41-43 for definitions. 
69 States use different terms to refer to PNFCs. For example they are termed 
‘Public  Trading  Entities’  (PTEs)  in  New  South  Wales  and  ‘Government  Owned  
Corporations (GOCs) in Queensland. 
that their independent revenue streams will cover their costs, 
including capital expenditure.70 However, the headline capital 
expenditure in NSW does include capital expenditure in the PNFC 
sector to purchase assets directly or through finance leases, such 
as the lease of train carriages via RailCorp. 
Figure 29: State and territory capital expenditure  
General government net acquisition of non-financial assets, $2013 bn 
 
Notes: 2012-13 are estimated actuals, 2013-14 and forward estimates are budgeted 
figures 
                                            
70 Other issues in reconciling this analysis to budgets published by individual 
state governments, such as timing issues, are discussed in Supporting Analysis 
p41-43. 
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Source: ABS (2013) cat 5512, Treasury (2008), Part 2, Table 2.1, State and Territory 
budget papers 2013-14 
Box 1 – Budget classifications 
Government budgets are reported according to standard 
economic sector classifications, as defined by the ABS.71 The key 
terms are: 
General government means government departments and 
agencies that deliver public services, or act as a regulator of 
private sector activity. Examples of general government 
expenditure include education, health, and criminal justice. 
Public Non-Financial Corporations (PNFCs)72 typically deliver 
commercial services such as water, electricity and ports. They 
operate on a cost recovery basis and fund capital expenditure 
through user charges as well as borrowings.73 State governments 
may also provide general government funding to PNFCs to deliver 
services on behalf of the government. Such expenditures are 
usually included in headline capital expenditure numbers. 
Public Financial Corporations (PFCs) are arms of government 
engaged in financial activity including state central borrowing 
authorities such as Treasury corporations. 
6.2 Commonwealth capital expenditure 
The Commonwealth funds a large amount of state-based 
infrastructure such as roads, schools and hospitals. However the 
                                            
71 ABS (2014e) 
72 Also known as Public Trading Enterprises (PTEs) in New South Wales. 
73 Treasury NSW (2006) Budget Paper 4, pp. 16-17 
Commonwealth accounts for this funding as recurrent grants to 
states rather than as capital expenditure in its capital account. As 
a result,  the  Commonwealth’s  capital  expenditure  captures  only  
money spent on assets owned by the Commonwealth.  
Between 2002-03 and 2012-13 Commonwealth capital 
expenditure grew by 10 per cent a year, on average.74  
The growth significantly exceeded average GDP growth of 3 per 
cent per year. While capital investment peaked at around $7 
billion in 2009-10, it has reduced and is not forecast to grow over 
the forward estimates period (Figure 30). This may change in the 
2014-15 budget given recent defence acquisition decisions. 
Most Commonwealth Government capital expenditure is spent on 
defence assets. These include specialised military equipment 
such as aircraft, ships and building support facilities. The increase 
in defence spending over the last 10 years was largely due to 
buying weapons systems and planes, chiefly Super Hornets and 
heavy lift planes.75 Capital expenditure by other departments is 
significantly less than defence spending and includes buildings, 
infrastructure and computer software.76 
As it spends more on capital, the Commonwealth, like the states, 
will incur increasing interest and depreciation expenses. Yet the 
pressure on the Commonwealth budget will be less since the 
Commonwealth spends less on capital assets compared to states 
and territories. 
                                            
74 PBO (2013a), p. 50 
75 Growth in defence funding is consistent with a White Paper Defence 2000 
target of three per cent growth in defence spending per year: ibid. p. 38. 
76 Ibid., p. 50.  
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Figure 30: Commonwealth general government net capital 
investment 
$2013 bn 
 
Source: PBO (n.d.-b) 
6.3 Funding capital expenditure 
States could have funded capital expenditure through recurrent 
operating surpluses. However, over the last 7 years, states posted 
either recurrent deficits or small recurrent surpluses at best. 
Consequently, all states funded increased capital spending by 
running down accumulated surpluses and then borrowing and 
increasing debt. In 2006, total state and territory budgets had 
financial assets that exceeded debt liabilities by $37 billion. Today 
states have $69 billion in net debt, as Figure 31 shows. Borrowing 
by the three largest states – Queensland, Victoria and New South 
Wales – mostly drove the increase. Capital expenditure drove 
almost all the increase in debt as states collectively had close to 
zero net operating balances between 2008 and 2014. 
Although the Commonwealth Government contributed funds for 
large infrastructure projects, these were often conditional on 
states  matching  the  Commonwealth’s  funding.  Victoria’s  Regional  
Rail Link and the New  South  Wales’  Pacific  Highway  upgrade are 
examples.77 States therefore increased debt to pay their share. 
                                            
77 Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (2014b), Department 
of Infrastructure and Regional Development (2014a) 
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Figure 31: Combined state and territory net debt 
$2013 bn 
 
Note: Net debt is deposits held, advances received and borrowings, less cash, deposits, 
investments, advances paid, and investments, loans and placements: ABS (2005) 
Source: ABS (2013d), state and territory budget papers 2013-14  
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6.4 Recurrent budget impacts of capital expenditure  
From an accounting perspective, historic capital expenditure 
increases depreciation and therefore recurrent expenses in future 
budgets. If capital works are debt-funded, the increased interest 
also drags on future recurrent budgets.  
Unlike many other expenditures, depreciation charges cannot be 
reduced through a change in government policy or priorities. 
Depreciation costs are locked in for the life of the asset. Interest 
costs are locked in until debt is repaid. 
Over the last 11 years, interest and depreciation costs as a 
percentage of state revenue increased from about 6 to 9.4 per 
cent in 2013-14, as Figure 4 shows. They are estimated to 
increase slightly over the forward estimates period. Interest 
expenses have increased faster than depreciation. 
This increase is equivalent to states spending about 0.5% of GDP 
more paying for the infrastructure spending of previous years. 
Figure 32: State and territory depreciation and interest costs as a 
percentage of revenue 
Percentage of revenue 
 
Source: ABS (2013) cat 5512, State and Territory budget papers (2013-14) 
The only state that has not followed this trend is Tasmania, as 
Figure 33 and Figure 34 show. The particularly rapid increase in 
Queensland is partly due to capital works repairing damage from 
cyclones, flooding and bushfires. 
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Figure 33: Interest and depreciation costs as a percentage of 
revenue, by state  
Percentage of revenue  
 
Source: ABS (2013d), State and Territory budget papers (2013-14) 
If capital expenditure is simply maintained at current levels, 
depreciation charges may increase further. Whether this is 
happening is not clearly visible, and depends on the age profile of 
assets already being depreciated. The depreciation charges 
attributable to this profile are visible over the forward estimates. 
But beyond that period, some state government central agencies 
have no central registry of the aggregate stock of assets, their 
remaining life, or forecast depreciation costs. Instead, individual 
agencies hold these figures.  
Figure 34 Interest and depreciation costs as a percentage of 
revenue, by state 
Percentage of revenue 
 
Source: ABS (2013d), State and Territory budget papers (2013-14) 
6.5 Maintenance costs 
As well as adding to interest and depreciation expenses, new 
infrastructure also requires ongoing operational expenses and 
maintenance. Budgets typically do not provide aggregated 
reporting on maintenance. Maintenance spending can usually 
only be calculated by examining line items for each agency in 
every jurisdiction.  
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It is often possible to defer maintenance spending. Doing so 
improves recurrent budget balances but increases the amount 
that will need to be spent in future. 
Failing to maintain assets often increases total costs in the long 
run. As many home-owners have discovered, ignoring a leaky 
roof can cost a lot more than buying new tiles. If assets are badly 
run down, then recurrent maintenance will often be reclassified as 
capital works for renovations. This classification may defer the 
impact on recurrent budgets, but will then be a larger ongoing 
charge than is timely maintenance. 
A  case  study  of  Victoria’s  Department  of  Education  and Early 
Childhood Development (Box 2) shows that spending can be 
much less than industry standards for maintenance for many 
years. This creates a substantial backlog that will inevitably need 
to be spent but which is not visible in the budget papers. 
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Box 2: Maintenance  and  capital  expenditure  in  Victoria’s  Department  
of Education and Early Childhood Development  
Over a decade, spending on regular school maintenance in 
Victoria was only about 0.6 per cent of asset value, less than a 
third of the industry standard for asset management. 
As Figure 35 shows, money was allocated for maintenance both 
through recurrent school budgets, and as capital projects to 
“modernise  and  redevelop”  schools  when  buildings  had  fallen well 
behind contemporary requirements. These capital projects were a 
mixture of substantial renovations for new purposes, and catch-up 
maintenance  
In 2012, the Department undertook an audit of school buildings. It 
identified that more than 2000 buildings, or 7.5 per cent, were at 
the  point  of  ‘imminent  failure’  or  had  already  failed.  The 
Department estimated that an additional $420 million was required 
to return these buildings to appropriate condition, with more than 
half the spending classified as capital expenditure rather than 
maintenance.  
Following  the  Victorian  Auditor  General’s  report,  the  Department  is  
developing a new maintenance funding formula driven by the 
profile of stock of assets, rather than by the number of students. 
Note: The maintenance  funding  benchmark  used  by  the  Victoria  Auditor  General’s  Office  is  2  
per cent of asset stock. Victorian Auditor-General's Office (2012), p. viii 
Sources: Victorian Auditor-General's Office (2012) 
Figure 35: DEECD school maintenance expenditure 
Expenditure as a % of asset stock 
 
Note: Figures converted to $2012-13.  Asset  stock  is  ‘property,  plant  and  equipment’  Capital  
refurbishment includes modernisation, refurbishment and regeneration, minor works, 
construction of new classrooms, replacement and specific programs. Capital refurbishment is 
annual Total Estimated Expenditure (TEI) classified as Refurbishment Recurrent maintenance is 
maintenance provided to schools through SRPs and Budget and Expenditure Review 
Committee (BERC) funding) 
Source: DTF Victoria (multiple years), DEECD (multiple years) 
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6.6 Accounting impact of Commonwealth grants 
Accounting standards for Commonwealth infrastructure grants 
can make state budgets look better than they really are. 
Accounting standards require that states treat Commonwealth 
contributions as recurrent revenue. The Commonwealth treats 
these grants as recurrent expenditure, and so includes them in its 
recurrent budget balance. The states and territories treat the 
grants as recurrent income – which helps their headline recurrent 
budget balance – but when they spend the money they typically 
account for it as capital expenditure.  
This accounting trick does not immediately affect the  states’ 
headline recurrent budget balance, but it creates a drag on future 
recurrent budget balances as the asset depreciates. It increases 
both short-term recurrent revenue and long-term future recurrent 
spending. When Commonwealth grants for capital expenditure 
return to more normal levels, the underlying recurrent budget 
position of state governments will be revealed as worse than it is 
on current headline numbers.  
6.7 Capital recycling 
Capital recycling is the use of proceeds from the sale of 
government-owned assets to invest in new infrastructure. Such 
sales are claimed to free up capital for new capital works that 
would otherwise put the budget further into debt.  
Capital recycling does affect net debt positions: the amount of 
cash that governments are liable to pay bondholders. If 
governments built new infrastructure, but did not sell existing 
infrastructure, their debt levels would be higher. Debt positions  
Box 3: Capital recycling examples 
New South Wales leased Port Botany and Port Kembla to private 
operators and put the cash produced from these long-term leases 
into  NSW’s  infrastructure  fund,  Restart  NSW.78 The government 
intends to use some of this money to fund transport capital 
projects including the WestConnex project. 
The Commonwealth Government recently announced the sale of 
Medibank Private in 2014-15.79 It intends to spend the proceeds 
of the sale on infrastructure.80  
To encourage states to recycle capital, the Commonwealth 
Government announced that it will provide incentives for state and 
territory governments to sell assets. The Commonwealth will 
make incentive payments, valued at 15 per cent of the asset sale 
price, when sale proceeds are invested in infrastructure as 
opposed to paying down net debt.81 
are relevant when ratings agencies calculate credit ratings for 
state governments. These ratings affect the interest rate paid on 
state debt.  
Capital recycling usually does not markedly improve a 
government’s  recurrent  budget  balance.  If you sell an asset and 
use the funds to repay debt, then you avoid interest and operating 
expenses. However, the reduced expense is usually matched by 
reduced income given up when the asset is sold. The private 
                                            
78 Treasury NSW (2013), Budget Paper 2, pp. 1-14 
79 Cormann (2014a) 
80 Cormann (2014b) 
81 Hockey (2014) 
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sector usually values assets according to their future revenues.82 
Because  the  private  sector’s  cost  of  capital  is  higher  than  public  
sector debt charges, assets are likely to be sold at prices so that 
the savings in interest payments are outweighed by the loss of 
future income.  
However,  capital  recycling  can  improve  a  government’s  recurrent  
budget balance if the purchaser thinks that they will be able to 
generate substantially more revenue from the asset than 
government did, and accordingly pays more for the asset. For 
example, the NSW government sold three ports for more than $5 
billion at what were generally regarded as excellent prices.83 
However, even at these prices, the interest saved will only just 
cover the current earnings given up. Although the ports had not 
paid dividends to government in the previous five years,84 they 
were generating profits, retained in the business. The purchasers 
paid about 25 times the current earnings,85 implying that the 
revenues were about 4% of the sale price. States currently pay an 
interest rate of around 4% on their borrowings. 
Privatisation of government assets may also lead to productivity 
gains.86 The value of these gains may be captured by the public, 
government, or the new operator.87 Who gains depends on the 
price paid, and whether user charges fall as costs are reduced. 
                                            
82 PWC (2014) 
83 Bartholomeusz (2014) 
84 Roe (2014) 
85 Bartholomeusz (2014) 
86 For example, in the electricity distribution sector, private operators appear to 
have materially lower capital and maintenance costs: see Wood, et al. (2012) 
87 See discussion in Daley, et al. (2013a) pp. 78-9. 
Capital recycling may also effectively transfer risks from 
government to the private sector. 
The construction of new assets affects recurrent budgets whether 
or not other assets are recycled. New assets create additional 
depreciation, and will drag on future budgets, except in the 
unusual situation where additional revenues from the asset (such 
as tolls) are greater than the depreciation and interest costs from 
building the asset. 
6.8 Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
PPPs have become a popular mechanism to finance state 
government infrastructure. A private entity borrows the capital, 
builds the asset, and then leases it to government through a 
finance lease. Typically the asset is transferred back to 
government once the finance lease expires – often after decades.  
A few assets generate so much income that government does not 
need to make payments under the finance lease. Much more 
commonly, government undertakes to make regular payments to 
the developer for a number  of  years.  Ultimately  these  ‘availability 
payments’, as they are often called, must be funded from 
recurrent budgets. 
PPPs  affect  a  state’s  capital  expenditures  just as if the state built 
the asset itself. Accounting rules typically require state 
governments to record the capitalised value of the finance lease 
as a capital expense when the asset is commissioned. This value 
should be similar to the cost of borrowing to build the asset, and 
then paying interest and repaying the principal on those 
borrowings. Given the higher profit margins and financing costs of  
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Box 4: What are Public Private Partnerships? 
PPPs are agreements between private enterprise and 
governments to deliver public infrastructure projects.88 Since the 
early 2000s governments have undertaken about 130 PPPs to 
build roads, railways, hospitals, courts and prisons, among other 
projects.89 PPPs typically bundle the investment to finance, design 
and build a single piece of public infrastructure, and to provide 
services from the infrastructure, into a long-term contract.90 
Private investors finance and manage the construction of public 
infrastructure, then lease it to government over a contracted 
period, sometimes between 20 and 30 years.  
the typical PPP, the finance lease may well be more expensive 
than borrowing directly.  
PPP arrangements have a similar effect on recurrent expenditures 
as if the state built and operated the asset itself. The annual 
payments under a finance lease should be similar to the cost of 
interest, principal repayments and maintenance. 
PPP arrangements are only likely to cost budgets less if 
outsourcing  a  project’s  design,  building  and  operation  to a single 
operator aligns incentives and reduces the long run total cost of 
ownership of the asset. For example, a private sector operator 
might  choose  to  invest  more  in  a  road’s  initial  construction 
because this will reduce future maintenance costs. The best 
                                            
88 Infrastructure Australia (2008) 
89 See Infrastructure Australia (2014) for a full list of completed PPPs:  
90 Engle, et al. (2013), RBA (2014) 
argument for PPPs is that private operators may make better 
trade-offs of this kind than the public sector. 
However, these advantages need to be balanced against the 
additional costs of PPPs, including transaction costs and the 
higher cost of funds for a private sector operator. The conditions 
of  the  PPP  may  also  reduce  government’s  ability  to  build  future  
infrastructure. They may also provide windfall gains to private 
operators when government builds additional connecting 
infrastructure. 
PPPs can transfer construction risk, and sometimes forecasting 
risks, to private sector operators. They may be better at managing 
construction risks, reducing total cost. Private sector capital may 
increase discipline around forecasting, so that white elephants are 
built less often. Yet these advantages must again be balanced 
against the additional costs, particularly the price that the private 
sector demands for taking forecasting risk. 
Due to the commercially sensitive nature of PPPs, there is little 
publicly available information on the total cost of projects to 
government, nor the annual payment for each project. Nor is there 
information on the capital costs – interest and depreciation 
expenses – that the government will continue to incur for the life 
of the finance lease. This reduces transparency of capital 
expenditure across states and territories.
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Box 5: PPPs in Australia  
The Victorian County Court project showed how PPPs can be 
innovative. The Liberty Group, a private entity, designed, 
developed, financed,  built  and  manages  the  state’s  busiest trial 
court. It comprises 54 courts and state-of-the-art technology, 
including video-conferencing and remote-witness facilities.  
The  consortium’s  bid  included  the  construction  - but not fit out – of 
two additional floors for future expansion at no further cost to 
taxpayers until new courtrooms were required. The delay in fit-out 
expenditure on eight additional courtrooms until they were needed 
in 2008 generated significant savings that both reduced the 
government’s  costs  and  improved  the  consortium’s  return  on  
investment. 
PPPs can effectively transfer construction and traffic risks to 
private sector operators. These risks are real. Cracks in walls 
delayed  opening  Melbourne’s  City  Link  tunnel.  Delays  in  
construction of the Victorian Desalination Plant resulted in lower 
payments to the private sector operator. Several toll road PPPs, 
including  Sydney’s  Cross-City and Lane Cove Tunnels and 
Brisbane’s  Clem7  tunnel,  went  into  receivership  when  traffic  
volumes fell significantly short of forecasts.  
Source: Hodge and Duffield (n.d.), Guest (2011), New South Wales Audit Office (2006) 
6.9 Impact of capital expenditure  
The rapid increase in state infrastructure spending may be 
surprising given the frequent assertions that Australia has a large 
infrastructure deficit. 91 Yet Australian government spending on 
infrastructure increased significantly over the last seven years, 
and was much higher over this period than its typical level since 
1987 when the ABS began collecting records. 
Figure 36: Infrastructure work done for the public sector 
per cent of GDP 
 
Note: Health and education expenditure is general government expenditure by national, 
state and local government 
Source: ABS (2013c) Table 11, ABS (2013b) Table 53. Excludes telecommunications 
which is insignificant after Telstra sale 
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Capital expenditure can be a good thing; infrastructure is 
important for economic growth if it is the right infrastructure in the 
right place at the right time for the right price.92  
However, governments may not be getting particularly good value 
from the significant increase in infrastructure spending. Some 
have questioned whether governments have invested  in  the  ‘right’  
or most productive infrastructure.93 Governments continue to 
promise  investment  in  projects  that  don’t  have  rigorous  benefit  
cost analyses ahead of those that do.94 Even when these 
analyses are followed, they do not guarantee value for money. 
Analyses for transport infrastructure systemically overestimate the 
benefit cost ratios of projects.95 A litany of local examples – from 
the cost overruns for the Myki ticketing system in Melbourne to 
the highly optimistic initial traffic forecasts for the Clem7 Tunnel in 
Brisbane, the Cross City Tunnel in Sydney, Eastlink in Melbourne, 
and the Sydney and Brisbane airport trains – demonstrates that 
Australia is not immune from this dynamic.96 Unfortunately, 
rigorous evaluation is hampered by lack of availability of data. 
Others have suggested that governments have overpaid for 
infrastructure as a result of high costs.97 The recent increase in 
government capital expenditure has not produced a clear lift in 
                                            
92 Eslake (2010) 
93 The Productivity Commission notes that there are many examples of poor 
project  selection  leading  to  ‘highly  inefficient  outcomes’.  Productivity Commission 
(2014), p. 69  
94 See, for example, Wiggins (2013); Infrastructure Australia (2013a); Flyvbjerg 
(2009); Davies (2013); Dobes (2008); Ergas and Robson (2010)  
95 Flyvbjerg (2009) 
96 Davies (2010); Davies (2012) 
97 Victorian Government (2014), p.34 
productivity, although this would inevitably be hard to see given 
the many drivers of productivity growth.98  
On any view, increased capital expenditure has led to higher 
interest and depreciation costs that are an ongoing drag on state 
budgets. In addition, operating expenses will increase with capital 
expenditure. In the long term, budgets will be under even more 
pressure if expenses are not increased to maintain these assets 
properly. 
Given the other pressures on state budgets, there is little room to 
fund new infrastructure. Sustainable spending on infrastructure 
will require improved recurrent budget balances, either through 
reduced spending in other areas, or higher taxes and charges. 
While PPPs may lead to better trade-offs between initial spending, 
design, and maintenance costs, they are not likely to result in a 
much better recurrent budget bottom line than government 
construction. Similarly, capital recycling may affect credit ratings, 
but it will not alter the additional pressure on recurrent budget 
balances due to new capital spending. 
To ensure long-term state budget sustainability, the Victorian 
government has adopted a principle that future capital spending 
must be funded from recurrent budget surpluses so that debt does 
not increase, with interest payments that drag in future. 
 
                                            
98 For a more detailed discussion of the merits of recent infrastructure spending, 
see Daley, et al. (2013a), p.65. 
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7 Budget pressures
Many in the community expect that Commonwealth and state 
government budgets will balance, without substantial cuts to 
services or increases in taxes. Many also expect that our 
standards of living will continue to rise rapidly. These expectations 
have been set by 20 years of rising standards of living, with real 
incomes per person rising at more than 2 per cent a year. 
Through the 1990s, productivity improvements fuelled growth. In 
the  2000s,  rising  prices  for  Australia’s  minerals  exports  delivered  
rising standards of living, particularly through lower prices for 
imports. These strong terms of trade boosted government 
revenues by about 2 per cent of GDP. 
Yet good budgetary and economic times obscured mounting 
pressures on Commonwealth and state government budgets. In 
particular, health costs increased by 1 per cent of GDP, cuts 
amounting to 1 per cent of GDP were made to income tax and 
fuel excise and governments suffered through the global financial 
crisis. These hits to budgets were offset, however, by the price 
and economic effects of the mining boom.  
The next decade is likely to be more difficult than the last. Real 
wages are likely to grow much more slowly. As the terms of trade 
fall, income growth per capita is likely to be much lower than we 
have come to expect through the last decade.99 Falling terms of 
trade and lower economic growth will also make it harder to 
balance government budgets. 
                                            
99 Gruen (2012) p. 3; Eslake and Walsh (2011), Parkinson (2014). This is likely 
to be the case unless productivity growth rises quickly and to far above its 
historical average. 
Budgets will face increasing pressures. Demand for health care is 
likely to continue to rise. As wages grow more slowly, inequality 
may increase, placing pressure on government to increase 
welfare  spending.  Australia’s  ageing  population  will  also  put  more  
pressure on budgets in the form of Aged Pension and aged care 
costs.100 Without changes, the Aged Pension could expand from 
2.4 to 3.3 per cent of GDP by 2060.101  
The increased capital expenditure over the last 10 years will 
continue to place pressure on budgets due to interest and 
depreciation expenses. These now account for 10 per cent of 
revenue in some states. Unless new revenue sources or spending 
cuts  are  found,  these  pressures  may  limit  governments’  ability  to  
invest in new infrastructure, as Chapter 6 discussed. 
Finally, new government spending will increase the pressure on 
budgets. Implementing the National Disability Insurance Scheme, 
reforms to school funding and a more expensive paid parental 
scheme will all make future budgets more difficult. 
The  title  of  Laura  Tingle’s  2012 Quarterly Essay, ‘Great 
Expectations’, aptly captured the political tendency to raise 
expectations about what government can and should deliver. 102 
As she pointed out, although governments have relinquished 
direct control of many institutions, from running airlines to setting 
interest rates, political rhetoric over the last decade has tended to 
                                            
100 IMF (2014a), pp. 27-28, Productivity Commission (2013), p. 143, 148 
101 Productivity Commission (2013) p. 146 
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imply that government can solve virtually any problem. Such 
expectations were easier to fulfil when real GDP was rising 
quickly, and government revenues were rising as a percentage of 
GDP.  
While there may well be political pressures for government to 
increase living standards in more difficult economic times, there is 
little government can do. Community expectations about budgets 
are also likely to be disappointed. As the Secretary to the 
Treasury, Martin Parkinson, has pointed out, there is a “gap  
between community expectations and what governments can 
realistically  do…  [and]  a  gap  between  what  citizens  want  from  
governments and what they are prepared to pay for those 
services”.103  
7.1 Macroeconomic influences on Australian budgets 
Government budgets benefited from the strong terms of trade 
over the last decade. The prices of goods that generated taxes 
rose more quickly than the price of goods and services that 
governments bought (particularly foreign goods and Australian 
wages). Terms of trade have already fallen from their peak, and 
Treasury projects they will return to 2005-06 levels by 2019-20.104 
It is possible they will fall faster and further, back to the long-run 
average that prevailed between 1982 and 2002. This would mirror 
the history of other terms of trade changes around the world, 
which have tended to be symmetrical, falling back as far and as 
fast as they rose.105 If Treasury projections are right, Australian 
                                            
103 Parkinson (2014) 
104 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), Part2, p. 17 
105 Minifie, et al. (2013), p35 
governments will be looking for 0.5 per cent of GDP in savings or 
tax increases to repair their budget balances. They could be 
looking for as much as 1.5 per cent of GDP in savings if terms of 
trade return to long run averages. 
Australian government budgets are also benefiting from relatively 
benign economic conditions. Four years after the GFC, the 
economy of Australia and its major trading partners in Asia are 
close to their long run growth rates, even if the economies of 
many developed countries have not yet recovered to their pre-
GFC size.  
Combining these effects, one would expect Australian 
governments to be running comfortable surpluses at this point in 
the mining and economic cycles in order to pay back the stimulus 
spending of the GFC, and to absorb the likely hit to budget 
balances when the terms of trade return to more normal levels. 
Instead, Australian governments are relying on current minerals 
prices only declining slowly, and even then the effect will be to 
maintain current deficits or thin surpluses. Governments are very 
exposed to the risk of a scenario in which mining investment and 
earnings slow more quickly. Consequently there is a strong case 
for adjusting budget revenue and expenses sooner rather than 
later to prepare for this. 
7.1.1 Terms of trade and minerals prices 
The improvement in the terms of trade since 2003 as a result of 
the mining boom is estimated to have added around 1 to 2 per 
cent of GDP to the Commonwealth Government budget balance 
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over the last few years, as Figure 37 shows.106 The publicly 
reported cash balance was materially higher than the structural 
balance (what the budget outcome would have been without 
cyclical economic factors). 
This free kick to the budget came because government revenues 
were boosted by high export prices,107 while government 
expenses were more linked to import prices and local wages. 
When mining prices return closer to historic levels, these effects 
will unwind. Indeed there are signs this is already happening.108 
The speed of the decline in mineral prices is uncertain. Treasury 
expects they will only decline slowly in the near term,109 reducing 
steadily over the long term as global supply increases.110 Treasury 
now estimates that the terms of trade will decline to their 2006-07 
levels by 2017-18, and then continue to decline to 2005-06 levels 
by 2019-20. The projected decline to 2019-20 is outside the 
forward estimates period of the next three years. 
The decline in the terms of trade may be faster and deeper than 
this. It is quite plausible that terms of trade could decline to about 
halfway between peak and the long-run average. If so, the price 
effect would reduce the Commonwealth budget balance by 0.6 
per cent of GDP below current forecasts. Treasury scenario 
analysis suggest the flow-on effects on the economy and the 
                                            
106 Estimates by Treasury officials in 2010 are consistent with estimates 
compiled by the OECD, the IMF, and in Deloitte Access Economics (2012) 
107 McDonald, et al. (2010) 
108 Swan (2013) 
109 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), p. 12 
110 Ibid., p. 12 
labour market would be much larger, albeit possibly offset by 
changes in the exchange rate.111 
Figure 37: Commonwealth budget balance 
Per cent of nominal GDP 
 
Notes: Financial years (i.e. 2003 is 2002-03). 2013f is the 2013-14 forecast in the 13-14 
Budget. Stimulus allocated to cyclical; changes in company tax from the decade average 
due to depreciation allocated to cyclical. Depreciation rate assumed at 15 per cent. Terms 
of trade baseline is 2002-03. 
Source: Minifie et al. (2013)  
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When minerals prices decline, nominal economic growth rates 
and government revenues will reduce, increasing the pressure on 
government budgets. If terms of trade fall faster than Treasury 
projections, and revert to their long-run average, they could 
reduce Commonwealth revenues and budget balance by 2 per 
cent of GDP, as Figure 38 shows. 
To be prepared for this scenario, Australian governments would 
need to be running a budget balance 1 to 2 per cent of GDP 
higher than ordinary economic indicators would suggest. As 
discussed below, major economic indicators for Australia and the 
world suggest the Australian economy is now growing close to 
trend, and that governments should have a net budget surplus, 
even without the contribution of the terms of trade. 
Government revenues in some states also benefited from a surge 
in royalties as volumes increased, and some states increased 
royalty rates. But total royalties collected are just $10.6 billion, or 
0.7 per cent of GDP, so the potential impact on Australian 
government budgets of royalty payments falling with mining prices 
is relatively small.  
How significant is the risk of lower terms of trade? It is inherently 
difficult  to  forecast  the  minerals  prices  that  drive  Australia’s  terms  
of trade. They may stay stronger for longer given high demand 
from the continuing economic development of a range of 
countries, and relatively slow increases in supply due to 
consolidation of the global mining industry, declining ore grades, 
and slowing construction.112 Iron ore prices have fallen from 
around $US135 a tonne in December 2013 to $112 in April 2014, 
                                            
112 Eslake (2011) 
having rebounded after falling to as low as $104 in March 2014.113 
The Australian Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics 
(BREE) forecast the price will fall to $US97 a tonne by 2017.114 
Figure 38: Impact of terms of trade on Commonwealth tax revenues 
Per cent of GDP 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2013b) cat. no. 5204.0; ABS (2013e) cat. no. 5506.0; 
Commonwealth budget papers for 2002-03 to 2013-14;McDonald et al. (2010). 
                                            
113 IMF (2014b); McGrath (2014)  
114 BREE (2014). Analysts such as Goldman Sachs forecast a period of 
oversupply in 2014, pushing down prices further to around $85 a tonne by 2017: 
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7.1.2 Economic growth 
Australian economic growth has a material impact on budgets 
from year to year. The gap between forecast and actual economic 
growth and prices has typically added or subtracted in the order of 
$5 to $10 billion from Commonwealth revenues over the last 
decade.115  
Australia is no longer at the bottom of the economic cycle. 
Instead, the economy is probably at or above the average 
performance that can be expected over the next decade or two. 
GDP growth is close to its average over the 2000s and inflation is 
inside  the  RBA’s  target  of  2 to 3 per cent. Unemployment has 
edged up, and Australian rates of unemployment and under-
employment are higher than if the economy were running at full 
capacity. Participation rates have stalled for almost all age-groups 
over the last 2 years, ending seven years of strong growth, as 
Figure 39 shows.  
Nevertheless, current rates of participation and unemployment are 
consistent with other recent periods of low unemployment outside 
the boom years of 2005-2008.116 
The fact that commodity prices are higher than during the pre-
GFC boom, and that terms of trade are higher than almost any 
period in the last 60 years, is a big boost to national income. 
Yet  much  of  Australia’s  good  fortune  is  driven  by  the  economic  
performance of its trading partners. While the world economy has 
slowed post-GFC,  Australia’s  main  trading  partners  have  roared  
                                            
115 See Chessell, et al. (2012)p. xviii, xxi 
116 RBA (2013), ABS (2014d) cat 6202 Table 01 
ahead at growth rates only a little below their mid-2000s boom. As 
a consequence, Australian commodity export volumes are higher 
than ever. Iron ore exports are double their pre-GFC level.  
There are some weaknesses in the Australian economy that might 
improve. The high dollar is impeding growth in trade-exposed 
industries, particularly manufacturing and international services 
such as higher education. Economic growth may also be boosted 
Figure 39: Annual change in participation rate 
Percentage points change in workforce participation per year 
 
Source: Borland (2013) 
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as new mining capacity begins production. A key will be how 
much of this revenue stays in Australia, either as dividends for 
shareholders or tax and royalties for governments. However, the 
RBA estimates that foreigners own about 80 per cent of the 
resources sector,117 and in the absence of a well-designed 
resource rent tax, their profits are only captured in Australia 
through state mining royalties and company tax of 30 per cent 
which acts as a  “final  tax”  for  foreign  shareholders. 
Whatever the fate of this revenue, economic growth is normally 
slower after the peak of a mining boom than before.118 The history 
of previous mining booms around the world suggests that 
manufacturing industries typically rebound strongly afterwards. 
But these rebounding industries typically add less to economic 
growth than is subtracted by the slowing resources sector.119 
Therefore, the current economic conditions may be about as good 
as it gets. Australian budgets should not expect a significant 
improvement  from  the  economy  ‘returning  to  normal’.  Economic  
conditions that are generally close to long-run trends suggest that 
at this point in the economic cycle, Australia governments should 
be posting comfortable surpluses. 
Classic Keynesian fiscal policy maintains that a country should 
have budget surpluses when the economy is growing strongly, 
and budget deficits when the risks of stalling are high. On this 
basis, the substantial budgetary stimulus that Australia employed 
at the bottom of the economic cycle needs to be counter-balanced 
                                            
117 Connolly and Orsmond (2011) 
118 Aitkin, et al. (2014) 
119 See Minifie, et al. (2013) for a discussion of how other industries bounce 
back. 
by budget surpluses even at mid-points in the economic cycle. Yet 
the  current  government’s  statement  of  fiscal  strategy,  ‘to restore 
public sector finances by returning the budget to sustainable 
surplus…  by  2023-24”,120 implies a much slower return to surplus 
than would be expected at this point in the economic cycle. 
The budgetary surpluses appropriate at this point in the economic 
cycle are on top of the  buffer  that  may  be  needed  if  Australia’s  
terms of trade reduce, affecting prices in ways that would reduce 
government budget balances by about 1 to 2 per cent of GDP, as 
Section 7.1.1 discusses. 
7.1.3 Economic forecasts  
Budgetary forecasts depend on economic forecasts. If the latter 
are systemically optimistic or pessimistic, then the medium-term 
outlook may need to be revised. In the 2000s, budget outcomes 
were often about 1 per cent of GDP better than forecast, and 
since the GFC they have generally been about 1 per cent worse 
than forecast, as Figure 40 shows. 
The variations are primarily in revenues, not expenses.121 Before 
the GFC, Treasury tended to underestimate the strength of growth 
in the global and Australian economies, and in the terms of trade, 
causing it to underestimate taxation revenue.122 Since the GFC, 
Treasury has generally overestimated the budget outcome by 
about 1 per cent of GDP. About half of this is due to 
                                            
120 Treasury (2013b), p. 26 
121 Deloitte Access Economics (2013), p. 17 
122 Chessell, et al. (2012), p. xviii 
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overestimating the strength of global and Australian economic 
growth.123 
Figure 40: Actual and forecast underlying cash balance, 
Commonwealth budget 
Per cent of GDP, year of forecast labelled 
 
Source: Treasury (multiple years), Commonwealth of Australia (2013) 
Estimating economic growth is inherently difficult: an RBA 
analysis found that half of its forecasts for GDP growth for the 
                                            
123 Ibid., p. 37 
following year were out by 1.2 per cent or more. Private sector 
forecasts are similarly inaccurate.124 These forecasting issues are 
likely to balance out over the economic cycle, however. Treasury 
has now corrected its previous systemic overestimation of 
company tax revenues in its forecasts.125  
More recently, Treasury revised down its forecasts since the 
2012-13 Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO). The 
deficit is worse by $17 billion, due to a $9 billion (one-off) grant to 
the Reserve Bank, $4 billion in spending decisions and $4 billion 
due to lower income, primarily personal income tax. These 
revised forecasts also include the impact of election commitments 
such as the repeal of the carbon and mining taxes, the 
introduction of the “Direct  Action” response to climate change, and 
the implementation of paid parental leave.126 
7.1.4 Balance sheet risks  
Government net debt is created by year-to-year budget deficits, 
and any major liabilities assumed by government that turn out to 
be unrecoverable. Only financial sector contingent liabilities are 
likely to be material to total government debt, and government is 
unlikely to have to pay for them given current policy settings. 
The Commonwealth sets out its major contingent liabilities in its 
‘Statement  of  Risks’,  part  of  each  year’s  budget  papers. Many of 
these risks are substantial, several are described as 
“unquantifiable”, but few are likely to result in the Commonwealth 
government taking on a debt of tens of percentage points of GDP.  
                                            
124 Tulip and Wallace (2012), p. 40 
125 See above section 5.4 
126 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), pp.19-22 
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The largest risk is a government assuming the bad debts of major 
financial institutions. During the GFC the Commonwealth 
guaranteed the deposits of Australians, and provided guarantees 
for the wholesale borrowing of Australian banks. As recent events 
in Spain, Iceland, Ireland and Cyprus have shown, taking on 
these liabilities can add materially to total government debt.  
Yet despite the stresses of the GFC, Australia’s  financial  
institutions remain in relatively good health.  Australia’s  strong  
emergence from the GFC was in part good luck, as its banks were 
short of deposits given its long-running negative balance of 
payments, and so did not lend to sub-prime mortgages or to 
governments that subsequently encountered difficulties. As well, 
the Australian property market did not suffer a rapid collapse. In 
part this was due to good management as many bank managers 
had been part of banks that came near to failing in 1990, and 
APRA actively discouraged more risky lending in the years before 
the GFC.127 Whether by good luck or good management, the 
failure of a substantial financial institution in Australia appears 
unlikely in the foreseeable future given current policy settings.  
7.2 Spending pressures on Australian budgets 
Future government budgets will come under pressure from rising 
political expectations and specific policy promises. Social and 
economic trends, particularly growing demand for health services, 
may also increase pressures.128 Rising inequality as a result of 
increasing returns to the more highly educated may also create 
                                            
127 McDonald and Morling (2011) 
128 The IMF (2014a) notes that both health care and pensions will be impacted 
by ageing populations, see p. 22 
pressure for additional welfare spending, particularly if income 
inequality increases with the slowing of the mining boom. The 
ageing population will place additional pressure due to lower 
workforce participation and increased costs, including Aged 
Pension and aged care. Yet the impact may be mitigated if policy 
reforms to increase workforce participation are put in place. 
States’  recent  capital  expenditure  will  also  put increasing pressure 
on budgets in the form of interest and depreciation expenses. 
7.2.1 Health costs 
Health dominated the increase in government spending above 
GDP over the last decade. Health costs are likely to continue to 
increase as a percentage of GDP. As Chapter 4 discusses, the 
primary driver of increasing health costs over the last decade was 
not an ageing population, but rather increased services for all 
ages. Without concerted policy changes, these trends are likely to 
continue. The 2010 Intergenerational Report (IGR) forecast that 
health costs would grow by 3 per cent of GDP over the following 
40 years, with 1.3 per cent of GDP a result of the increased scope 
of health services.129 Actual growth due to servicing in just the last 
decade was an additional 1 per cent of GDP, and about 2 per cent 
of GDP after adjusting for the terms of trade boom, a growth 
substantially faster than the IGR projection.130 
                                            
129 Treasury (2010a) 
130 If economy-wide prices grew at the CPI over the past decade, health 
spending would have been about two percentage points above its 2002-3 
proportion of GDP. As the terms of trade boom lifted economy-wide prices, this 
meant government had additional revenues to pay for increasing health costs. 
However, we expect economy-wide prices to move with CPI over the coming 
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If the scope of health services continues to increase at the rate of 
the last decade, health will demand an additional 2 per cent of 
GDP in government budgets by 2023. 
7.2.2 Welfare 
Welfare is the largest category of government expenditure, 
comprising 22 cents of every dollar spent by Australian 
governments. Future budgets are therefore sensitive to changes 
in welfare spending. 
The purposes of welfare are contested. Almost all political 
theories agree that welfare payments should enable the most 
disadvantaged to pursue worthwhile opportunities and to live lives 
they have reason to value. Other theories, less universally 
accepted, aim to reduce inequality of outcomes and opportunities 
more generally. According to some economic analysis and some 
political theories, if incomes before taxes and payments become 
less equal, there is likely to be pressure to increase welfare to 
redress the balance. The pressures are likely to be greater if 
richer households are seen to gain the vast bulk of the benefits of 
economic growth.131 
The real incomes of poor Australian households have generally 
risen over the last decade. At the same time tertiary graduates 
earn less of a premium than elsewhere in the OECD, perhaps 
because the mining boom has kept wages relatively high for those 
with fewer skills. 
                                                                                    
decade, with the price of healthcare continuing along its current trend. This 
implies an increase in share of GDP of about 2 per cent by 2022-23. 
131 For more detailed analysis of inequality issues see Daley, et al. (2013). 
But if the mining boom slows, inequality is likely to increase and 
absolute incomes will grow more slowly.132 This may increase the 
pressure for Australian governments to spend more on welfare. 
In particular, government may face pressure to increase Newstart 
payments, which have fallen in real terms while Aged Pension 
payments increased much faster than CPI due to indexation 
arrangements and policy decisions.133  
The rapid growth of inequality in the rest of the world suggests 
that inequality in Australia may grow much faster in future, 
particularly if lower skilled workers are less in demand after the 
mining boom. If this happens, inevitably there will be more calls 
for governments to increases taxes and payments to reduce 
inequality. These calls are likely to be louder if poorer households 
are not seeing any growth in real income. Real household 
incomes have declined for three of the last five quarters.134 
Reducing inequality in these circumstances would impose 
substantial pressures on government budgets, particularly the 
Commonwealth’s,  which  includes  most  welfare  payments.  Even  in 
                                            
132 Minifie, et al. (2013) see p. 15 for a discussion of how the mining boom has 
impacted employment and wages, countering the international trend towards 
increased inequality. 
133 In 1991 the Aged Pension was indexed to 25 per cent male total average 
weekly earnings, whereas unemployment benefits were left indexed to the 
consumer price index. Subsequently in 2009 the Rudd government lifted the rate 
again to 27.7 per cent of male earnings Department of Social Services (2014). A 
review is being conducted into the working age welfare payments including 
Newstart and the Disability Support Payments. The review however excludes the 
Age Pension and family assistance payments. Buckmaster (2014) 
134 National Centre for Social and Economic Modeling (NATSEM) analysis 
discussed by Uren (2014) 
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Australia’s  highly  targeted  tax-payment system, if Australian 
household income inequality follows its historic trend for another 
decade, it would cost 0.5 to 1.5 per cent of GDP to maintain the 
current level of household income inequality. 
In practice, attempts to redistribute more widely drive at least 
some welfare payments. For example real spending on the Age 
Pension, after adjusting for the ageing of the population, is $8 
billion a year more than a decade ago. This suggests that the 
estimated budget pressure from welfare increases of 0.5 to 1.5 
per cent of GDP may be conservative. 
Unfortunately, higher taxes and payments inevitably impose 
inefficiencies, and often reduce incentives for workforce 
participation. Policy changes that increase participation rates 
among low-income households can have lower costs and do more 
to reduce inequality, although inevitably there are fewer 
guarantees that such policies will have the desired impact.  
7.2.3 Ageing 
The ageing of the population has not yet had much impact on 
Australian government budgets. It will have more impact over the 
next decade in aged care and health as substantially more people 
move into their 70s and 80s, as Figure 41 shows.  
The impact on the budget can be offset by taxation and welfare 
reforms that encourage greater workforce participation by older 
Australians. Chapter 8 discusses these potential policy changes. 
Figure 41: Age-related government spending 
$ thousands per person, 2011-12 
 
Note: Selected categories of expenditure. Includes Commonwealth, states and territories. 
‘Other’  includes  the Disability Support Pension, Parenting Payment, Family Tax Benefit, 
Disability Support Services (both Australian Government and state and territory), Other 
social security and welfare payment, Defence and other expenditures and other state and 
territory expenditures not classified elsewhere. 
Source: PC (2013) Figure 5.1 
An ageing population will also substantially affect budgets if 
pension benefits and eligibility grow faster than GDP. The cost of 
pensions increased substantially over the last decade, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.5. Under current policy settings, these 
costs will continue to grow. The Productivity Commission 
estimates that the cost of pensions may increase by 0.4 per cent 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
0-
4 
5-
9 
10
-1
4 
15
-1
9 
20
-2
4 
25
-2
9 
30
-3
4 
35
-3
9 
40
-4
4 
45
-4
9 
50
-5
4 
55
-5
9 
60
-6
4 
65
-6
9 
70
-7
4 
75
-7
9 
80
-8
4 
85
-8
9 
90
-9
4 
95
-9
9 
10
0+
 
Aged Care 
Aged Pension 
Education 
Other 
Health 
Budget pressures on Australian governments: 2014 edition 
Grattan Institute 2014 61 
of GDP in the next 10 years and to 3.3 per cent of GDP by 
2060.135 
Changes will be needed to make the pension system more 
sustainable.136 The public debate is beginning to acknowledge 
that  Australia’s  current  spending  on  Aged  Pensions  is  
unsustainable. Accordingly, the Australian Government has 
mooted changes, including raising the eligibility age to 70, 
tightening assets tests to include the family home and lowering 
generous indexation arrangements.137 
Aged care cost Australian governments $17 billion in 2012-13 – 
1.1 per cent of GDP - with most of it spent on residential care.138 
The Productivity Commission estimates that these costs may 
increase to 2.6 per cent of GDP by 2059-60.139 Demand for these 
types of services will only increase with an ageing population, 
placing additional significant pressure on budgets if governments 
continue to meet the majority of costs. However, reforms 
recommended by the Productivity Commission, if they are 
implemented, may reduce the cost to government. 
                                            
135 Productivity Commission (2013) p. 146. The IMF (2014a) estimates that 
pension spending will increase by 0.7 per cent of GDP by 2030. 
136 IMF (2014a) p. 27 Stevens (2014) also notes that due to the demographic 
shift, more people will be moving into retirement and fewer people entering the 
workforce over time. As a result, governments need to focus on the medium term 
issue of the ageing population rather than the individual budget year outcomes. 
Stevens (2014) 
137 Maher (2014) 
138 Other types of care include home care and support. 
139 Productivity Commission (2013) p. 150. This is greater than that projected by 
the Intergenerational Report of 2010 which suggested an increase to 1.8 per 
cent of GDP by 2049-50. 
Figure 42: Projected real increases in aged care costs 
Per cent of GDP 
Source: Productivity Commission (2013) Figure 5.12 
Political pressure to continue these levels of age related 
expenditure is likely to grow. As the age of the median voter 
increases, a greater proportion of the electorate will have a vested 
interest in broader eligibility and higher benefits for aged 
pensions. In the medium run, this is where an ageing population 
will exert most pressure on government budgets. The electoral 
demography is an argument for changing policy sooner rather 
than later. The politics will only become more difficult as time 
0 
0.5 
1 
1.5 
2 
2.5 
3 
2012 2024 2036 2048 2060 
Budget pressures on Australian governments: 2014 edition 
Grattan Institute 2014 62 
passes and the population ages.140 
The impact of ageing on government budgets depends on both 
demography and workforce participation. If more older people 
work, then economic output is higher, governments collect more 
in taxes, and pension expenses are lower. 
Participation may even increase, despite ageing, if older age 
workforce participation is reinforced by policy change to increase 
the age of access to the Age Pension and superannuation.141  
Without change in the participation rate of each age group, overall 
participation will reduce over the next decade. If participation rates 
of older age groups continue to increase, however, then overall 
participation rates will only fall slightly in the next decade, 
although they will probably fall more substantially thereafter, as 
Figure 42 shows. 
Policy reforms along the lines of those identified in Grattan 
Institute’s  2012  report,  Game-changers, would more than  
                                            
140 Thanks to Jeff Borland for this insight 
141 Increased female workforce participation across age brackets will also 
provide substantial benefit to the economy if women with young children take 
home more of their earnings after paying tax, giving up welfare benefits, and 
paying for childcare. More in-depth analysis on this issue is provided in Daley, et 
al. (2012). 
Figure 43: Changes in labour force participation rates 
% of total population who participate in workforce 
 
Note:  ‘lower  participation  due  to  ageing’  assumes current age-specific participation rate of 
each  age  cohort.  ‘Increased  participation  of  older  workers’  assumes  participation rate of 
each age cohort continues to increase at 50% of current trends.  ‘Super  /  pension  reforms’  
are to lift age of access to pension and superannuation to 70, as specified and modelled in 
Daley  et  al  (2012a).  ‘Increased  female  participation  with  childcare/welfare  reforms’  
assumes reforms to tax, welfare and childcare subsidies, as specified and modelled in 
Daley et al (2012a) 
Source: Grattan analysis of ABS (2012e); Daley et al (2012a); ABS (2008) 3222.0 T A9. 
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medium term budget position by increasing participation, and 
therefore increasing income and consumption tax revenues while 
reducing pension expenditure. See Chapter 8 for a discussion of 
potential policy reform. 
7.2.4 Capital expenditure 
States and territories have increased capital expenditure 
significantly in the last 10 years as Chapter 6 shows. As a result, 
governments face ongoing budget pressure through increased 
interest and depreciation expenses that cannot be compressed. 
These costs will be borne on an annual basis for the length of the 
debt and life of the assets.  
Future infrastructure investment, expected under Coalition-
National Government policy, will add to these expenses, placing 
ongoing pressure on budgets.142 
7.3 Commitments beyond the forward estimates 
Government commitments to spending beyond the forward 
estimates could reduce budget balances by around $29 billion, or 
1.2 per cent of GDP, within the next few years, as Figure 44 
shows.  
                                            
142 The Prime Minister has signaled his intention for increased infrastructure 
investment  by  wanting  to  be  known  as  the  ‘Infrastructure  Prime  Minister’.  Abbott 
(2013), Abbott (2013). Future intended capital expenditure by the 
Commonwealth Government is yet to be made clear. However, the Productivity 
Commission notes that without reform to the process for selecting infrastructure 
projects,  increased  spending  will  ‘increase  cost  to  users,  taxpayers,  the  
community  generally,  and  the  provision  of  wasteful  infrastructure’.  Productivity 
Commission (2014), p. 2 
The Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO), released in 
December, incorporated the budget impact of most of the 
government’s  election  commitments  within  the  forward  estimates. 
This included abolishing the carbon price and mining tax, cutting 
company tax, increasing paid parental leave, and implementing 
Direct Action climate policy.143 However, the government made a 
number of commitments that have a significant budget impact 
beyond 2017.  
The government has now committed to the rollout of the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme in all jurisdictions,144 and costs will 
ramp up significantly beyond the forward estimates as the scheme 
is fully implemented.145 Furthermore, recent reports of the 
scheme’s  trials  costing  much  more  than  anticipated  suggest  the  
total cost of delivery may be even higher than estimated.146 Costs 
for  the  ‘Schools  First’  funding agreement (previously known as the 
Gonski reforms) also rise significantly beyond 2017. 
It is Coalition policy to restore defence spending to historic levels 
of 2 per cent of GDP.147  The budget papers also note that a 
return  to  Australia’s  commitment  to  spend 0.5 per cent of gross 
national income on development aid would involve a significant 
increase above current forward estimates provisions.148  
                                            
143 Commonwealth of Australia (2013) p. 3 
144 Western Australia is the final state to establish trial sites: Abbott (2014) 
145 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), p. 21 
146 Harrison (2014) 
147 Loughnane (2013c) 
148 Commonwealth of Australia (2013)p. 21 
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Figure 44: Budget impact of government policy commitments  
Nominal $ bn 
 
Note:  ‘Foreign  aid’  shows  the  budget  impact  of  a  return  to  official  development  assistance  
of  0.5  per  cent  of  gross  national  income  from  2018.  ‘Disability  insurance’  shows  MYEFO  
estimates  of  costs  beyond  the  forward  estimates  of  the  NDIS.  ‘Schools’  shows  the  
estimated  impact  of  the  ‘Schools  First’  funding  agreement  on  Commonwealth  and  state  
budgets. ‘Restore  defence  spending’  shows  budget  impact of a return to 2009-10 spending 
levels as a percentage of GDP from 2017. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Commonwealth and State budget papers and Mid-Year 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook , 2013-14; Loughnane (2010); Loughnane (2013c). 
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8 Budget solutions
8.1 Possible reform choices 
Governments will have to make difficult choices to fix the 
structural budget deficits they face. In the 2013 report Balancing 
Budgets: Tough Choices We Need, Grattan Institute presented a 
series of options for budget reform.  
We do not suggest that any Australian government will – or 
should – implement all the proposed options. However, we have 
tried to identify as many choices as possible that would both make 
a material difference to budget outcomes and not have 
unacceptable social or economic side-effects. Australian 
governments may find many of the choices unpalatable, but given 
the size of their long-term budget challenge, it will be hard for 
them to repair budgets without facing at least some of them. If 
they are all ruled off the table then Australians are entitled to ask 
whether their governments are serious about restoring budget 
balances. 
All the budget choices presented are politically difficult. If they 
were easy, they would already have  been  made.  Australia’s  
governments are small by OECD standards, and our public sector 
operates more efficiently than most.149 This makes it harder to find 
savings by cutting waste and shrinking non-essential services. 
                                            
149 OECD (2012a); OECD (2012b) 
Box 6: Commitments of the new government 
The new Commonwealth Government made a number of election 
commitments, not considered in the Balancing Budgets report, 
that would have a significant effect on the long-term budget 
balance. Further budget improvement would be achieved by not 
enacting some of these proposals: 
x Expanded paid parental leave: an extra $2 billion a year going 
mostly to middle- and upper-income families.150 
x Cutting company tax results in foregone revenue of over 
$3 billion per year.151 
x Changes to climate policy – the net effect of abolishing the 
carbon price and associated industry compensation, and 
introducing Direct Action – costs about $4.5 billion a year.152 
x Increasing defence spending – the commitment to increase 
defence spending from 1.6 to 2 per cent of GDP in 10 years –
will cost around $8 billion at full implementation.153 
Although these commitments were offset by budget improvements 
elsewhere (such as a levy on large companies, the abolition of the 
schoolkids bonus, and cuts to the public service and foreign 
aid),154 these improvements could be enacted without the 
accompanying spending, thereby improving the budget balance. 
Note: All costings are at full implementation, in $2013 
                                            
150 Grattan analysis of Loughnane (2013a); PBO (2013b) 
151 Grattan analysis of PBO (2013b) 
152 Grattan analysis of ibid. 
153 Grattan analysis of Loughnane (2013b); Thomson (2013) 
154 See PBO (2013b); Hockey and Robb (2013) 
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Figure 45: Budgetary impact of possible budget choices 
$2013 bn per year 
 
Note: Proposals considered that would generate less than $2 billion are not shown. These 
include congestion charges, grants to first home-buyers, middle-class welfare, public 
sector efficiency, avoidable hospital costs and end-of-life care. Collateral impacts include 
impacts on economic growth, disproportionate impact on people in the bottom 20% of 
incomes, and impacts on other social objectives: see Daley, McGannon, et al. (2013a) pp. 
20-22 
Source: Daley et al 2013 
The budgetary and collateral impacts of the 20 choices analysed 
in Balancing Budgets are summarised in Figure 45.  
Some clear themes emerge from the analysis, as Figure 46 
shows. Proposals for better targeting of support for older people –  
Figure 46: Budgetary impact of possible budget choices by theme 
$2013 bn per year 
 
Note: Proposals considered that would generate less than $2 billion are not shown. These 
include congestion charges, grants to first home-buyers, middle-class welfare, public 
sector efficiency, avoidable hospital costs and end-of-life care. 
Source: Daley et al 2013 
both pensions and superannuation (shown in orange) – are 
generally larger and more attractive than other alternatives. Just 
four choices could improve the budget balance by $27 billion a 
year.155 Reform of assets taxation (shown in red), particularly 
                                            
155 There is some interaction between the Age Pension asset test proposal and 
the retirement age proposal. If the retirement age is lifted, the additional savings 
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negative gearing and the CGT discount, could yield $7 billion a 
year. Of the other reforms, broadening the GST is large and 
relatively attractive. Some of the remaining tax exemptions are 
less attractive – they may have survived for good reasons. Tax 
increases could do more to improve budget balances, but they 
usually have more negative side effects. A number of cost 
reductions have smaller side effects, but their budgetary impact is 
also often smaller. 
8.2 Packaging reform 
All the proposals presented would leave some people worse off, 
at least in the short run. In the last decade, governments have 
been averse to making decisions that create identifiable losers.156 
Instead, potential losers were compensated with other measures, 
which generally drew on large and growing surpluses. In the 
current environment of substantial and increasing deficits, losers 
can no longer be paid off. 
Yet it is important for pain to be shared: people may be more 
willing to accept the burden if they understand that everyone is 
experiencing some pain. It is also harder for special-interest 
groups to claim that their interests should not be adversely 
affected when everyone in the community is sharing the burden.  
For these reasons, big and difficult reforms may be best 
introduced in a package. A package can show the magnitude of 
the problem and that the burden is widely shared. It can also 
                                                                                    
from reforming the Age Pension asset test are reduced as fewer people are old 
enough to qualify for the Age Pension. 
156For example, see Megalogenis (2012); Tingle (2012) 
include some (smaller) spending increases that mitigate the 
impacts on those worst off and least able to absorb adverse 
change. 
A package that would both focus on the most attractive 
opportunities identified in our prioritisation and distribute the 
burden across the community, affecting both rich and poor, would: 
x broaden the GST to include fresh food and private spending 
on health and education; 
x raise the pension and super age to 70; 
x include the primary residence in the Age Pension asset test, 
while allowing people to continue to claim a pension, although 
its value would be recovered from  the  recipient’s  estate;;   
x limit superannuation tax concessions so that only $10,000 a 
year can be contributed before tax, and those over 60 years 
old pay 15 per cent rather than no tax on earnings. 
The proposals in this package would contribute about $37 billion a 
year towards balancing budgets. The package picks up many of 
the proposals that would do most to improve budget balances, 
with relatively limited side effects  
It would affect both rich and poor. Broadening the GST would 
affect all income groups, but hit low-income earners hardest, 
although compensation could reduce most of the impact. Raising 
the pension and superannuation age would affect all income 
groups. Including the primary residence in the Age Pension asset 
test would primarily affect middle-income earners – people doing 
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well enough to own their own house, but not so well that they do 
not qualify for the Age Pension.157 Limiting superannuation tax 
concessions would mainly affect high-income earners, who reap 
most of the benefits of tax concessions for contributing more than 
$10,000 a year to superannuation. 
The package would probably slightly reduce inequality overall, 
which is consistent with some – but by no means all – efforts to 
improve budget balances around the world.158 
The major sensitivity with the package is that all the reforms 
appear to affect older Australians more. This may be more 
perception than reality, but it would need to be addressed.  
Increasing the pension and superannuation preservation age 
mainly affects those aged about 50 to 55 in the short term. 
Assuming that the eligibility ages are lifted gradually, those 
already retired would be unaffected. All Australians who are under 
50 today will share the burden in the future as they age. Many 
under the age of 45 may believe that increase is inevitable – and 
in any case the effect is at least 20 years away.  
Including owner-occupied dwellings in the assets test primarily 
affects those over 65 – although these rules will of course apply to 
everyone when they are older. Limiting superannuation 
contribution tax concessions would affect high wage earners in all 
age groups, but particularly those over the age of 60. This group 
                                            
157 People in this cohort are likely to be middle-income earners over their 
lifetimes, and although their income in retirement is likely to be less than when 
working, their disposable incomes can often be relatively high: see Phillips and 
Nepal (2012) 
158 Rawdanowicz, et al. (2013), p. 27-28 
currently pays much lower rates of income tax than do younger 
people on similar incomes. Those who are younger will also miss 
out on current, generous arrangements as they age. 
Broadening the GST affects the spending of all Australians. Older 
Australians who are not working are likely to prefer other tax 
changes such as income tax increases that inherently affect them 
less. 
The skew of Australia’s  current  tax  and  welfare  systems  explains  
why the proposed package would have a greater impact on older 
Australians in the short term. Our tax and welfare system is 
generally tightly targeted to those most in need. The biggest 
exception is pension and superannuation systems, which are 
substantially  ‘age-based’  rather  than  ‘needs  based’.  Reforming 
these arrangements is a high priority that would substantially 
improve budget balances with relatively limited side effects. 
Other packages might be designed around a different combination 
of proposals. The key task is to group together major reforms in 
ways that demonstrate that everyone in the community is sharing 
the burden of budget repair.  
Further detail of potential reforms is provided in Balancing 
Budgets.159 Other proposals for budget reform were made by the 
National Commission of Audit in May 2014.160 Further analysis is 
required to understand both the costs and benefits of these 
proposals.161 
                                            
159 Daley, et al. (2013a) 
160 National Commission of Audit (2014) 
161 McGannon and Daley (2014) 
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9 A bluffer’s guide to budgets 
9.1 General economic and financial terms 
Gross domestic product or GDP is a measure of the size of a 
country’s  economy. In 2012-13,  Australia’s  GDP  is  forecast  to  be  
approximately $1,564 billion or $1.6 trillion.162 
Inflation measures how much prices have increased over time. It 
is often measured by the change in the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) which tracks the prices of what a typical household buys.  
As a result of inflation, a loaf of bread costs more today than 
several years ago. Consequently, $1 today buys less than $1 
bought in 2000. Nominal prices are the prices you see in the 
shop at the time. Real prices remove the effects of inflation so 
that a dollar has a constant value – it buys the same number of 
loaves of bread in any year. Real prices provide more meaningful 
comparisons of spending in different years. Real prices are often 
expressed in dollar values for a particular year, e.g. 2013 dollars. 
In the context of budgets, nominal spending is the amount listed 
in the budget papers each year. Real spending removes the 
effect of inflation so we can compare how spending has actually 
changed. For example, if government purchases medicines that 
increase in price by 3 per cent each year, and government 
spending increases at 3 per cent per year, government buys the 
same amount of medicine every year. While its nominal spending 
grows at 3 per cent each year, its real spending is constant.  
                                            
162 Commonwealth of Australia (2013); ABS (2014b) Table 30. 
A price deflator converts nominal values into real values, and is 
based on a measure of inflation. The nominal price divided by the 
price deflator is the real price. 
Production is how much is produced in an economy. Economic 
growth measures the increase in production from time to time. 
Productivity measures how much is produced by a given input. 
Labour productivity, for example, measures how much is 
produced per hour worked. Capital productivity measures how 
much is produced for every dollar invested. Productivity growth 
measures how much more is produced with the same inputs. 
The labour force participation rate is the proportion of working-
age adults (16 years and older) who are either working or looking 
for work. The labour force includes the unemployed, but not 
people who are retired, institutionalised, or at home caring for 
children. 
Australia, like most developed countries, has an ageing 
population. People are living longer on average, so a greater 
proportion of the population is older. This demographic change 
is likely to have big effects on society over time, affecting 
participation rates, tax collection, and government spending, 
particularly health and aged pensions 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) is a Paris-based think-tank whose 
members and funders are rich countries. It includes most 
developed countries.  
Budget pressures on Australian governments: 2014 edition 
Grattan Institute 2013 70 
9.2 Macroeconomics 
Many measures of economic activity – such as GDP, 
unemployment and interest rates – move in cycles. During a 
boom, economic output increases, unemployment drops, and 
interest rates typically rise. Conversely, during busts, 
unemployment increases, interest rates fall, and GDP growth 
slows (or becomes negative). This is known as the economic 
cycle. 
The terms of trade is the ratio of export prices to import prices for 
a country. Crudely, it measures the tonnes of coal Australia must 
export in order to import a plasma-screen TV. When terms of 
trade rise, Australia earns more plasma screen TVs per tonne of 
coal. If terms of trade fall, Australia would need to export more 
tonnes of coal to buy the same number of televisions. 
From the mid-2000s, increased international demand for 
Australian minerals raised their price relative to other goods. 
Mining became very profitable. More mines were dug, increasing 
employment in the mining sector, as well as related industries 
(such as construction). Increasing demand for Australian minerals 
contributed to the rise in the value of the Australian dollar. These 
effects together are known as the mining boom.  
The global financial crisis (GFC) is a common term for the 
financial crisis of 2007-08, which led to the 2008-12 global 
recession. Australia fared considerably better than most of the 
developed world during and after the crisis, but even so, 
economic growth slowed and government budgets were placed 
under greater pressure than in earlier years. 
9.3 Budgets 
9.3.1 Revenue 
Revenue is all money the government collects. It is made up of: 
x Taxes, including: 
- Income taxes – taxes paid by individuals on their earnings 
- Company tax – taxes paid by companies on their profits. 
When firms purchase new equipment, they are not generally 
allowed to deduct the entire cost from their revenues all at 
once. Instead, they allocate a portion of the investment to 
each year of its useful life. For some types of asset, 
Australian tax rules allow accelerated depreciation: firms 
can claim a greater share of the initial investment cost each 
year than the usual portion. This means that firms claim the 
cost  of  the  capital  more  quickly,  and  so  the  firm’s  cost  of  
investing decreases. Because firms pay less tax while they 
are claiming this greater portion of costs, accelerated 
depreciation reduces government revenues in the short 
term. 
- Sales taxes – such as the Goods and Services Tax 
- Excises – sales taxes levied on a particular product, such 
as fuel, cigarettes, or alcohol.  
- Customs duties - taxes on imported items, including 
clothing and cars 
- Other taxes, including resource rent taxes (‘mining  taxes’)  
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and carbon pricing. 
x Sale of goods and services 
x Income received from investments, such as dividends from 
government-owned companies, and interest. 
x Royalties – In Australia, states own resources and mining 
companies purchase them. Royalty revenues are the sales of 
these minerals to mining companies. Royalties are generally 
levied either as a fixed rate per tonne, or as a percentage of 
the total value. 
x Grants from other levels of government 
9.3.2 Tax expenditures 
x When governments exempt certain types of transactions or 
taxpayers from an otherwise general tax, the foregone 
revenue is known as a tax expenditure. Tax expenditures are 
usually justified on the basis that they serve a particular policy 
objective better than does direct spending. Although tax 
expenditures are often less discussed than revenue or 
expenditure, they are a significant component of government 
budgets. 
9.3.3 Expenditure 
Expenditure is all money the government spends. It includes: 
x Payments to individuals, such as the Age Pension and 
unemployment benefits.163  
x Transfers to other levels of government 
x Purchases of goods and services. This includes purchase of 
physical goods as needed, as well as the purchase of services 
from many different entities. For example, a government might 
purchase job retraining services from a private company or 
not-for-profit organisation rather than employ staff directly to 
deliver the training. 
x Salaries and other expenses for employees, including front-
line staff such as teachers and nurses as well as 
administrative staff. 
9.3.4 Capital expenditure 
Capital expenditure is money spent on building infrastructure, 
which can also be referred to as fixed or non-financial assets. 
General government capital expenditure is money spent on 
government infrastructure that is used to deliver services for the 
community. Examples include hospitals, schools, rail 
infrastructure and roads.  
Government-owned corporations, or public non-financial 
corporations, also spend capital funding on infrastructure. 
Examples include water boards, railway corporations and 
electricity generators and distributors where state owned. 
                                            
163 These  payments  are  sometimes  called  ‘transfers’  or  ‘welfare  transfers’.  This  
report  uses  ‘transfers’  to  refer  to  payments  by  the  Commonwealth  to  the  states;;  
welfare  transfers  are  called  ‘payments’  or  ‘benefits’  to  avoid  confusion.
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However these corporations deliver services typically on a user 
pay basis. In some instances, these corporations deliver 
infrastructure and services on behalf of the general government. 
However, accounting methods for recording this varies between 
states. 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) – a private financing 
mechanism for public infrastructure such as hospitals, schools 
and transport infrastructure such as rail and roads. Private 
providers are contracted to finance, design, build and operate 
infrastructure that is leased back to the state. 
Capital expenditure costs include: 
x Net acquisition of non-financial assets – the total change in 
the value of infrastructure over a year. It includes the purchase 
of, or expenditure on capital assets, less the sales of any 
capital assets, depreciation and any other changes such as 
the revaluation of assets. 
x Depreciation – the annualised cost of consuming a fixed 
asset or infrastructure over the number of years the asset is 
expected to last. 
x Interest expenses – interest paid on debt used to finance 
capital expenditure. 
When governments finance capital expenditure through 
borrowing, it is recorded as a component of net debt. This is the 
total debt owed which includes borrowings, deposits and 
advances received by government, less any cash and 
investments held by government and loans made to other parties. 
9.4 Terms used in the budget papers 
Commonwealth and State governments in Australia each publish 
a collection of documents every year in May or June that set out 
the  government’s  economic  and  fiscal  plans  for  the  next  year.  
These are generically called the budget papers. 
Since economic conditions change through the year, governments 
also update their estimates of revenue and expenses late in the 
year. The Commonwealth update is called the Mid-Year 
Economic and Fiscal Outlook (MYEFO). They also publish an 
updated set of figures before each election in the Pre-election 
Fiscal Outlook (PEFO). State governments publish equivalent 
documents under different names. 
Budget papers generally contain figures for revenue and 
expenditure for the previous financial year, the current financial 
year (sometimes called the budget year), and the next three 
financial years. This three-year period is called the forward years 
and the figures are known as the forward estimates.  
Figures for the previous, current and next financial year are 
generally presented as estimates. Sometimes figures for the past 
year are presented as actual figures and the current year as 
budgeted figures. The figures for the final two years of the 
forward estimates are generally presented as projections. 
Government expenses and revenues vary with the economic 
cycle. During a boom, profits and incomes increase, resulting in 
more taxes being paid; unemployment also falls, reducing 
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expenses. During a bust, the opposite happens. The cyclical 
balance component of the budget is the proportion of revenues 
and expenses that occur due to the economic cycle. Once we 
subtract this from the cash balance, we arrive at the structural 
balance. Determining the cyclical balance depends on modelling 
assumptions about the relationship between the economic cycle, 
expenses, and revenues. 
9.5 Surplus, deficits and debt 
A budget deficit occurs when a government collects less in 
revenues than it spends in any given year. A budget surplus 
occurs when revenues are greater than expenditures in a year. 
Government debt is the total debt that a government owes, and 
may come from governments running deficits several years in a 
row. Gross debt is the total amount of debt the government has. 
Net debt is the gross debt minus the value of assets the 
government owns (such as the Future Fund). 
9.6 Federal financial relations 
In Australia, the Commonwealth government collects most of the 
taxes, while State governments deliver most of the services. To 
correct this imbalance, the Commonwealth transfers money to the 
States in several ways: 
x Some funding, such as the money collected via the GST, is 
given to States as untied funding. It can be spent however 
the State chooses. 
x Most of the rest of the funding is given to the States as tied 
funding. This funding is given to the States on the condition 
that they use if for a particular purpose. There are two types of 
tied funding: Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) are 
relatively large amounts of money to be spent in general 
areas, such as schools or housing. National Partnership 
Payments (NPPs) are smaller amounts of money more 
closely tied to a particular policy goal, such as improving 
literacy and numeracy, or mental health reform. 
x A  small  amount  is  paid  by  the  Commonwealth  ‘through’  the  
states to other bodies, mostly non-government schools and 
local governments. States do not control how this money is 
spent; they just pass it on to the Commonwealth-identified 
recipient. These payments are sometimes known as on-
passings. 
In this report, we use the term ‘transfers’ to refer to untied and 
tied funding from the Commonwealth to the States. Where we 
present combined Commonwealth and state expenditures, these 
transfers are treated as state expenditure unless otherwise 
specified. On-passings are always treated as Commonwealth 
expenditure. 
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